

IMĀM RĀZĪ'S 'ILM AL-AKHLĀQ

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

of his

KITĀB AL-NAFS WA'L-RUH
WA SHARH QUWĀHUMĀ

with

INTRODUCTION AND COMMENTARY

by

M. ŞAGHĪR ḤASAN MA'ŞŪMĪ
Professor-in-Charge

KITAB BHAVAN
New Delhi-110002

VISIT...

LANZAROTE
Caliente.COM

KITAB BHAVAN
Exporters & Importers
1784, Kalan Mahal, Daryaganj
New Delhi-110002 [India]

Phone : 3274686, 3263383
Telex : 31-63106 ALI IN
Fax : 91-11-326 3383

ISBN 81-7151-098-1

First published in India 1978
2nd Reprinted 1981
3rd Reprinted 1992

published by:
Nusrat Ali Nasri for Kitab Bhavan
1784, Kalan Mahal, Daryaganj
New Delhi-110002 [India]

Printed in India at:
Chaudhry Printers
Rodgran, Lal Kuan
Delhi-110006

To
My Parents

CONTENTS

	Page
INTRODUCTION	I

PART ONE

UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS

Chapters

I. On the Position of Man <i>vis-a-vis</i> other Beings ..	43
The First Division	43
On Explaining Wisdom in Creating the	
Fourth Kind, the Man	50
The Second Division	51
The Third Division	51
II. On the Four Kinds of Existents	63
III. On Explaining the Ranks of Human Spirits ..	75
IV. On the Discussion of the Quiddity of the Soul ..	87
The First Proof	87
The Second Proof	88
The Third Proof	89
The Fourth Proof	89
V. On the Proofs derived from the Divine Book ..	107
The First Argument	107
The Second Argument	108
The Third Argument	109
The Fourth Argument	110
The Fifth Argument	110
The Sixth Argument	110
The Seventh Argument	112
The Eighth Argument	112
The Ninth Argument	113
The Tenth Argument	113

	Page
VI. On the Discourse that what is related to the Substance of the Soul is the Heart ..	119
VII. On Explaining the Faculties of the Soul ..	147
VIII. On the Investigation Relating to Words and Expressions ..	152
IX. On the Relation of the Faculties to the Substance Soul ..	154
X. On the Question Whether the Rational Soul is Univocal or Equivocal in Species ..	164
XI. On the Explanation that the Mental Pleasures are Nobler and more Perfect than the Sexual Pleasures ..	169
XII. On the Explanation of the Causes of Blame and Defect that lie in Sensuous Pleasures ..	178

PART TWO

ON THE TREATMENT OF WHAT CONCERNS APPETITION

Chapters

I. On the Love of Wealth ..	195
II. On the Method of Using Wealth for Attaining Spiritual Bliss ..	198
III. On Greed and Miserliness ..	202
IV. On the Treatment of Greed and Niggardliness ..	213
V. On the Nature of Miserliness and Generosity ..	217
VI. On the Generous and the Benevolent ..	219
VII. Discourse on Worldly Position ..	220
The Cause that Necessitates the Love of Worldly Position ..	220
The Cause that Necessitates the Love for Wealth and Position, and it has two positions ..	222

	Page
VIII. On the Explanation of Real Whimsical Perfections ..	226
IX. On the Explanation that sometimes Search for Position is Necessary, sometimes Commendable and Permissible, and sometimes Undesirable and Forbidden ..	233
X. Explanation of the Reason for Loving Praise and Panegyric and Abhorring Satire and Blame ..	237
XI. On the Treatment of the Love for Worldly Position ..	242
XII. Practical Treatments are of Several Kinds ..	248
XIII. Explanation of the Cure of Disliking Satire The Treatment of Disliking Satire ..	252
XIV. On the Explanation that People Differ in Behaving with Respect to Praise and Condemnation Explanation of Impressions of Praise ..	261
XV. Discourse on Hypocrisy and its Laws Explanation of the Ranks of Hypocrites in Hypocrisy ..	267
XVI. The Explanation of Concealed Hypocrisy ..	271
XVII. On the Explanation of the Concealed and Manifest Hypocrisy, which Nullifies the Deed and which does not ..	279
XVIII. Explanation of Permission to Intend to Manifest Obedience ..	284
The Sign of Distinction ..	303
XIX. Explanation of Permission to Conceal Sins ..	305
XX. The Explanation of Giving up Actions of Obedience in order to avoid Hypocrisy ..	309
Bibliography ..	313
Index ..	325
	330

INTRODUCTION

I

IMĀM FAKHR AL-DĪN AL-RĀZĪ

Abū 'Abd Allah, Abū al-Faḍl¹, Muḥammad ibn 'Umar al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209), well-known as Imām Rāzī and Fakhr Rāzī², is one of the greatest exponents of Islam of all ages and is rightly regarded as the Ḥujjat al-Islām, the proof of Islam, after Imām Ghazzālī. This great encyclopaedist excelled his contemporary scholars as a philosopher, historian, mathematician, astronomer, physician, theologian and exegetist. He has so far not received due attention from the orientalist, not even from the Muslim scholars. His *magnum opus*, known as *al-Taḥṣīr al-Kabīr*, and other valuable works like *K. al-Muḥaṣṣal*, and *Lubāb al-Ishārāt* have been popular among the students of Islamic sciences.

For his erudition and scholarship he was favoured with the title of *Shaykh* al-Islām, and there gathered around him a large number of disciples and admirers including kings, rulers and learned judges and ṣūfis.

His Life

Born at Rayy-Jibāl in a Shāfi'ite and Ash'arite family on the 25th Ramaḍān 543 or 544/1149-50, Imām Rāzī was educated by his father, Ḍiyā' al-Dīn 'Umar³, celebrated as Khaṭīb al-Rayy and hence his title "Ibn Khaṭīb al-Rayy." Imām Rāzī studied Islamic Sciences with his

father till the latter died⁴. He studied with al-Kamāl al-Simnānī⁵ for a period, returned to Rayy to study with al-Majd al-Jīlī whom he accompanied to Marāghah reading for a long time Philosophy and 'Ilm al-Kalām. It is said that the Imām could read the theological treatise *al-Shāmil fī 'Uṣūl al-Dīn* of Imām al-Haramain from his memory. The chain of his teachers in Fiqh and 'Uṣūl goes back to Imām Shāfi'ī and that of his teachers in theology to Imām Abu'l-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī⁶.

Having mastered philosophy, Kalām and other Islamic sciences, Imām Rāzī travelled to Bukhāra, Khwārazm and Māwarā' al-Nahr (Transoxiana) and held discussions with the local savants who were impressed by his memory, forceful speech and irrefutable arguments, but compelled him to leave their cities.

Imām Rāzī undoubtedly passed his early days in troubles and turmoils and, as Ibn al-Qiṣṭī has it⁷, he fell ill and remained in a sad plight in some unknown madrasah at Bukhāra. He was, however, helped by some of his friends who collected some amount of Zakāt from their fellow traders for him.

According to Ibn Khallikān⁸, Imām Rāzī returned from Khwārazm to Rayy and stayed with a wealthy, experienced physician who had two daughters. The physician married his daughters to two sons of Imām Rāzī, and on his death, left the whole property to the sons of the Imām who thus became very rich, a statement which is incredible. Al-Qiṣṭī's statement seems more convincing when he says that from Bukhāra Imām Rāzī travelled to Khurāsān where he had the chance of meeting the famous Khwārazm Shāh Muḥammad ibn Takush who made him his associate and favoured him with power and position. Imām Rāzī, thus, settled at Herāt, possessed property and begot children. Biographers agree on the point that Imām Rāzī's sons were still receiving

education when he died — a fact that supports the doubt concerning the marriage of the sons of Imām Rāzī with the daughters of the rich physician of Rayy. Had he grown-up sons at Rayy before he settled at Herāt, these sons would have surely been considerably aged and required money for their own families. Moreover, the inherited wealth could not be so enormous as to enrich three persons, rather three families. It is also incredible that the sons of the Imām would allow their father to lend money to such a notable ruler of a great kingdom as Shihāb al-Dīn Ghori⁹, an incident to which we shall refer again in the following pages.

Imām Rāzī attained great name and fame for his scholarship and oratory both in Arabic and Persian. Even the learned scholars visited him and attended his discourses from far and wide.

Ibn Khallikān¹⁰ relates that once when he was lecturing in his famous Madrasah at Khwārazm, on a frosty and extremely cold day, a dove running away from a bird of prey fell near him. The Imām took pity and gently caught hold of the bird and his student Sharaf al-Dīn ibn 'Unain composed the following lines extempore :

جاءت سليمان الزمان بشجوها
والموت يلمع من جناحي خاف
من نبي الورقاء : ان ملككم
حرم وانك ملجأ للخائف

"The dove came to the Solomon of the age with her complaint while death had brightened up through the wings of a skipping (bird). Who did inform the bird that your place was sacred (*i.e.*, protected) and a safe refuge for the dreaded?"

These lines were enlarged into a poem later on¹¹. It appears from the *Ṭabaqāt* of Ibn al-Subkī that the

incident took place at Herāt¹². Ibn 'Unain composed, among others, a panegyric, well-known among the 'ulamā' which ends with the following verse and which he sent to the Imām from Nishapur:¹³

ولو انهم جمعوا لديه تيقنوا أن الفضيلة لم تكن للاول

"If they had gathered around him they would have surely declared, 'Excellence does not go to the first (the preceding one)'!"

His Scholarship

Imām Rāzī excelled his contemporary scholars in both religious and worldly sciences. In philosophy he was greatly influenced by the works of Muḥammad ibn Zakariyyā al-Rāzī, al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, and Imām Ghazzālī. Though he admired Ibn Sīnā, as his commentaries on the works of Ibn Sīnā indicate, he differed from the Shaykh al-Ra'is in many points. His criticism of the Shaykh al-Ra'is led Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and Mullā Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī to refute the charges levelled by him¹⁴.

As a devout Shāfi'ite scholar, Imām Rāzī never spares his predecessors if their remarks or opinions go against Islam in any manner. Polemist as he is, he very often wins the argument mostly by his eloquence and command of language. His opponents are not less vulnerable on this score. Mullā Ṣadrā, for example, in his devotion to Aristotle, forgets the fact that the *Theology* of Aristotle is an apocryphal work, and is wrongly ascribed to Aristotle. The piety, the ascetic tendency and the mystic exercises attributed to Aristotle in the admiring phrases of Mullā Ṣadrā only surprise the readers inasmuch as he does not, in his strong belief and blind imitation, pay any heed even to the doubt expressed by Ibn Sīnā¹⁵ himself concerning the *Theology* of Aristotle.

Had he kept Ibn Sīnā's criticism in mind, he would have escaped the gross error he unwarily made.

Imām Rāzī has rendered a great service to the Ummah by his precise and clearly written books on various sciences. He popularised philosophy, Kalām, Maṭīq, Fiqh, 'Uṣūl Fiqh by his rational and easy expositions both in Arabic and Persian. His Tafsīr, though criticised as "having everything in it except tafsīr" enabled the people to appreciate many views of the Mu'tazilites, philosophers and other Muslim sects which, in fact, were not out of harmony with our Faith¹⁶.

It is for this reason that on hearing the criticism of Shaykh Taqī al-Dīn ibn Taimīyah, *فيه كل شيء إلا التفسير*, Qāḍī al-Quḍāt Abū al-Ḥasan 'Alī al-Subkī said: *وبما الامر كذا، إنما فيه مع التفسير كل شيء*. "The matter is not like this, in fact, his work contains everything together with Tafsīr" (exegesis)¹⁷.

His ever-increasing fame and popularity brought him the envy of the Bāṭinites and the Karrāmītes. The latter even alleged that he was involved in the assassination of Sultān Shihāb al-Dīn Ghori, his great benefactor.¹⁸ The Sultān had built a Madrasah at Herāt for the Imām who was in the habit of giving sermons and wa'z to the Sultān and also his army. Once when he was in the course of his wa'z, the Sultān arrived and took his seat near by the Imām who continued his wa'z till he uttered: *يا سلطان! سلطانك لا يبقى ولا تلبس الرازي، وان مردنا الى الله*. "O king! Your authority shall not remain, nor shall remain the conceit of Rāzī. Surely we are to return to Allah." This affected the king who wept bitterly and moved the audience to sob and weep profusely.

In the whole history of Islam no other learned scholar appears to have ever helped a king financially as he helped Shihāb al-Dīn Ghori. A number of madrasahs

were established by the admiring kings for him and his lectures were attended by a large number of savants and scholars. Due to his sure and convincing arguments a good number of the followers of other sects gave up their early beliefs and accepted the doctrines of the Ahl al-Sunnah. He is, therefore, rightly designated as Shaykh al-Islām and the *Mujaddid*, reformer, of the sixth century of the Hijrah¹⁹.

Some Baseless Allegations

It is not at all surprising that al-Dhahabī and Abū Shāma have recorded some blasphemous expressions alleged to have been uttered by Imām Rāzī. He was, for example, charged of comparing his authority with that of the Holy Prophet by saying: قال محمد التازي، وقال محمد الرازي، "Said Muḥammad of Arabia, and said Muḥammad of Rayy"²⁰. This is a false charge propagated by his enemies who also accused him of treason to true Islam by favouring Aristotle and other philosophers.

In the present treatise entitled *K. al-Nafs wa al-Rūḥ* we find that Imām Rāzī refers to the Holy Prophet by his honorific expressions, صاحب الشرع and صاحب الشريعة, the Chief of the Faith.²¹

Again, it is a fact that in spite of his rational attitude and deep reasoning he used to say, من التزم بمذهب المعجائز، كان هو الفائز، "successful is he alone who sticks to the religion of the old people"²². His Wasīyyat (Legacy) which he dictated just before his death indicates that he was above all such accusations, and even if they are taken for granted, his last words belie all these allegations and declare his sincere belief in Islam and the Holy Prophet: وإن ديني الإسلام ومتابعة محمد وصحبه وآله عليه وعليهم السلام، وإن دأبي هو القرآن العظيم، إمامي السنة، وعليهما القول،

"Verily, my faith is Islam and adherence to Muḥammad, his companions and his family. May peace be upon him and upon them. Surely, my motto is the Sublime Qur'ān, and the Sunnah (way) of the Prophet is my Highway, and upon these two I depend and rely"²³.

Sultān Shihāb al-Dīn Ghorī was assassinated by Gakkhar, on his way from Lahore to Ghazna near modern Rawalpindi. The Qarmatians who hated Imām Rāzī for criticising their doctrines accused him of having been involved in an intrigue which resulted in the king being put to death. The slaves who loved their deceased master got furious and wanted to attack him. Imām Rāzī, however, got the information and slipped away to the vazier Mu'ayyid al-Mulk who arranged to escort him to a place of safety²⁴.

His own elder brother, Rukn al-Dīn, did everything in his power to rouse the fury of the populace against him²⁵.

His vast knowledge, eloquence and erudition and, above all, his pomp, power and wealth caused his opponents who had been worsted in his verbal duels, to envy his position and power. "We are told that he never moved about at this period (at Herāt), without a following of 300 disciples. His attendance included fifty armed well-dressed slaves who stood by his side. But in spite of this his life was made difficult by the intrigues and hostilities of his opponents"²⁶.

In his *Tadhkirah al-Kindiyyah*, 'Alā' al-Dīn 'Alī b. al-Muẓaffar al-Kindī al-Widā'ī states²⁷ that Imām Fakhr Rāzī, as is usual with the learned of Irān and according to his own habit, was delivering his sermons when by chance the Ḥanbalites who used to write stories containing abuses, curses and all sorts of vicious things, drew his attention to a piece of paper containing a story which

related that his son committed fornication and perpetrated evil deeds and that his wife was also like his son. When the Imām read the story he said, "This story relates that my son committed fornication and evil deeds which are the indications of youth, a kind of madness. We pray to, and expect from Allah, the Exalted, that He would guide him aright and accept His repentance. As for my wife, this is the affair of women except those whom Allah protect. I am old and women have no interest in me. All this can possibly occur. By Allah ! I never said that Allah, the Exalted and the Glorious Creator and Nourisher, is a body, nor did I compare Him with any creature, nor did I assign any shape or place to Him".

The worst allegation brought forward by his opponents is that Imām Fakhr Rāzī creates doubts and advances the arguments of his enemies but falls short in giving them a reply. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn relates that some of his contemporary thinkers have admitted that though he mentions the doubts of philosophers forcefully, and often refers to them in his books, he, nevertheless, weakened the principles of their doctrines by his counter arguments. For example, he refers to the sceptic view of the philosophers about the existence of Allah, the Exalted, enumerates their strong proofs based on their principles, and then adds by saying, "All this we know. But we know surely that Allah Exists and we doubt in His Essence as to what it is. If His Existence were identical with His Essence we would have known His Existence in a way and not known it in another way, for nothing in itself is known as well as not known. This is something sure and certain." So, look at this proof. How strong and how precise and clear it is, and how cleverly his arguments demolished what they had built²⁸ !

His Travels

As indicated by his *Risālah Munāẓarāt*, Imām Rāzī's sojourn in Bukhāra seems to have occurred twice. The first time when he visited this part he was a student and moved from madrasah to madrasah in search of knowledge but this visit was forgotten and was not at all mentioned. The second time, when he was going to Transoxiana he first visited Bukhāra and held discussions with Nūr al-Dīn al-Ṣābūnī and Sharaf al-Dīn Mas'ūdī whom he held spell-bound by his convincing arguments and forceful speech. As he himself states, this happened in the year 582/1186 when the astronomers had forecast a devastating gale and people were panic-stricken. Imām Rāzī spoke eloquently against the forecast and allayed the fears of the people a great deal. According to Rāzī himself, his second trip occurred when he returned from Samarqand and held discussions anew with Raḍī al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, whom he described as weak in understanding deep ideas and thoughts, but not stubborn and arrogant²⁹.

Imām Rāzī was outspoken and brave in his speech. On reaching Ghaznī he, first of all, wanted to see a learned man whose knowledge and manners were admired by the local people. They also related to him that the learned man also taught his (Rāzī's) books. Imām Rāzī grew all the more interested in seeing him and called on him. But the man kept Imām Rāzī waiting for an unusually long time, and showed no respect when he met him. The Imām thereupon resolved to teach him a lesson, and dragged him into some philosophical discourse which left the man bewildered and nonplussed.³⁰

Imām Rāzī showed great respect for knowledge and learning so much so that when he got a copy of Shaikh al-Ishrāq's *Talwīḥāt* he kissed it and placed it on his eyes.

'Izz al-Dīn Ismā'il b. Ḥusain Marwazī, a well-known genealogist and litterateur, relates that when Fakhr Rāzī visited Marw he had already earned a great name and fame; and nobody could talk to him without an appointment. I called on him and sat in his assembly. One day he asked me to write a book on the genealogy of the Ṭālibiyyīn and desired me to make it simple to read and remember so that he might keep abreast of this science as well. When I wanted to deliver the book to him, he forcibly made me sit in his own place which I reluctantly yielded to. He took the book and started reading it from the beginning till he finished it and was satisfied in understanding its difficult portions. He also said, "You are my teacher in this branch of study and I am your student. This is the manner of imparting knowledge, that a disciple should lay his knees before his teacher. Now, you may take your seat wherever you like". After this, I attended his class as usual and he taught us from his seat as usual¹.

His Munāẓarah with the Karrāmites

The Karrāmites could not stand the honour and respect Sulṭān Ghiyāth al-Dīn had shown to Imām Rāzī by building a madrasah near the Jāmi' of Herāt. Seeing no other way, they arranged a verbal duel with Imām Rāzī in the presence of the King. It is said that 'Abd al-Majīd b. Qudwah, the head of the Karrāmites, was, in the course of the discourse, virulently criticised for his ill-expressed doctrines by the Imām. It is, however, strange and incredible that the historians have recorded that the Imām hurled abuses on his opponent. In the same breath they also speak of his (Rāzī's) influencing young members of the opposed group by his logical conversation, erudition, and also mention that though Ḍiyā' al-Dīn, a cousin of the Sulṭān, patronised the

Karrāmites, complained of the harsh words used by the Imām for the head of the Karrāmites, and accused him of heresy, the Sulṭān did not pay any heed to the complaint of his cousin. The matter did not end here. On the following day, Ḍiyā' al-Dīn convened a meeting in the Jāmi' and addressed from the pulpit with the recitation of the verse:—

ربنا انما بما انزلت واتبعنا الرسول فاكتبنا مع الشاهدين

"O our Lord! we believe in what Thou hast revealed and we follow the Messenger, so record ourselves down together with those who bear witness." He started his speech by saying, "We the followers of the Qur'ān and Allah's Book follow and obey the Sunnah and the commandments of the Prophet. We declare all that is not the saying of the Prophet as absurd and wrong. Unaware of God, a group of the people read the philosophy of Aristotle and the heretical doctrines of al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, and dishonour and disrespect the religious savants." "Yesterday," he continued, "you saw how this man called Rāzī, a seeker of power and position, abused a Godly religious old man with an enlightened heart. He was molested and jeered at just because he defended the Faith and took care to popularize the tradition and the Sunnah of the holy Prophet". He then bitterly wept and roused the feelings of the audience just to induce them to rise against the Imām. Seeing the emotion and feelings of the people, the Sulṭān had to suppress the trouble by calling in the army and promising to the ringleaders to take the Imām to task and suppress his doctrine. It is said that this happened in 595/1198.

The victory of Imām Rāzī in the verbal discussion so much irritated the opponents that they intended to kill him, and anonymous letters were written to him threatening his life. The Imām therefore left Herāt and went to his native town of Rayy. Formerly, he was called "Ibn

al-Khaṭīb", but now that he delivered his sermons, and taught at Rayy, he was given the title of "Khaṭīb al-Rayy"²².

Ibn Taimiyyah's Charges

Ibn Taimiyyah has charged Imām Rāzī with the innovation of apparently preaching idol and star-worship, as the latter had written a book under the title *Al-Sirr al-Maktūm fī al-Siḥr wa Mukhāṭabat al-Nujūm*.²³ He further says that Imām Rāzī wrote this book for the mother of Sulṭān Muḥammad ibn Takush Khwārazmshāh, the great ruler of the time. The book *Al-Sirr al-Maktūm fī Asrār al-Nujūm*, is in our hands. It has surely nothing to do with any blasphemous expression or deed. It is strange that without looking into the book itself, savants like Ibn Taimiyyah have sometimes expressed their views about it. Some have, moreover, denied totally that the book was ever written by Rāzī, and some have argued that the book does not deal with prohibited sorcery. Ibn Ḥajar holds²⁴, وله كتاب السر المكتوم في مخاطبة النجوم, "His book السر المكتوم is a clear sorcery. It is expected, Allah willing, that he expressed his *Tawbah* (repentance) after writing it." In fact, the book is entitled السر المكتوم in the hidden secret on the mysteries of stars, but it avoids all those points which are condemned by the Sharī'a. The author himself declared by saying²⁵:—
اما بعد فهذا كتاب يجمع فيه ما وصل الينا من علم الطلسمات و السحريات والعزائم ودعوة الكواكب مع التبري عن كل ما يخالف الدين وسلم اليقين، والتكلان على احسان الرحمان،

Ibn Taimiyyah has also accused Imām Rāzī of recommending wine (khamr) to Khwārazmshāh Sulṭān 'Alā' al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Takush. He further says that Imām Rāzī permitted the King to worship stars and

drink wine, which are, by common consent, unlawful in Islam. One, however, fails to understand how Imām Rāzī, a pious Muslim as he was, could declare unlawful things lawful. Al-Subkī denies this in his *Ṭabaqāt* and says that Imām Rāzī cannot write a book like كتاب السر المكتوم في مخاطبة الشمس والنجوم. The truth concerning the book has already been stated. Unfortunately, *al-Ikhtibārāt al-'Alā'iyyah* has not reached us²⁶, which would have finally explained the story of his recommending wine.

His Relation with the Ismā'ilites

It was at Rayy that he fearlessly refuted the heretical doctrines of deviating sects and often refuted the views of his opponents in the course of his teachings saying, for example, خلافا للاسماعيلية لعنهم الله و خذلهم "This is against the Ismā'ilites. Allah may curse and disgrace them"!

Muḥammad b. Ḥasan, the then leader of the Ismā'ilites at Almūt, thereupon sent an emissary to threaten the Imām and give him a warning. This emissary kept the company of the Imām as a devoted disciple for a few months and, then, one day finding an opportunity, jumped over the teacher with his dagger and left him only on the promise that he would not openly criticise the Ismā'ilite doctrines, and he would receive a handsome annual amount as emolument, or else he would receive a dagger-wound which would bring about his death. The Imām agreed reluctantly to the offer just to escape death and after this never criticised the Ismā'ilite doctrines and views openly²⁷.

Though the Ismā'ilite chief, Abū al-Faḍl paid him the annual amount on behalf of the Ismā'ilites, Imām Rāzī felt very much miserable and helpless every time this unwelcome amount reached him, and he simply shud-

dered at the recall of the incident. Perhaps, this emolument was thrust on him just to refresh the memory of this warning. In utter disgust, the Imām left Rayy and set out for Khurāsān.

His Relations with Shihāb al-Dīn Ghori

Shihāb al-Dīn Ghori, as mentioned earlier, expressed to his sincere friend, the Imām, his need for money and the Imām laid before him all the wealth he then possessed. After some time, on the desire of the Sultān the Imām visited him at Ghaznīn and was favoured with a much greater amount than what was borrowed from him. Moreover, the Karrāmites were banished from Herāt and the Imām was requested to grace the city once more by his presence. The Imām was now called Shaykh al-Islām and settled at Herāt with all pomp, power and grace, the like of which was never enjoyed by any Shaykh al-Islām before or after him. On the day of his arrival at Herāt the whole town celebrated a holiday, the Chief of the city, Husain Kharmīl^{37a}, with the dignitaries of the town received him and took him in procession to his own palatial residence known as Aiwān Shāhī which was presented to him by his disciple, Khwārazmshāh³⁸. On the same day he gave his first lecture in the Jāmi', a special pulpit was placed for him and the class appeared like a magnanimous court before which a huge gathering had assembled. His Turkish slaves stood in two rows with their scabbards around their waists, the Chief and the elite took their seats on his right and left, Sultān Maḥmūd, cousin of Sultān Shihāb al-Dīn Ghori, ruler of Firuzah Koh, also presented himself and was permitted to sit close to him. The Jāmi' having been full, the Imām started his teaching. When the audience was fully absorbed in listening to his eloquent speech, all of a sudden, a dove helplessly fell down in the lap of

the Imām and the hunting bird seeing the crowd quietly slipped away. This was the occasion, as related earlier, when Ibn 'Unayn composed his poem³⁹.

His Shaykh (Shaykh Najm al-Dīn al-Kubrā)

Once when the chiefs, savants, and officials and the elite of the town were present in his *dars* (teaching), the Imām enquired if anybody was there in the town who did not care to come to his presence. They said, 'yes, an ascetic called Najm al-Dīn al-Kubrā is the only person who remained behind and did not come to see him.' The Imām expressed his surprise by saying, "Why did he not come to see me? I am the leader of the Muslims and Shaykh al-Islām; however great a *ṣūfī* he may be, he should have come to see me."

Some of the disciples of the Imām, however, arranged for a feast and invited both the savants. They sat together, and after exchange of greetings the Imām enquired why he did not come to see him. The Shaykh said, "I am a man, needy and devoid of good. No nobility is there in seeing me, nor is there any loss in keeping myself behind." Fakhr Rāzī said, "This is a mystic (*ṣūfī*) answer. Now that Shari'at and *Ṭarīqat* are assembled together, the real impression must find its manifestation. I like you to tell the actual reason." Najm al-Dīn al-Kubrā thereupon enquired, "Why is it necessary to have a look at you?" Imām Rāzī replied, "Because I am the leader of the Muslims and a man of learning." Najm al-Dīn retorted, "The first knowledge is to know the Almighty. How do you know your God?" Rāzī answered, "By hundred proofs." Najm said, "Proof is mentioned to remove doubt. Can there be any doubt concerning Allah, the Creator of the Heavens and the Earth? Allah has favoured His slaves with a light that allows no doubt to afflict their hearts, and they feel

no need of any proof". The Imām was impressed by the words of Najm and expressed his repentance by holding the hands of Shaykh Najm. As a result of this meeting with the Shaykh, the Imām disciplined himself and often went into retirement⁴⁰.

It is also related that Shaykh Najm al-Dīn wanted him to forget all that he knew and desired to break the idol of his knowledge. The Shaykh influenced him by the power of his inner direction and guidance. On realizing what had happened to him, Imām Rāzī bewailed, complained of having no forbearance on the loss, and begged his Shaykh to restore him to his own state, as he did not want to become a dervish⁴¹.

Ibn Taimīyah relates a story that was narrated to him that Rāzī and his companion, once, asked Shaykh al-Kubrā saying: يا شيخ بلغنا انك تعلم علم اليقين "We are told you have sure knowledge, O Shaykh." The Shaykh replied, "Yes." Imām Rāzī said, "How do you attain knowledge; we have been debating for a long time refuting all that is advanced as arguments by both of us"? The Shaykh replied, "(my objects of) knowledge are feelings of the soul which she is unable to repulse". They were wonderstruck and repeated the speech, and one of them desired to experience the feelings. The Shaykh taught him and trained him till he experienced the feelings⁴². Ibn Taimīyah adds that Imām Rāzī was a Mu'tazilite and negated all the attributes of God. The Shaykh explained to him that truth is with those who believe in the Attributes of Allah. That Imām Rāzī never believed in Mu'tazilite doctrines and was at no stage a Mu'tazilite has already been discussed. Ibn Taimīyah himself has quoted the confession of Rāzī in the following expressions: "وهو قد اعترف في آخر عمره بأنه قد تأمل الطرق الكلامية والناهج الفلسفية فما وجدها تشفى عيلا ولا تروى غيلا ، ووجد اقرب الطرق طريقة القرآن"

Ibn Taymīyah sometimes refers to Imām Rāzī and tries to refute his views, perhaps, because the contemporary Ḥanbalites were at daggers drawn with Imām Rāzī⁴³.

His Importance

It has already been mentioned that Imām Rāzī's works excel most of those of his predecessors both in rational and religious sciences in points of brevity, simplicity and easy diction. After Imām Ghazzālī, Imām Rāzī stands prominent in harmonizing reason with revelation on a rational basis. He tries to solve all his difficulties with the touch stone of human reason. In his zeal to do so he claims in his *magnum opus*, the Tafsīr, that the Qur'ān contains every kind of science and discusses the most difficult problems of his philosophy in the light of the Qur'ānic verses. Liberal in his outlook, he frequently quotes the verses of the philosopher-poet Abū al-'Alā al-Ma'arrī in support of his thesis throughout his works.⁴⁴

Having studied the works of al-Fārābī and Abū 'Alī b. Sīnā, he mastered theology, ancient and rational sciences so much so that he had no rival in these sciences in his age. As a Sunnite polemist, he held discussions with prominent leaders of other sects and refuted their doctrines with all the vigour of his belief and resolution. His logical arguments converted many opponents into the fold of the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah. His criticism does not spare even the preceding Imāms like Imām al-Ash'ary, Ibn Furak, Qāḍī Abū Bakr, and Imām al-Ḥaramayn in some of their doctrines.⁴⁵

Towards the end of his life when he had reached the climax of his knowledge he was confronted with the same sceptic ideas as had afflicted Imām Ghazzālī in the past. His confidence in human reasoning was shaken, and he realized his inability to comprehend existence and experi-

enced a kind of ecstasy every now and then. In the course of his sermons he sometimes experienced a similar psychical mood and uttered as mentioned above:—

يا سلطان العالم! لا سلطانك يبقى ولا تلبس الرازي يبقى

“O the king of the universe! neither your authority will remain nor will remain the conceit of Rāzī.”

His following composition also bears evidence⁴⁶ to the same mood:

لهاية إقدام العقول عقل و أكثر سعى العالين ضلال
وارواحنا في وحشة من جسوننا وحاصل دنيانا ردى و وبال
ولم نستفد من بحثنا طول دهرنا سوى أن جمعنا فيه قلت وقالوا
وكم قد راينا من رجال ودولة فبنادوا جميعاً مسرعين وزالوا
وكم من جبال قد علت شرفاتها وعال فزالت والجبال جبال

“The advancing reasons end in getting shackled; most of the endeavours of the people of the universe go in vain. Our spirits are in fear from our bodies; and the whole achievement of our world is pain and misery.

“We did not derive any benefit from our lifelong discussions except that we collected a number of controversies and different views.

“We saw many an important man and state: But all of them hastened to finish themselves and then disappeared.

“Many a pinnacle of mountains were trodden by people who perished while the mountains remained just the same”.

His scepticism finds expression in his following verses⁴⁷:

أرواحنا لسن تدرى أين مذهبها وفي التراب توارى هذه الجثث
كون يرى وفساد جاء يتبعه الله اعلم، ما في خلقه عيب

“Our spirits disappear to a place we do not know where. These bodies are concealed in the earth. A generation is observed, and a destruction

follows it. Allah knows there is no absurdity in His creation:”

As a true Muslim ascetic, he explains his ambition for high ideals and excellences in simple, easy and direct speech:⁴⁸

فلو قنعت نفسي بميسور بلغة لما سبقت في الكرمات رجالها
ولو كانت الدنيا مناسبة لها لما استحققت نقصانها وكمالها
ولا اربق الدنيا بعين كرامة ولا اتوق سوءها واختلالها
وذاك لاني عارف بفنائها ومستيقن ترحالها وانحلالها
اروم امورا يصغر الدهر عندها وتستعظم الافلاك طرا وصالها

“Were my soul contented with an easy morsel it would not have excelled the men of excellences in high ideals and generous qualities!

“Had the world suited my soul it would not have belittled worldly perfection and imperfection.

“I do not look at the world with the eye of nobility, nor do I fear its evil and disorder. This is because I know its transitoriness and am sure of its annihilation and dissolution. I aim at great affairs before which time appears small and even the heavens consider it too sublime to reach them.”

No less a personality than Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ himself relates, “Al-Quṭb al-Ṭaughānī informed him twice that he heard Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī say: “Would that I did not engage myself in Theology!” And then he wept⁴⁹.

In his Tafsīr (volume IV, page 134), he writes:

“The author of this book, ‘Muḥammad ibn ‘Umar al-Rāzī’, says, “I have explained various religious and rational sciences. I found in neither of them the satisfaction, blessings and peace which might be considered equal to the satisfaction, blessings and peace that I found in dealing with this science (the exegesis)”⁵⁰.

Biographers have differed in depicting his character and achievements. Some have declared him a genius,

founder of a school and an original thinker. Others consider him proud, self-conceited and reckless in speech. They have apparently kept no balance in giving an account of his life.

It is evident that he was a great speaker and won over his opponents by arguments and forceful speech. All of them agree that he had great power of argument and reasoning. His works eloquently bear evidence to his vast learning, excellent knowledge of philosophy, Kalām, Uṣūl Fiqh, Tafsīr and other branches of human studies. Though he criticises the views of the Mu'tazilites, he appreciates the Tafsīr of Abū Muslim al-Mu'tazilī. An Ash'arite by faith, he expresses his disapproval of certain doctrines of Imām Abū'l-Ḥasan al-Ash'ary. An avowed opponent of the Shī'ites and the Ismā'ilites, he sometimes speaks in favour of the Shī'ites, as is eloquently testified by the following couplets:

إذا كانت الاشياء من الله قدرت فقد قام عذر للروافض في السب
إذا كان رب العرش في حكمه قضي عليهم بهذا فالعتاب على الرب

"If things are said to have been destined by Allah, the Rawāfiḍ may be excused for abusing (the Ṣaḥābah). When the Lord of the 'Arsh has given His decision against them, the charge (should) be brought against the Lord."

That Imām Rāzī was not a Shī'ite is clearly understood by his declaration that the true Imām after the Messenger of Allah was Abū Bakr, then 'Umar, then 'Uthmān and then 'Alī. He also says the Shī'ites hold that the true Imām after the Prophet is 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib. He argues in favour of the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah by saying that it is a confirmed report (متواتر) that 'Alī did not oppose Abū Bakr to win the Khilāfat. If he did not accept Abū Bakr as a true Imām, he would have surely fought him as he fought Mu'āwiyah. Again, if he considered that Khilāfat was

his right and yet he did not fight, then he yielded to transgression which was equally a transgression, and a transgressor does not deserve Khilāfat. Then, there is a saying of the Prophet: *أبى بكر وعمر*، *أبى بكر وعمر* i.e. "you follow Abū Bakr and 'Umar after me". Now, if their Imāmat had been a transgression, the Prophet would not have ordered the people to follow them⁵¹.

He also holds that it is binding to respect the Companions of the Prophet and to refrain from abusing and criticising them, as is indicated by the verse:

والسابقون الاولون من المهاجرين والانصار والذين اتبعوهم
باحسان رضى الله عنهم ورضوا عنه -

"And the first to lead the way of the Muhājirīn and the Anṣār, and those who followed them in goodness—Allah is well pleased with them and they are well pleased with Him."

Ibn Hajar al-'Asqalānī writes, "In his *al-Ikshār fī 'Ilm al-Tafsīr* al-Najm al-Tawfī says: I have not seen any Tafsīr containing most of the science of exegesis better than the book of al-Qurṭubī and that of Imām Fakhr al-Dīn." He further says: "By my life I do not find any defect in him. It is true that he explains the arguments of his opponents with all the force and vigour at his disposal and expresses his own favourite view in a straight and simple way. Perhaps, this is because of the fact that after he finishes with the exposition of the views of the opponents he feels exhausted and refers to his own view briefly, as the psychological faculties follow the corporeal faculties"⁵².

Fakhr Rāzī is considered a great theologian. But a theologian considers him a philosopher and accuses him of rational bias, a gnostic like a common person considers him devoid of truth, and a Ṣūfī also declares him as an innovator, and far from truth, as he says⁵³:

اندرين راه از خرد ره بين بدى فخر رازى راز دار دين بدى

"If this path of intelligence had shown right guidance, Fakhr Rāzī would have possessed the key of the secrets of the faith".

A Mu'tazilite condemns him as an Ash'arite and the Ash'arites disown him. In short, the enemies of Imām Fakhr Rāzī have accused him of all sorts of crimes, of murdering one and causing the extermination of the other. They say, Majd al-Dīn Musharraf b. Mu'ayyad of Khwārazm was drowned in the Oxus by Khwārazmshāh at the instigation of Fakhr Rāzī. But it is a fact that Majd al-Dīn was one of the sincerest friends of Fakhr Rāzī, a great devotee who regularly studied his books and works. Fakhr Rāzī held him in high estimation and loved friends like him dearly. How could he instigate the king to drown him and for what?

Similarly, the story of expelling Bahā' al-Dīn Wālī from his own country is a fabricated story. Whatever the differences in their views, Imām Fakhr Rāzī, with such a pomp and power, knowledge and eloquence, could not envy his disciples and subordinates as to cause to murder the one and expel the other.⁵⁴

A great jurist, exegesist, and mystic as he is, the mystics and gnostics appreciate his discourse, speeches and writings, and admire his taste in ṭasawwuf and inner advancement. Once he wrote to Sulṭān Muḥammad Khwārazmshāh and expressed his desire by writing: "I have placed my want before Allah. If He allows, He will forgive me and then I shall ask you to supply my want. If He rejects my desire, it is He Who rejects, and your excuse is obviously acceptable"⁵⁵.

His Death

The followers of Karrām never spared him. Whenever they got any opportunity to abuse and curse him, they did him all sorts of harm. Once they stoned him

while he was on the pulpit giving his sermon eloquently. It was on such a critical occasion that he recited the following verse from the pulpit:

المرء ما دام حيا يستهان به و يعظم الرز فيه حين يفتقد

"As long as a man is alive, he is dishonoured and shown disrespect. But the great misfortune is realized when he is lost".

They accused him, as stated earlier, even of having a hand in the murder of Sulṭān Shihāb al-Dīn Ghori. It is said they, at last, succeeded in employing a man who poisoned him in a drink that he offered the Imām who drank it and breathed his last due to the effect of the poison⁵⁶.

His Works

Imām Rāzī wrote a large number of books. Most of his works became popular in his own time. Ibn Abī 'Uṣaybi'ah has mentioned as many as sixty-eight books and the editor of *I'tiqādāt Fīraq al-Muslimīn wa al-Mushrikīn* mentions about ninety-three great or small works.

Fakhr Rāzī was greatly attached to the contemporary rulers of Ghore, Bāmiyān and Sāmiyān (i.e. Khwārazm and Khurāsān), all of whom were fond of him and admired his erudition and vast learning. These rulers, sometimes, requested him to write some books for them. A number of works of Imām Rāzī were written for some of them and dedicated to them. *Tāsis al-Taqdīs* or *Asās al-Taqdīs* was written for Saif al-Dīn Ayyūbī who presented him one thousand dinār (gold coin), *Al-Risālah al-Kamāliyyah fī al-Haqā'iq al-Ilāhiyyah* was written for Kamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Mikā'il. Similarly, *Ḥadā'iq al-Anwār fī Haqā'iq al-Asrār* and *al-Ikhtiyārāt al-'Alā'iyah* were written for 'Alā' al-Dīn Takush of Khwārazm.

The treatise entitled *K. al-Nafs wa al-Rūḥ*, the work in hand, seems to be identical with *K. al-Akhlāq*.

It is easy to understand from his writings that Imām Rāzī was inclined to practical sciences and especially to moral sciences, and concentrated on the purification of soul and achievement of high ideals. His Tafsīr and other works explain his doctrine concerning the sciences as follows⁵⁷: (Tafsīr: Volume IV, p. 134):

واقول : العلوم إما نظرية وإما عملية ، أما العلوم النظرية فاشرفها و اكملها معرفة ذات الله وصفاته واقواله واحكامه و اسمائه ، ولا ترى هذه العلوم اكمل ولا اشرف مما تجده في هذا الكتاب . و اما العلوم العملية فالملطوب إما اعمال الجوارح و اما اعمال القلوب و هو السمي بطهارة الاخلاق و تزكية النفس—ولا تجد هذين العلمين مثل ما تجده في هذا الكتاب ، ثم قد جرت سنة الله تعالى بأن الباحث عنه والتمسك به يحصل له عزالدنيا وسعادة الآخرة -

“I say: Sciences are either speculative or practical. The most noble and perfect of the speculative sciences is the knowledge of the Essence, Attributes, Actions, Decrees and Names of Allah. But you do not consider these sciences as more perfect and nobler than what you find in this Book (the Qur’ān). As for the practical sciences, what is desired is either the actions performed by the organs or the actions that concern hearts—which are, in other words, called the purification of manners and refinement of the Soul. Now, you do not find these two sciences as compared to that which you apprehend in this Book (the Qur’ān) on the same footing. Again, there has been the set tradition of Allah, the Exalted, that He favours with honour and position in this world, and blessings in the world hereafter, those who investigate into the meanings of the Qur’ān and hold fast to it.”

II

IMĀM RĀZĪ'S 'ILM AL-AKHLĀQ

The Title of the Book

The present work entitled *Kitāb al-Nafs wa al-Rūḥ wa Sharḥu Quwāhumā*, the Book of Soul and Spirit and an Exposition of their Faculties, of Imām Rāzī has survived in a unique Bodleian manuscript No. Hunt 534 which contains among other treatises *Kitāb al-Najāt* of Ibn Sīna which was transcribed in 466 A.H./1073 A.D. The work covers folios 257a-295b which possess no colophon; and although these folios are obviously different from the folios of the *K. al-Najāt* in handwriting, the ink and the character of the letters bear testimony to the fact that they belong to the eighth or the ninth century of the Hijrat. It, however, remains a mystery that no other copy of the work has so far been traced. What is more surprising is the fact that Ḥājji Khalīfah alone has mentioned this title of the book. He says⁵⁸:

وصنف الامام فخرالدين محمد بن عمر الرازي كتابا في النفس والروح ، لخصه محمد العلائي ، ورتب على اقسام ،

“Imām Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ‘Umar al-Rāzī wrote a book on “the Soul and Spirit” which was abridged by Muḥammad al-‘Alā’i and was arranged in Sections”.

Other biographers have mentioned unanimously the following two names:

1. *Kitāb al-Akhlāq* and
2. *Kitāb al-Nafs*

Now, the fact that the text of the present work begins with هذا كتاب في الاخلاق ‘This is a book of Ethics’, clearly indicates that the present work supplies the text of كتاب الاخلاق mentioned by the biographers.

The contents of the First Part (the present work consists of two parts) justify the title mentioned by Hājji Khalifah: كتاب النفس و الروح and also by the scribe who writes the contents of the work beginning with كتاب النفس و الروح و شرح قواها (vide the text). The Second Part deals with اخلاق, Ethics. That the work is genuinely ascribed to Imām Rāzī cannot in the least be doubted inasmuch as the style of the Imām is not so difficult as to escape recognition. The notes added at the end of the translation supply quite a few parallels quoted from his famous *al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr* entitled *Maṣāliḥ al-Ghaib* and other works.

The manuscript contains a brief list of contents on the folio 257a just below the title of the book which has been obviously added by the scribe. This list has been retained separately in the beginning of the text.

The Subject

The book is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the general principles of Ethics (the Science of Morals) and consists of twelve chapters. The second part consisting of ten chapters deals with the treatment of all that is concerned with passion.

Though after the manner of the preceding Muslim philosophers Imām Rāzī has described the cosmological doctrine, the Islamic teachings dominate the exposition of the moral doctrines. Like a devout Muslim he refers to the Qur'ānic verses and the prophetic aḥādīth. In explaining the ethical problems he has particularly used Imām Ghazzālī's *Ihyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn*, the Revival of the Sciences of the Religion, besides many other works of both the Greek and Muslim predecessors.

Now, it is agreed upon that though Muslims studied Greek, Indian and Iranian sciences they always tried to excel their masters. Their study of Greek sciences, as

supported by evidences, has been most extensive and it is in these sciences that their contributions have been the greatest. A critical study of the Epistles of *Ikhwān al-Ṣafā'* (the Brethren of Purity), the works of Al-Kindī, al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Bājja, Ibn Ṭufail, Ibn Rushd and their successors both in the East and the West will amply bear testimony as to how successfully they have Islamised the foreign sciences. They have not only employed the scientific and philosophical terms and expressions but have totally moulded them into Islamic terms and expressions to denote their thoughts and ideas.

Since Imām Rāzī combated many heterodoxical sects of his time and vehemently criticised the doctrines of the Mu'tazilites, the Bāṭinites, the Karrāmītes and the Ḥanbalites and succeeded in bringing a large number of their followers back to the fold of the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah, he flooded the Islamic world with his speeches and writings. His works were taken far and wide to the distant corners of the Muslim territories. as his biographers state, his works became popular in his very life-time and formed part and parcel of the curriculum in various Madrasahs in Ghaznī, Khwārazm, Khurasan Rayy and Damascus and other places. By his forceful diction and simple but lucid and concise style his works soon attracted the teachers and the taught of all shades and opinions. His writings excel the writings of his predecessors in general and the works of Imām Ghazzālī in particular, in so far as they advance convincing arguments derived from both reason and revelation. Though not in a new style, Imām Rāzī's works surely surpass the works of Imām Ghazzālī in their wider rational outlook and deeper religious knowledge, as Rāzī's penetrative mind enjoyed superiority and excellence in Islamic and Greek Sciences. In other words, the task of rationalization of religious sciences begun

by Imām Ghazzālī was completed by Imām Rāzī through his extensive works. Ibn Sīna's long works and small treatises, however, greatly facilitated the task undertaken by Rāzī who was no doubt influenced by Imām al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, Abū al-Barakāt and other contemporary thinkers as well. Imām Rāzī is, however, very critical in his writings and never accepts all that is advanced or advocated by philosophers especially by Ibn Sīna whose works were studied extensively by the savants in those days. In his commentaries on certain works of Ibn Sīna he has criticised some of his doctrines. His criticism roused the feelings of certain Shī'ite thinkers, especially Naṣir al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shirāzī — a fact which dismisses the allegations that he was a Shī'ite and that he had an inclination towards Shī'ism⁵⁹. That he was not a Shī'ite has already been amply elucidated above. It is certain that he expressed his profound care and affection for the descendants of the Prophet which is not enough for declaring him a Shī'ite, as he himself says:

ان كان رفضا حب آل محمد فليشهد الثقلان اني رافضي

"If the love for the family of Muḥammad were Rafḍ, let both the species — men and genii — be witnesses to this that I am a *Rāfiḍī* (a Shī'ite)".

In the notes beside explaining the text I have tried to quote a number of parallels from the works of al-Rāzī. On collation, it became quite clear that in the second part Imām Rāzī extensively used Imām Ghazzālī's *Ihyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn*, Part III, which deals with Ethics. Imām Rāzī has, however, utilized the material of the *Ihyā'* independently in so far as he has dealt with certain other problems in the manner of Imām Ghazzālī.

In the first part, Imām Rāzī has closely followed the Greek and Muslim philosophers. His discourses

in this part display the influence of Imām Rāghib of Iṣfahān and Abū al-Barakāt of Baghdād besides the influence of other Muslim and Greek philosophers.

His valuable discourse on the views of Galen as against the Aristotelian view concerning the source of nerves seems to be very rare which I have so far failed to trace in the scanty material available to me here in Pakistan.

In so far as the Quranic verses quoted by Imām Rāzī are concerned, I have made use of the translation of the Qur'ān by Mohamḥād Marmaduke Pickthall — *The Meaning of the Glorious Koran*.

NOTES

1. Some biographers state that his nickname was "Abū al-Faql." See Al-Qiftī, *Tārīkh al-Hukamā'* Leipzig, 1930, p. 291.
2. Al-Rāzī, *Al-Risālah al-Kamāliyyah fi al-Ḥaqā'iq al-'Ilāhiyyah* ed. S. M. Baqir Subzwārī, Tihiran, 1335/1916.

For the biography of Imām Rāzī see Abū Shāmah al-Maqdisī, *Tarājim Rijāl al-Qarnain al-Sādis wa al-Sābi'* ed. Zāhid al-Kawthari, Cairo, 1937, p. 63; Ibn al-'Ibri, *Tārīkh Mukhtaṣar al-Duwal*, Beirut, 1958, pp. 240, 254; al-Dhahabi, *Mizān al-'Itidāl*, Volume II, p. 224; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, Vol. I, p. 474; Ibn Abi 'Uṣaybi'ah, *al-Ṭabaqāt al-Aṣṣibā'*, Vol. II, p. 25; Ibn al-'Imād, *Shadharāt al-Dhahab*, V p. 21, al-Yā'fī, *Mir'āt al-Jinān*, Vol. IV, p. 7 (Egypt, III, p. 478); Ibn Hajar, *Lisān al-Mizān*, Vol. IV p. 427; Ibn al-Athīr, *Tārīkh al-Kāmil*, Vol. XII, p. 89; Zakariyā Qazwīnī, *Āthār al-Bilād wa Akhbār al-Bilād*, 1960, Beirut, pp. 377-78; Tāsh Kapri Zādah, *Miftāḥ al-Sa'ādah* Vol. I p. 150; Khair al-Din al-Zirakli, *Al-A'lām*, Vol. VII, p. 203; Khwāndmīr, *Ḥabīb al-Siyar*, Haidari, Iran, Vol. II, p. 331; C. Brockelmann, *Geschichte des Arabischen Litteratur*, I, p. 666 sqq. Supp. I 920 sqq. Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science*, Vol. II, Part I, p. 364; H. A. R. Gibb, *Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 1953, pp. 470-471; Paul Kraus, *The "Controversies" of Fakhr al-Din Rāzī*, Islamic Culture, April, 1938, pp. 131-153; 'Abd al-Salām Nadvi, *Imām Rāzī*, 1950, India; also E. G. Browne, *A Literary History of Persia*, Cambridge, 1956, Vol. II, p. 484.
3. Imām Rāzī studied Islamic Sciences including *Ḥadīth*, *Fiqh* and *Uṣūl* with his father. See Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, Vol. III ed. M. Muḥiy al-Din Ḥamid, 1948, p. 382.
4. *Ibid.*
5. According to some sources it reads "Sam'ānī" instead of 'Simmānī'. See Fakhr al-Din al-Rāzī's *I'tiqādāt Firaq al-Muṣlīmīn wa al-Mushrikīn* ed. 'Alī Sāmi al-Nashshār, Maktabah al-Nahḍah al-Misriyyah, 1938/1356, p. 17. Salāh al-Dīn, *al-Wāfi*, IV, p. 249.
6. Ibn Khallikān, op. cit. p. 382.
7. *Tārīkh al-Hukamā'* op. cit. p. 291.
8. *Wafayāt* op. cit. III, p. 381.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*

11. See also Yāqūt al-Rūmī, *K. Irshād al-Arib* Egypt 1925, Vol. VII p. 121. Other verses are as follows:

يا ابن الكرام الطمعين اذا شتوا في كل حمصة و ثلج خاشف
والعاصمين اذا النفوس تطايرت بين الصوارم والوشيج الراعف
من نيبا البورقا ان محلكم حرم ، وانك ملجا للخائف
وافت اليك وقد تدانى حنفاها فحبوتها بيقاتها المستائف
ولو انها تجبى بمال لانتنت من راحتك بنائل متضاعف
قمر لواء القوت حتى ظله بازائه يجري بقلب واجف

Salāh al-Dīn in his *al-Wāfi* narrates from Ibn 'Unain who said when he was at Khurasān in the Majlis of al-Fakhr al-Rāzī a dove fell into the lap of Rāzī on the Mimbar (pulpit). He then recited his verses extempore.

12. Vide *Ṭabaqāt*, al-Ḥusainiyyah, Egypt, V, p. 35.
13. See Yāqūt, *Irshād al-Arib*, VII, p. 121. The poem is as follows:

ريح الشمال عساك ان تحملى خدسى الى الصدر الامام الافضل
وقى بواديه القدس وانظرى نور الهدى متالفا لا ياتل
واستمطرى جدوى يديه فطالما خلف الحيا في كل عام محفل
من دوحة فخرية عمرية طابت مغارس مجدما المتائل
مكية الانساب زاك اصلها وفروعها فوق السماك الاعزل
بحرا تصدر للعلوم ومن رأى بحرا تصدر قبله في محفل
ومشرا في الدين يسحب للتقى والدين سر بال العفاف المسيل
ماتت به بدع تمادى عمرها قهرا و كاد ظلامها لا ينجلي
فعلا به الاسلام ارفع هضبة ورسا سواه في الحضيض الاسفل
غلط امره بأبي على قاسه هيهات قصر عن مداه ابوعلی
لوان رسطاليس يسمع لفظه من لفظه لمرته هزة افكل
ولحار بطليموس لو لاقاه من برهانه في كل شكل مشكل

فلوانهم جمعوا لديه الخ
14. Cf. Naṣir al-Dīn Tūsī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt* al-Haidari, Tihiran, p. 2. *Sharḥ 'Uyūn al-Hikmah*, and Mullā Ṣadr al-Dīn, *Asfār Arba'ah*, Vol. III, Bāb V.
15. Cf. *Asfār*, III; 'Abdur Raḥmān, Badawī *Arisū 'Ind al-'Arab*.

16. *al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr*: أبو مسلم حسن الكلام في التفسير كثير الخوض؛ على الدقائق واللطائف. *Muqaddimah al-Risālah al-Kamabūh* p. كه.
17. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, *al-Wāfi*, IV, p. 254.
18. Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāyah wa al-Nihāyah*, al-Sa'ādah, Egypt, Vol. XIII, p. 43; Ibn al-Sā'ī, *al-Jāmi' al-Mukhtaṣar*, ed. Muṣṭafā Jawād, Baghdād, IX, p. 172.
19. Zakariyā ibn Md. ibn Maḥmūd, *Āthār al-Bilād wa Akhbār al-'Ibād*, Beirut, 1380/1960, pp. 377-78; 'Abd al-Muta'al al-Ṣa'īdī, *Al-Mujaddidūn fi al-Islām*, al-Numuzajiyah, Egypt, p. 215.
20. Abū Shāmah, *Tarājim Rijāl al-Qarnain* ed. Zāhid al-Kawthari, Cairo, 1366/1937 p. 68; al-Dhahabi, *Mizān al-'Itidāl*, Vol. II p. 224.
21. Imām Rāzī, *Kitāb al-Nafs wa al-rūh*, MS. foll. 260b, 262b, 267b, 269a.
22. Ibn al-Sā'ī, op. cit. IX, p. 307, Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, XII, p. 63.
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*
25. Ibn Abī Uṣaibi'ah, II, p. 25; Paul Kraus, *Islamic Culture*, 1938.
26. Ibn Hajar, *Lisān al-Mizān*, IV, p. 427; Paul Kraus, *Ist. Cul.*, 1938. Ibn Kathīr, *Bidāyah*, XIII, p. 34.
27. Al-Subki, *Tabaqāt, al-Ḥusainiyah*, V, p. 36.
28. *al-Wāfi bi'l-Wafayāt* IV, p. 252.
29. Sayyid M. Bāqir, *al-Risālah al-Kamāliyyah li'r-Rāzī*, Tihirān, 335; *Munazẓarāt al-Rāzī*, Hyderabad, pp. 2, 5, 9, 20.
30. *Ibid.*
31. *Ibid.*, يا.
32. *Ibid.*, يو.
33. Ibn Taimiyah, *Majmū'ah al-Rasā'il al-Kubrā*, al-'Amirah, Egypt, 1325 H. *al-Risālah al-'Ulā*, p. 140: انه صنف الرازي كتابا في عبادة الكواكب و الاصلنام و عمل السحر سماء سرالكتوم في السحر و مخاطبة النجوم
34. *Lisān al-Mizān*, Egypt, IV, p. 426.
35. *Sirr al-Makṭūm*, al-Maṭba'ah al-Ḥajariyah, p. 2.
36. Ibn Taimiyah, *al-Risālah al-'Ulā*, op. cit. pp. 141, 142. "Ikhtiyārāt" has also been read "Ikhtibārāt."
37. S. M. Bāqir Sabzwāri, *Muqaddimah al-Risālah al-Kamāliyah* p. ١٣.
- 37-A. Ibn Abī Uṣaibi'ah, Ibn al-Athīr and some others call him "حسين بن خرمين"

38. Ibn al-Qifti, *Tārīkh al-Hukamā'* ed. G. Lippert, p. 291; *Muqaddimah al-Risālah*, op. cit. p. ١٣٥.
 39. Sharafuddīn Abū Maḥāsīn Muḥammad ibn Naṣr known as Ibn 'Unain composed a number of poems eulogizing the Imām and received good endowment. According to Ibn Khallikān, the incident took place when Imām was in the Jāmi' of Khwārazm-shāh; Ibn Abī 'Usaibi'ah states that it occurred at Herāt. *Diwan*, ed. Khalīl Mardum Beck, p. 95 ft., *Ṭabaqāt*, Vol. II, p. 23.
 40. Ibn Taimiyah, *Majmū'at al-Rasā'il*, Maṭba'ah 'Amiriyah, p. 53.
 41. Cf. Introduction to *al-Risālah al-Kamāliyyah* op. cit. pp. ك and ك١
 42. *Risālah al-Furqān*, *Majmū'at al-Rasā'il* op. cit. p. 52.
 43. *Ibid.*, pp. 33, 53, 108, 109, 118, 130, 140-2.
 44. Cf. *Mafātīḥ al-Ghaib*, al-Khayriyah Press, Egypt, 1307 H., Vol. I, p. 4:
- قال ابو العلاء المعري:
- يا ايها الناس كم لله من فلك تجرى النجوم به والشمس والقمر
هين على الله ما ضينا و غابنا فمالنا في نواحي غيره خطر
45. 'Alī al-Sāmī al-Nashshār. *I'tiqādāt Firq al-Muslimin wa al-Mushrikīn li'l-Fakhr al-Rāzī*, al-Nahḍah al-Miṣriyyah 1356/1938 p. 18.
 46. Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-'A'yān*, al-Nahḍah al-Miṣriyyah, 1948, Vol. III, p. 381.
 47. Ibn Abī 'Uṣaibi'ah, *'Uyūn al-Anbā'*, Iṣḍār Dār al-Fikr, Vol. III, p. 43.
 48. *Ibid.*
 49. Ibn Taimiyah, *Risālah al-Furqān* op. cit., p. 109.
 50. See also Ibn Taimiyah, *Raisālah al-Furqān*. op. cit., pp. 100, 108, 109.
 51. Imām Rāzī, *Al-Masā'il al-Khamsūn* p. 385, published by Muḥyiddīn Ṣabrī under the title *Majmū'ah al-Rasā'il* in 1328 H.
 52. Ibn Hajar, *Lisān al-Mizān* First edition, Hyderabad, 1330 H. Vol. IV, p. 428.
 53. Mawlānā Rūmī, *Mathnawī* cf. al-Kamāliyyah, op. cit.
 54. Cf. *al-Risālah al-Kamāliyyah*, Introduction, op. cit., pp. ك and ك١
 55. Cf. al-Subki, *Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfi'iyah al-Kubrā*. Ḥusayniyah Press, Egypt, Vol. V, p. 35.
 56. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
 57. *Al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr*, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 134.
 58. *Kashf al-Zunūn*, ed. Flügel, 1850, Vol. V, p. 164.

59. In his *Lisān al-Mizān* (Vol. IV, p. 429, ed. Hyderabad) Ibn Hajar has narrated on the authority of Ibn al-Ṭabbākh that Fakhr al-Rāzī was a Shī'ite. He used to prefer the members of the house of the Prophet due to his love for the Shī'ites. He said in some of his works: *وكان علي ربه شجاعا بخلاف غيره* 'And 'Alī was brave as against others.'

IMĀM RĀZĪ'S 'ILM AL-AKHLĀQ

[Fol. 257 a] The Book of the Soul and Spirit,
and the Description of their Faculties

257a

〈KITĀB FĪ 'ILM AL-AKHLĀQ〉

〈PART ONE〉

On the position of man *vis-a-vis* (other) beings.
On the determination thereof in the stages of human spirits.

On the discussion concerning the quiddity of the soul.

On the proofs derived from Divine Books.

On what is related to the substance of the soul is the heart, as proved by Revelation and Reason.

On the explanation of the faculties of the soul.

On a discussion relating to expressions and words.
(On the relation) of these faculties to the substance of the soul.

On the Rational Soul — whether it is unitary in species or in genus.

On the explanation that mental pleasures are nobler than sensuous pleasures.

〈PART TWO〉

On the treatment of the Soul; and it contains a few chapters:

[On the excellence of] wealth.

[On how] to attain bliss through wealth.

[On the condemnation of] Temptation and Miserliness.

On Position.

On hypocrisy and being heard (سَمْعًا).

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

257b

[Fol. 257 b] In the name of Allāh, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate.

All praise belongs to Allah Whose Greatness¹ is free from the contention of figures and opposites, Whose grace is purified of combat² likes and partners; Whose unity and individuality is free from spouse³ and children; Whose existence is shorn of the nature of potency and aptitude⁴. He is above the elevated high heavens without pillars, and buttress, Who has spread the earth which has been stretched without having any support and assistance concerning the warren of reality of Whose eternity pulsating hearts are puzzled, and in the light of Whose Divine heity, the thoughts of the seekers of truth and the visions of the people of guidance remain distracted travelling in the absence of absence, the ungeneration of the ungenerated, the eternity of eternity⁵, never returning except to the absolute confession that He is Indivisible unlike individuals, an Entity unlike entities. If you say, "when did He come into being?" Surely, He was in existence even when there was no 'time⁶ to be indicated' before the genesis. If you say, "wherein (*i.e.*, wherein did He exist?)?" Surely, He is too sublime to be incarnated, transmigrated, and depended on. Therefore, He is Allāh; there is no God but He. All praise belongs to Him in this world and in the Hereafter — praises which never come to an end and never get exhausted.

I praise Him with a praise which springs from the sincerity or belief, and thank Him for the assistance (bounties)⁷ He has bestowed on us. I bear witness to the fact that there is no God but Allāh alone, Who has no associate for Himself—an evidence free from falsehood and enmity, a preparation which may be instrumental in obtaining salvation on the Day of Resurrection. And, I bear witness that Muḥammad (S) is His servant and His Messenger whom He has sent to all His servants (mankind), and whom He has made the most eloquent of all those who speak Arabic. May the blessings of Allah be upon him and upon his family as long as the days, months and festivals come in succession, and may He send to them peace and prosperity in abundance !

Now, this is a book on the science of Ethics (moral teachings),⁸ arranged according to the convincing demonstrative method and not the dialectic method which forcibly imposes accusations (upon the opponents).

We ask Allāh to render it unto a cause for great profit in both the worlds, for happiness in both Abodes. Verily He is the best of Guides and Helpers.

The book consists of several parts.

NOTES

1. كبرياء: Grandeur, magnificence; cf. Fakhr Rāzi: *Asās al-Taqdīs*, Muṣṭafa al-Bābi, Egypt, 1354/1935, p. 2:

المتعالى عن شوائب التشبيه والتعطيل صفاته واسماؤه....
العظمة ازاره، والكبرياء رداؤه.

F. Rāzi: *Al-Masā'il al-Khamsūn*, pub. Muḥi al-Dīn al-Ṣabri under the title *Majmū'ah al-Rasā'il* (No. 15) p. 330:

الحمد لله الذى تميرت العقول والارواح فى مطالعة بيد كبريائه وعزته؛

cf. al-Khaṭīb al-Dimaṣḥqī: *Mishkāṭ*, Nizāmi Press, p. 425 :
وعنه (عن ابى هريرة رض) قال قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم
يقول الله تعالى: الكبرياء رداى والعظمة ازارى، فمن نازعنى
واحدا منهما ادخلته النار، وفى رواية قدفته فى النار، رواه مسلم،

2. معارضة: He declares that He is too Graceful to oppose 'likes' and 'equals'. This is in accordance with the purport of the Qur'ānic verses:

ليس كمثله شئ، وهو السميع البصير، هو القاهر فوق عباده،
in which Allah has been declared as free from any resemblance with the possible and transitory existents.

3. عن الصاحبة الخ، unlike the Christians who emphasize on a unity to be apprehended in the sense of the Trinity (union of three persons—Father, Son, Holy Spirit—in one Godhead). The Qur'ān explains the meaning of Oneness in the Sūrah Al-Tauḥīd (CXII).

4. القوة والاستعداد: His Being must be free from potency and aptitude. For if we suppose that He has some potency, there must be an actualizer of this potency which is absurd.

5. غيب، ازل، ابد: *Ghaib*, unseen, is a Qur'ānic word (يؤمنون بالغيب), they believe in the unseen). *Azal* and *abad*, in fact, represent the Qur'ānic expressions: هو الاول والاخر الخ، He is the First, He is the Last... As an Islamic terminology *ازل* means 'that which has no beginning' and *ابد* means 'that which has no end.' See F. Rāzi: *T. al-Kabīr*, Vol. I, p. 99. S. Vanden Bergh traces the origin of these words to Aristotle. He says: "... Aristotle distinguishes the eternal *a parte ante*, the

ungenerated, *ازلى*, from the eternal *a parte post*, the indestructible *أبدى*". That Aristotle's words have different meanings are quite obvious, as the correct Arabic equivalents for the Greek words seem to be "غير مولود", and "غير هالك" respectively. Prof. Vanden Bergh is, however, determined to accuse the Muslims of borrowing everything from the Greeks and Syrians and has declared in the very beginning of his "Notes on Averroes' *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*" in the words of Maimonides (Guide of the Perplexed, I, 71):

"One must know that everything the Moslems, Mu'tazilites as well as Ash'arites, have professed concerning these subjects, has been borrowed from the Greeks and Syrians who applied themselves to the criticism of the philosophers", vide Averroes' *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*, vol. II, the University Press, Oxford, 1954, p. 1.

6. لا زمان: Allah existed while no time was there to be mentioned before He created it. Though 'timeless eternity' or *دهر* is mentioned by Plato (*Tim.* 39d) and Aristotle (*De Caelo* Ag. 279a 22), it has occurred in the famous ḥadīth: لا تسبوا الدهر الخ، "do not abuse *دهر*, timeless eternity", as Allah Himself is *Dahr*. Time has been defined by Aristotle as "time is the thing numbered and not the numbers by which we count (*Phys.* 219 b7) and it is the 'now' which counts according to *Phys.* 220a 22. Not only do we measure movement through time, but reciprocally time through movement, since they mutually determine each other" (Aristotle, *Phys.* 12. 220 b 14). He further clarifies this by saying: "When we call time much or little we measure it through units of motion, as we measure numbered things through the units of number—the number of horses, for example, by taking one horse as a unit", (loc. cit. I. 18).

7. إِيَاد: that with which a thing is strengthened; or أِيَاد: bounties, favours. In the second case the usual form is الأِيَادى: plural of أِيَادى and أِيَادى plural of يَد; in the case of نَكَرَه it can be read أِيَاد and أِيَاد.

8. علم الاخلاق: Imām Rāzi has defined *Khulq* (pl. *Akhlāq*) as: الخلق ملكة تصدر بها عن النفس افعال بالسهولة من غير تقديم روية،

"Khulq is an innate habit through which the soul displays its actions with ease and without prior thinking and deliberation. Cf. Jāmi' al-'ulūm, Bombay, 1323H, p. 201. He further says that when the psychical state is such that it can produce an action without thinking and deliberation it is called 'khulq': پس....

هیئت نفسانی چون چنین ، باشد او را خلق گویند ، op. cit. The same definition is understood from Kitāb Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq ascribed to Yahya ibn 'Adi, Jacobite scholar, died in 364/974:

ان الخلق هو حال النفس ، بها يفعل الانسان افعاله بلا روية ولا اختيار

see Kurd 'Ali : Rasā'il al-Bulaghā', fourth edition, 1374/1954, Cairo, p. 485. Cf. Imām Ghazzālī: Iḥyā III, p. 52:

فالخلق عبارة عن هيئة في النفس راسخة عنها تصدر الافعال بسهولة ويسر من غير حاجة الى فكل و روية -

فان كانت الهيئة بحيث تصدر عنها الافعال الجميلة المحمودة عقلا و شرعا سميت تلك الهيئة خلقا حسنا ، وان كان الصادر عنها الافعال القبيحة سميت الهيئة التي هي المصدر خلقا سيئا -

PART ONE

UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS

PART ONE

The First Part deals with universal principles of this Science (Ethics) and comprises a few chapters.

CHAPTER I

The First Chapter explains the place of mankind in the various ranks of the existents¹.

Know that it is possible to describe 'the being' in more than one way, each one manifesting the rank of mankind amidst the ranks of the existents.

THE FIRST DIVISION

It is said, the created objects are of four kinds :

1. The first is that which possesses intellect² and wisdom³ but is devoid of nature⁴ and appetite⁵ — they are the angels⁶ whose characteristic is that "they do not disobey Allāh concerning what He commands them". "They fear their Lord as He is above them, and carry out what they are ordered to do"⁷.

2. The second is that which has no intellect, no wisdom, but possesses nature and appetite⁸, as are the rest of the animals except mankind.

3. The third is that which has no intellect, no wisdom, no nature, and no appetite, as are the inanimate things and plants.

Now, since all these kinds are included in existence, there remains nothing except the fourth kind.

4. The fourth is that which possesses intellect, wisdom and also nature and appetite as is man.

Since it has been asserted concerning rational sciences that the necessary being pervades all possible beings by means of general emanation; it demands the inclusion of this kind in existence. Hence, Allah has said, "Lo! I am about to place a viceroy in the earth"⁸, so that no kind of possibles would remain deprived [Fol. 258a] of the effect of His invention and the bounty of His first creation.

When Allah revealed to the angels: "Lo! I am about to place a viceroy in the earth, they said: Wilt Thou place therein one who will do harm therein (and will shed blood)?"⁹ which meant that when You would unite appetite, desire and intellect together this would violently flare up into the fulfilment of appetite and the outburst of anger. This would necessitate destruction due to appetite and His expression "(he) will shed blood" indicated the usage of anger. Allah, thereupon, revealed to them, "Surely, I know that which ye know not".⁹

While Allah knows the best, this speech bears more than one meaning

1. First the angels are pure intellects, and simple lights, so there will inevitably come from them only *Tasbīḥ*, *Taḥmīd* and *Taqdīs*¹⁰ (celebration of سبحان الله, How sublime is Allah! الحمد لله, All praises go to Allah, and قدس الله, all Sanctity is due to Allah).

This is the first kind of the created beings¹¹ which possesses intellect and wisdom but no nature (habit) and anger. And the motive for including this first kind in existence is not to include the benefit of their *Tasbīḥ* and *Taqdīs*, rather, the motive of this being the all-pervasiveness of generosity. This meaning stands valid for the fourth kind of existence.

2. Secondly, this division though contains destruction due to appetite, bloodshed due to anger, also contains *Tasbīḥ* and *Taḥmīd* due to the intellect it contains. Their engagement with this virtue is greater than their engagement with and execution of the evil. To abandon a good deal of virtue for the sake of a little of evil is a great evil (in itself)¹². For this reason, it was deemed absolutely wise to invent this division (kind).

3. Thirdly, the pious angels, and Divine objects of knowledge are available to Angels, but the desire for Truth is not 'available to them, and while desire has a noble station, it was necessarily wise to include human nature in existence in order to achieve this station'.

That the desire¹³ is not available to Angels is well explained by the fact that desire is not perceived except in relation to an object which is perceptible in a particular way but not perceptible in other ways, inasmuch as what is not perceived by man in a way (out of so many ways) is not desired by him. As for that which he has perceived perfectly and completely is obviously not desired by him, because desire is a demand and the demand of that which is in hand is absurd.

Nevertheless, the attachment to the beloved can develop in two ways: First, it is like this that when he (lover) sees the beloved the impression of the beloved's form remains in his imagination after its disappearance. So the spirit desires to transmit the impression from the world of imagination to the world of sense-perception. Secondly, he looks at the face of his beloved, that is, his essence (person), but has not seen the other parts. He, therefore, longs to unravel for himself that which he has not seen.

When you have realized this, we say :

As for the first kind of desire, this is only possible concerning him who realizes something after its disappearance. This is not so concerning the Angels, as all that is known of the angels is eternally present and free from the nature of power and ability. Their knowledge, therefore, does not change due to indifference, nor is their presence affected by the disappearance. This is the meaning of Allah's expression—Sublime is He—"They glorify (Allah) night and day; they flag not"¹⁴. The same is the meaning of the expression of the Prophet, "verily, there are some angels who keep standing and do not bend, and there are some others who keep bending and do not prostrate (themselves)". Hence, it is impossible that they should have the desire of the first kind. If desire is obtained by them at all, it is of the second kind.

As for mankind, both of the kinds can occur in mankind in so far as men have aptitude for the Divine objects of knowledge. Both of them are, rather, evidently necessary for all gnostics.

258b The first kind is necessary, because the Divine affairs, which, though manifest to the gnostics in an extremely clear, vivid and illumined manner, they are mixed up with the mixture of imagination, because the ideas do not continue in this universe, nor do they remain free from images and phantoms [Fol. 258b] which, in fact, darken the illumination of the objects of knowledge. The holy Prophet has, therefore, said,¹⁵ "Verily affliction overtakes my heart; and verily I seek the forgiveness of Allah seventy times every day."

The perfection of imagination is only obtained in the next world where thoughts disappear and phantoms

are rendered absurd. This is the first kind of longing for Allah, the Almighty.

You must know that the second kind of longing knows no limit. Had the gnostic been created at the very outset of the origin of the universe and continued till the present times, and travelled with the utmost speed through the grades of Divine objects of knowledge, rather, he would have flown around the Throne of the August most quickly, and continued in this state till the last time of the people of the Paradise and the people of the Hell, what would have been achieved by his travel and flying would have been limited and whatever would have remained outside his reach would have been limitless. When the case is this, it is manifest that the first kind of desire of Allah would very often disappear in the other World. The second kind of desire will, however, not cease, rather, whenever the travelling will be severe and the exertion increase in volume the desire will be greater, and the thirst severer and greater.

If some one says 'truth' is the absolute individual free from all kinds of composition. If at all, an individual is known it is known in its entirety, otherwise it is not known. How then that which you have mentioned (could) be understood as is its due.

We say, we shall cite an example in support of our contention, so that the rest may be accordingly reasoned.

We, therefore, say: This physical world which exists at present is, according to the majority of philosophers, composed of particles which do not admit of any further division. Now, if we suppose that Allah, the Exalted, has created, in respect of every atom which cannot be separated from this world, thousand of thousand worlds like this one and then, suppose that these worlds are expanded so much so that they reach

the extreme thinness just to be void of thickness, rendering, rather, the whole into something like a surface which has no depth according to one who asserts that an atom does not split further, and we suppose that a scribe writes on this huge sheet arithmetical figures representing the stages of years, the intellect knows it that there is no way open to it of recording the spans of these years; nor can even a small part of the same be recorded.¹⁶

Then, verily we know when we guess these elongating durations in relation to the meaning of eternity¹⁷ which they dispute, since howsoever they may prolong, heighten or put it out of the grasp of intellect and estimation, they cannot but be limited, while the reality of eternity is limitless; and the limited has no relation whatsoever to the unlimited. Here is, to some extent, realized the nature of our expression that intellects fail to realize the reality of Allah's Grace. When like this you understand the eternity of Allah, the Exalted, you should, similarly, know the objects of His Knowledge, Decree, and the impresses of His Wisdom.

It is, therefore, established by what we have mentioned that love (lit. desire) of Allah, the Exalted, is a lofty place and a noble station. Now, even all that is pleasant while surviving and continuing does not remain pleasant throughout. Similar is the case with that which is painful. But pleasure and pain are only felt when transmitted from one side to the other.¹⁸ And Allah alone possesses (true) Knowledge!

Let us use a parable for it. This is a fact that the states of the creatures in relation to delicate and palatable foods are of three kinds: To the first stage belong the kings who enjoy the favours of Allah and who are generous in all good and pleasant things. As those who continuously and constantly eat good food become

used to them, they would, therefore, necessarily feel not so much pleased with them as with others.

To the second belong those who never eat but coarse unpalatable food and who have surely had no chance of enjoying pleasant food, drinks and putting on (fine) clothes etc.

The third consists of those who mostly eat coarse and distasteful food, but sometimes they get a chance of eating good and tasty meals. When once they [Fol. 259a] 259a have tasted good food but find nothing of the kind later they express their strong desire for it. When they get it they become greedy of it and enjoy it a good deal.

When you have known this, we say, "Though the archangels (الملائكة القربون) enjoy high ranks in gnosis, they are surely in their ranks (and) free from change. They are, therefore, like those kings who constantly eat good food. The angels though constantly receive nutrition with the light of the Grace of Allah, and enjoy the sweet fragrance of zephyr of the Mercy of Allah, do not have any gap in this state, nor do they suffer transference from one rank (to another).

As for the animals, their condition in relation to the appetites is like the condition of the needy who continue in the state of need, harm, misery and disgrace. Nor can they get transferred from these harmful states to natural states. They do not, necessarily, feel pained in the states they find themselves in.

A man¹⁹, sometimes, sinks down in the darkness of the maladies of the body, sometimes escapes from them towards the lights of the world of sanctity and the majesty of the canopy of grace, and sometimes he changes from hardship to comfort, and from despair to hope. Now, when they move from darkness to light, and from hiding to the access, they feel pleased with this

enormously. Moreover, they achieve pleasure and bliss so much that no eye has ever seen nor any ear has heard of.²⁰

Here, there is another delicate point. In the case of a man when presence is achieved after absence, pleasure reaches its extremity. Then, when absence occurs after presence while the intellect knows the bliss²¹ it enjoys in presence and observation, the pain rises to its extremity. When these two sorts of states occur (intermittently) in succession, pains and pleasures occur invariably resembling the spiritual titillation (دغدغة).

This sort of bliss and joy is felt by man alone. It is neither felt by those angels who are stationed near Allah, and not in the least by the rest of the animal world. It is, therefore, not far to derive this meaning from the word of Allah, "I know what you know naught". This is the fourth reason.

ON EXPLAINING WISDOM IN CREATING THE FOURTH KIND, THE MAN

We, therefore, say, verily by creating the angels, Allah has manifested His Power, since the fullness of their power indicates the perfection of the might of their Creator; their total immunity from sin also indicates this. The creation of man, on the other hand, indicates the perfection of generosity and mercy. As for the perfection of generosity, this is because there is no relation (مناسبة) between dust and the Grace of the Lord of Lords. Then, Allah (the Truth) by His complete Mercy and Perfect Generosity has made dust the attribute of the atom that bears Divine lights and eternal illuminations.

As for the perfection of Mercy, this is a fact that though man is composed of appetite, anger, and

blameworthy habits (الأخلاق الذميمة), his heart has been entrusted with the light of gnosis, his tongue has been honoured with the recitation of Tawhīd, his eyes have been made a means for seeing the signs of Allah and his ears an instrument for hearing the speech of Allah. So through the angels the Power and Wisdom were revealed, and through man Generosity and Mercy were manifested.

THE SECOND DIVISION

We say: The existent either exists without having any beginning or end—such existent is Allah, the Creator, the Exalted and the Glorified—or exists with a beginning and an end, as is the world—or with a beginning but no end, as are the human souls and the Last Abode (the world hereafter). As for the fourth form of existence which has an end but not beginning, it cannot exist, since it is impossible that anything the eternity of which is established should be void of existence.

When this is established it is manifest that there is more resemblance between human souls and the next world than there is between the human souls and the world. It is also evident that the 'abd (slave, man) is akin to the next world and not to the world. This kinship is a matter of consideration for the souls. It is therefore necessary that man should be more inclined towards the other-worldly [Fol. 259b] spiritual bliss than 259b towards his interest in the immediate happiness.

THE THIRD DIVISION

The created beings are of three kinds²²: they are either perfect, incapable of imperfection, as are the beings of the celestial world whose bodies are celestial spheres, whose hearts are stars, and whose souls are those angels who enjoy nearness to Allah, who remain pure

and perfectly purified. Or, the created objects are imperfect which do not admit of perfection, as are animals especially the genii, devils, the plants and minerals.

A third kind of the created objects consists of those who are sometimes perfect and sometimes imperfect. When they reach the climax of perfection they are with the angels, closely placed near Allah, stationed at the threshold of the Might of Allah, the Exalted, constantly occupied with the remembrance of the Power of Allah, contemplating the ascending steps of the bounties of Allah, relying entirely on the outflow of the grace of Allah, absorbed in the love of Allah, the Exalted. Sometimes, they descend to the level of cattles and the place of appetite and anger. When they descend to the place of appetite they, sometimes, become like a pig kept hungry, then let loose upon filth which he eats; and sometimes, like a fly which is attracted towards refuse whenever it is kept away from it. When they descend to the place of anger, they behave sometimes like a biting dog, and sometimes, like a violent camel, and some other time like a consuming fire, and devastating floods. Such a man, in spite of the fact that he is a single individual, is aptly called an illuminating angel, a darkening devil, an avaricious swine, a patient ass, a barking dog, and a sly fox. For there is no doubt that a single individual manifests all those conflicting conditions and contradictory states which only indicate the existence of a dominant power and an unlimited wisdom.

You must know that man marked with all these qualities²³ has been sent to this House as a traveller. Amīr al-Mu'minīn 'Alī says²⁴: "People are on a journey and this world is a place of temporary halt; it is not a house, where man can settle down permanently, the womb

of his mother is the beginning of his journey, his lifetime being the extent of the distance, his years, his halting places, months his miles and *farsakhs*, days and breathings his steps. The next world is his desired goal. He travels towards this goal like the travelling of the boat with its passenger, having been called to the House of Peace, as Allah says: 'And Allah summoneth (them) to the abode of peace'²⁵. The "House of Peace" is the noblest of all places. Allah Himself says: "Gardens underneath which rivers flow"²⁶.

NOTES

1. مراتب الوجودات: According to al-Fārābī the principal existents by which the bodies and accidents are constituted are of six kinds in six stages each one of which encompasses the lower stage—the First Cause in the First Stage, the Secondary Cause in the Second Stage, the Active Intellect (العقل الفعال) in the Third Stage, the Soul in the Fourth Stage, the Form in the Fifth Stage and the Matter in the Sixth Stage. The first three are not corporeal and the remaining three though not corporeal are in bodies. Bodies are also six—the heavenly body, the rational animal, the non-rational animal, plants, minerals and four elements. All these bodies taken together form the world, vide Al-Fārābī: al-Siyāsāt al-Madaniyyah, Hyderabad, p. 2.
2. عقل, Human intellect or human understanding is an ability by which man can know anything from the simplest objects of sense to the ultimate realities. The Arabic word العقل, especially as used by Imām Ghazzālī, is more comprehensive than the English word 'reason'. Imām Ghazzālī has traced four stages or elements in العقل as it develops in man: (1) an undeveloped primitive rational faculty, (2) self-evident truths, (3) knowledge العلم, and (4) a highly developed faculty in man capable of understanding or knowing the ultimate realities. Of these 'knowledge' is generally expressed by the word reason. Cf. Ihyā' al-'Ulūm, Vol. I, p. 76, 'Umaruddīn: Some Fundamental Aspects of Imām Ghazzālī's Thought, p. 33.
3. حكمة: Al-Hikmah means understanding and knowledge, as in the verses: ولقد اتينا لقمان و اتيناه الحكم صبيا Luqmān: أولئك الذين اتيناهم الكتاب والحكمة, An'am: وما انزل عليكم من (Hikmah means مواعظ القرآن), al-Nisā': أنزل عليك الكتاب والحكمة. It also means النبوة, prophethood, as in al-Nisā': و قد اتينا آل إبراهيم الكتاب والحكمة and ص: و اتاه الله الملك والحكمة, al-Baqarah: و اتيناه الحكم; ادع إلى سبيل ربك بالحكمة: means the Qur'ān, as in al-Nahl: و من يوت الحكمة فقد أوتي خيرا كثيرا. Consequently all these meanings refer to knowledge, vide Al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, Vol. I, p. 265.

4. طبيعة 'Nature' is a most ambiguous word, both in common language and in Aristotle. Nature, according to Aristotle, is concerned with the invariable, as habit with the frequent. Aristotle often says that things that happen by nature happen invariably or in a majority of cases, vide Phys. B 8. 198 b35, Rhēt. A 11. 1370 a7.

According to Ibn Miskawaih, "the movement of the Soul is in two directions. In the first it moves towards its source and contemplates it, and thereby perceives all the intelligible verities which are in the Intelligence. The second movement of the Soul is downwards, and to this movement the whole world and all the spheres owe their existence and activity. This downward motion of the Soul has two levels: the higher where it acts as a transcendental principle of form, order and intelligent direction, and the lower where it operates as an immanent principle of life and growth. The lower becomes so distinct from the higher that it may be treated as the fourth principle. It is called Nature. Nature is simultaneously the totality of material beings, and the law that governs their motion, the active force that energizes them to growth and perfection. Nature is not material nor is it a function of matter. It is the lowest of all spiritual existences, the slumbering Soul, so to say," vide M. 'Adul Haqq Anṣārī: The Ethical Philosophy of Miskawaih, Aligarh 1964, p. 55, cf. Al-Fauz al-Aṣghar, pp. 150-152.

5. شهوة: Shahwat is the disposition which enables the body to obtain what is good for it; it includes such qualities as hunger, thirst etc. According to Aristotle (De An. 9 ad fin.), moderate men, although they have desire and appetite, do not follow their desire, but obey reason.
6. الملائكة: Angels. "The philosophers identify the Aristotelian concept of a separate intellect with the Jewish concept of an angel. In the scholastic philosophy of the thirteenth century this identification of angel and separate intellect by the Arabic philosophers was known, but it was often denied" (see Vanden Bergh, Tahāfut, Notes, pp. 135). Ibn Sina says that the spiritual abstract angels, الملائكة الروحانية المجردة, of the highest degree are called intellects, whereas the angels of the second degree, the active angels, i.e. the movers of the Stars, are called Souls. In Qazwīnī's Cosmography (ed. Wüstenfeld, pp. 55 sqq.) there is

given a long list of angels who are inhabitants of heaven, 'some of them are wholly absorbed in adoration of God'. He mentions also the movers of the stars, of whom (he says) there are seven, but according to him the exact number of angels is known only to God.

S. M. Vanden Bergh (Notes on Tahāfut, p. 162) displays his ignorance of the Qur'ānic conception of angels when he says: "Muslim angelology was influenced by Neoplatonism (cf. Plotinus Enn. III. 5. 6), which regarded the stars as gods of a secondary order, subsidiary and related to the intelligible gods and dependent on them...."

Imām Rāzī has elaborately discussed the nature, the function and importance of angels in his Tafsīr, *vide* al-Kabīr, Vol. I, pp. 377-381 which clearly establishes that Muslim conception of angel is quite different from that of Plotinus. cf. *Infra* Notes 10 and 13.

7. Al-Qur'ān, al-Taḥrīm: 6, al-Naḥl: 50.
 8. Cf. Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics (No. 4), the Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1956, p. 129.
 9. Sūrah al-Baqarah: 30.
 10. Cf. T. al-Kabīr, Vol. I, p. 444:
- فلاّ نهم مواظبون على الخدمة دائماً يسبحون الليل والنهار لا يفترون، لا يلحقهم نوم العيون ولا سهو العقول ولا غفلة الأبدان، طعامهم التسبيح وشرابهم التقديس والتمجيد والتهليل و تنفسهم بذكر الله وفرحهم بخدمة الله متجردون من العلائق البدنية غير محجوبين بشيء من القوى الشهوانية والغضبية،
11. الوجودات: Imām Rāzī has divided the existents in a logical way into four kinds which he explains afterwards. Imām Rāghib Iṣfahānī has divided them into two broad kinds: (1) Heavenly mental objects, and (2) terrestrial sensible objects. He then mentions that Allah created the Ruḥāniyyāt, Spiritual beings, next, the four elements, the inanimate (الجمادات), the growing (النباتات) objects and the animals (الحيوانات), and set the seal with the human form. Moreover, his title of the second chapter تفصيل النشأتين في ذكر اجناس الوجودات وموضع

الإنسان منها، may be compared with the expression of Imām Rāzī: في شرح مرتبة الإنسان من مراتب الموجودات. Cf. K. Taḥṣīl al-Naṣḥ'atain wa Taḥṣīl al-Sa'ādatain li al-Imām Abū al-Qāsim al-Ḥusain b. Muhammad. b. al-Mufaḍḍal al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, Beirut, 1319 A.H., p. 15.

12. Cf. T. al-Kabīr I. p. 425:

لان ترك الخير الكثير لاجل الشر القليل شر كثير

The good (الخير) is what everything desires. When the first being knew the perfect good *in potentia*....it emanated from him....and that is the eternal providence and will. Thus good came within the divine decree essentially, not accidentally, while evil came accidentally. Evil (الشر) may be said to be deficiency, like ignorance and impotence, or like pain and sickness, or like fornication and theft. In fine, evil *per se* is privation, i.e. the loss of a thing's true and perfect nature. Evil absolutely does not exist, except in speech and thought. Accidental evil exists *in potentia*, because of matter. It begins through a certain disposition (ḥai'ah) which prevents its proper receptiveness of the perfection towards which it moves. The pernicious result is due, not to a privative act of the agent, but to the unreceptiveness of the object, thus arise bad morals, the dominion of the bestial over the human mind, giving rise to evil practices and corrupt beliefs; or the evil influence may come from without, as from parents or teachers. Evil, coming in thus accidentally, is rightly rewarded with destruction because of the existence of the opposing cause. When evil is mixed with good it is most proper that it should be brought into existence....otherwise a universal good would be lost in the interest of a particular evil....A good example is fire. See *Shahrastānī*, K. Nihāyatul-Iqdām ed. & trans. by A. Guillaume, Oxford, 1934, pp. 90-1.

13. الشوق غير حاصل للملكة: Cf. Al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr I, p. 448: ان الله تعالى خلق الملكة عقولا بلا شهوة، وخلق البهائم شهوات بلا عقل، وخلق الادسي وجمع فيه بين الامرين - See also Ma'ālim 'Uṣūl al-Dīn on the margin of al-Muḥassal, al-Ḥusayniyyah Press, Egypt, p. 107:
- ان الملكة جواهر مقدسة عن ظلمات الشهوات وكدورات الغضب قطعاً، وطعامهم التسبيح وشرابهم التهليل والتقديس وانسهم بذكر الله تعالى، وفرحهم بعبودية الله تعالى، فكيف يمكن مناسبتهم بالموصوف بالشهوة والغضب -

14. Sūrah al-Anbiyā': 20

15. قال عليه السلام: When a gnostic finds himself before God a slight error committed by him is considered a great sin. The Holy Prophet therefore constantly sought forgiveness from Allah just to remain free from any blemish. The ḥadīth has been referred to in Lawāmi' al-Bayyinat also with some difference in wordings vide p. 103:

واعلم ان هذا المقام لما كان في غاية العلو كان القصور فيه من اعظم الذنوب، قال عليه الصلاة والسلام: "انه ليغان على قلبي وانى لاستغفر الله في اليوم والليلة سبعين مرة".

16. ولان ضبط القليل منها: This argument seems to have been derived from the divine statement in Sūrah Luqmān, verse No. 27: "And if all the trees in the earth were pens, and the sea, with seven more seas to help it, (were ink), the words of Allah could not be exhausted. Lo! Allah is Mighty, Wise."

17. See Supra Note 5 (the Preamble) p. 38.

18. اللذة: Pleasure is defined as the perception of the agreeable, the stronger the perception and the nobler the perceptible the more perfect the pleasures. Now, what is agreeable to the human soul is to perceive the intelligibles, intellectual perception being nobler *per se* than the sensible perception. Cf. Fakhr Rāzī: al-Mabāḥiṭh al-Mashriqiyyah, Hyderabad, Vol. II, p. 427:

اللذة هي ادراك الملائم، واذا كان كذلك فمقي كان الادراك اشد والمدرك اشرف كانت اللذة الحاصلة أتم، والملائم للنفس الانسانية هو ادراك المعقولات، والادراك العقلي اشد اكتناها من الادراكات الحسية الخ.

Cf. Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, X, iii 6: if pleasure is a replenishment of the natural state, the pleasure will be felt by the thing in which the replenishment takes place. Therefore it is the body that feels pleasure. But this does not seem to be the case. Therefore pleasure is not a process of replenishment, though while replenishment takes place, a feeling of pleasure may accompany it just as a feeling of pain may accompany a surgical operation.

19. الانسان: Man is composed of various dispositions, sometimes he resembles angels and sometimes animals through his intellect and appetite. Cf. Rāghib: Al-Dharī'ah, p. 17 :

الانسان لما ركب تركيباً بين بهيمة وملك، فشبّهه للبهائم بما فيه من الشهوات البدنية من المأكّل والمشرب والنكح، وشبّهه للملك بما فيه من القوى الروحانية من الحكمة والعدلّة والجلود صار واسطة بين جوهريّن رفيع وضعيع، ولهذا قال تعالى: وهديناه النجدين، فالنجدان من وجه العقل والهوى، ومن وجه الآخرة والدنيا، ومن وجه الإيمان والكفر ومن وجه الهدى والضلالة، ومن وجه موالاة الله عز وجل وموالاة الشيطان المذكورتان في قول الله عز وجل: "الله ولي الذين آمنوا يخرجهم من الظلمات الى النور والذين كفروا اولياؤهم الطاغوت يخرجونهم من النور الى الظلمات ومن وجه النور والظلمة.... اي الفضيلة والنجاسة، ومن وجه الحياة والموت المذكوران في قوله تعالى ومن كان ميتاً فأحييناه -

20. عظم التذاهم: The idea has been expressed more clearly in his al-Mabāḥiṭh, Vol. II, Hyderabad, p. 427. He says:

فمقي كان الادراك اشد والمدرك اشرف كانت اللذة الحاصلة أتم، والملائم للنفس الانسانية هو ادراك المعقولات. والادراك العقلي اشد اكتناها من الادراكات الحسية، والمدرك العقلي هو الباري تعالى وصفاته وملائكته وكيفية وضع العالم، واذا كانت الادراكات العقلية للنفس اكمل من الادراكات الحسية وادوم منها واكثر عدداً منها، والمدركات العقلية اشرف من المدركات الحسية بل لا نسبة لاحدهما الى الآخر، وجب ان يكون الالتذاذ العقلي اقوى بكثير من الالتذاذ الحسي بل لا يكون لاحدهما الى الآخر نسبة -

21. السعادة: Happiness or Sa'adah is "the activity of virtue in a complete life. Virtue deals with Pleasure and Pain". Cf. Magna Moralia, II. VII 2. Loeb Classical, Heinemann, Harvard University Press, p. 615. Every pleasure is not a "process of becoming". The pleasure arising from mental contemplation is no process, nor is that which arises from hearing and sight and smell. For these are not the consequence of some need or deficiency, as in the case of the others, those, for example, which follow eating or drinking. These latter arise from deficiency or excess, either when the deficiency is replenished or when we are deprived of the excess; and so we regard them as a process. But deficiency and excess are pain; so that where pleasure arises, there is pain: op. cit., pp. 617-19. Pain is to perceive the

contrary: **والألم إدراك منافع**, vide *Muḥaṣṣal, al-Ḥusayniyah*, 1st ed., p. 115 ft. note last line. **لذة** (Pleasure) is to perceive the agreeable: **اللذة هي إدراك الملائم**, vide *al-Mabāḥiṭh al-Maḥriqiyyah*, Vol. II, p. 427, Hyderabad edition; *supra*, Note No. 18, p. 58.

22. This tripartite division seems to be derived from Rāghib's *Tafṣīl al-Naṣḥ'atāin*, Chapter III, according to which man has been declared as holding an intermediary position between *al-Malā'ikah*, angels, and *al-Ḥaiwānāt*, animals; vide p. 29:

الانسان من بين الموجودات مخلوق خلقه تصليح للدارين ، و ذلك ان الله تعالى قد اوجد ثلاثة انواع من الاحياء . نوعا للدار الدنيا وهي الحيوانات ، ونوعا للدار الآخرة وهو الملائكة الأعلى ، ونوعا للدارين ، وهو الانسان ، فالانسان واسطة بين جوهريين - وضيق وهو الحيوانات ، ورفيع وهو الملائكة - فجمع فيه قوى العالين وجعله كالحيوانات في الشهوة البدنية والغذاء والتناسل والمهارة والمناعة وغير ذلك من اوصاف الحيوانات ، وكالملائكة في العقل والعلم وعبادة الرب والصدق والوفاء ونحو ذلك من الاخلاق الشريفة .

Also see Rāghib: *al-Dhārī'ah*, Second edition, Al-Waṭan Press, p. 16:

الانسان وان كان هو يكونه انسانا افضل موجود ، فذلك بشرط ان يراعى ما به صار انسانا ، وهو العلم الحق والعمل المحكم فبقدر وجود ذلك المعنى فيه الفضل ،... فاما الانسان من حيث ما يتغذى وينسل فنبات ومن حيث ما يحس ويتحرك فحيوان ومن حيث الصورة التخطيطية فكصورة في جدار ، واما فضيلته فبالنطق وقواه ومقتضاه ، فالانسان يضارع الملك بقوة النطق والعلم والفهم ويضارع البهيمة بقوة الغذاء والنكاح ، فمن صرف همته كلها الى تربية الفكر بالعلم والعمل فخلق بان يلحق باقى الملك فيسمى ملكا وربانيا ، كما قال تعالى ، "ان هذا الا ملك كريم" ، ومن صرف همته كلها الى تربية القوة الشهوانية با تباع الذات البدنية يا كل كما تاكل الانعام فخلق بان يلحق باقى البهائم فيصير ما غمرا كثور ، واما شرها كخنزير ، واما ضرعا ككلب او حقودا كجمل او متكبرا كنمر او ذاروغان كثعلب او جامعا كدبك او يجمع ذلك كله كشیطان مرید -

Cf. *Al-Ghazzālī: Ihya'* III, p. 9:

....والانسان على رتبة بين البهائم والملائكة ، فان الانسان من حيث يتغذى وينسل فنبات ، ومن حيث يحس ويتحرك بالاختيار فحيوان ومن حيث صورته وقامته فكصورة المنقوشة على العائط ، واما خاصيته معرفة حقايق الاشياء فمن استعمل جميع اعضائه وقواه على وجه الاستعانة بها على العلم والعمل ، فقد تشبه بالملائكة فحقيق بان يلحق بهم وجدير بان يسمى ملكا ربانيا كما اخبر الله تعالى عن صوابات يوسف بقوله : ما هذا بشرا ، ان هذا الا ملك كريم - ومن صرف همته الى اتباع اللذات البدنية يا كل كما تاكل الانعام فقد انحط الى حضيض افق البهائم فيصير ما غمرا كثور واما شرها كخنزير واما ضرعا كثعلب او سنور او حقودا كجمل او متكبرا كنمر او ذاروغان ككلب او يجمع ذلك كله كشیطان مرید -

also see *Mizān al-'Amal*, 2nd ed. 1342 H. *al-Maṭba'ah al-'Arabiyyah*, Egypt, p. 25: **كشیطان مرید** as quoted from the *Ihya'* with slight change in expression.

23. Cf. *Imām Rāghib al-Isfahāni: al-Dhārī'ah*, p. 11:

الانسان مركب من جسم مدركه البصر ، و نفس مدركها البصيرة ، واليهما اشار بقوله تعالى : انى خالق بشرا من طين فاذا سويته ساجدين ، فالاشارة بالروح الى النفس وجود النفس فى الانسان بانها هى التى يحصلوها فى الجسم تحصل الحياة والحركة والحس والعلم والرأى وهى محل الاغراض الروحانية كالجسم فى كونه محلا للاغراض الجسمانية -

24. The same idea has been expressed in his *Tafsir* and is obviously derived from the saying of 'Ali (Rd.). See *Tafsir*, I, p. 5:

فاعلم ان الانسان كالمسافر فى هذه الدنيا ، وسنوه كالفراسخ و شهره كالا ميل ، وانفاسه كالخطوات ، ومقصده الوصول الى عالم اخره لان هناك يحصل الفوز بالباقيات الصالحات -

Cf. *Abū al-Qāsim al-Ḥusain b. Muḥammad al-Rāghib al-Isfahāni: al-Dhārī'ah ilā Makārim al-Sharī'ah*, Second edition, Al-Waṭan Press, p. 9:

الانسان في هذه الدار كما قال علي رضي: الناس سفر والدنيا دار
ممر لا دار مقر وبطن امه مبدأ سفره و الاخرة مقصده و زمان
حياته مقدار مسافته ، و سنته منازل و شهوره فراسخه و ايامه
امياله و انقاسه خطاه سير السفينة يراكبها كما قيل :
رأيت اخا الدنيا وإن كان خافضا
أخا سفر يسرى به وهو لا يدري

25. Sūrah Yūnus: 25.

26. Āl 'Imrān: 15; al-Mā'idah: 122; al-Burūj: 122; al-Ḥadīd: 21

CHAPTER II

On the assertion of what preceded in a way different but nearest to the established view.

You must know, the existents are of four kinds, in respect of Intellectual classification, because they:

- (i) either affect and are not at all affected in any way,
- (ii) or, receive effects but do not affect anything in any way,
- (iii) or, affect and are also affected at the same time,
- (iv) or, neither affect nor are affected at all.

These are the four kinds of existent and they do not admit of any more.

As for the first kind of existent which affects but is not at all affected, it is Allah, the True, the Sublime and the Exalted, as He is the Necessary Being in respect of His Essence and in respect of the Reality of His Heity¹ and that which is a Being Necessary in respect of this essence is a Necessary Being in all respects, since if His Particular Essence satisfies this definite affirmation and this definite negation, the affirmation and the negation must become eternal due to the Eternity of His Essence.

If, however, His particular Essence does not satisfy then, the negation and the affirmation will depend upon considering the condition of others and His Heity will depend upon the realization of this affirmation and this negation. Now, that which depends upon something which itself depends on something else depends upon

that last something else. His reality is then described as depending upon this something external. Now, that which depends upon something else is in its essence a possible being and a possible being is only produced by a Being, necessary in its essence. Production itself is a mode of affecting something. In so far as this productive Being is essentially independent it does not accept any effect [Fol. 260a] from other than itself, as it exists by itself. In so far as it affects everything other than itself and brings into being everything that is other than itself, it sustains something other than itself. That which exists by itself and sustains something else is in the highest rank of self-sustenance. The title of Him Who holds this description is the attribute of Qayyūm², an exaggerative noun derived from 'Qiyām'. It is, therefore, established that Allah, the True, Who affects others and is not affected is a pure Qayyūm, Self-existing. It is for this reason that the well-versed savants have agreed that the most sublime a verse in the Book of Allah, the Exalted, is His expression: "Allah! There is no God save Him, the Alive, the Eternal."³

As for the second kind of being which receives effects but does not affect others, it is matter. To us it is established that the matter of this corporeal universe is (a collection of) atoms which are indivisible. According to others the matter of the body is an existent which does not occupy space, its form being acceptance of space and size.

Now that you have recognized this we say: These particles are not *per se* hot, cold, moist, dry, nor joined and disjoined. But they accept these descriptions and conditions.

These particles are called by some of them "the forms" (الهيئات, the figures), which only contain absolute receptivity, obedience and submission. Since

existence is conferred by way of generosity, it can only be caused by the existent. Receptivity and getting affected are only caused by deprivation (of existence or effect). It is, therefore, said in the Divine Book: "Allah is the Rich, and you are the poor."⁴

When you have known this we say: Existence is nobler than the absence of existence. It is for this reason that the noblest being which affects and is not affected is Allah, the Sublime and the Exalted; and the most debased is that which is affected but does not affect others and it is 'matter'.

As for the third kind which affects and is, at the same time, affected, it is the universe of spirits and souls. This is because of the fact that when it is established that the Necessary Being is only one it is established that anything other than the One is possible in its essence and what is possible in its essence does not exist except when it is produced by something else, and the object receives effect from this something else. It is, therefore, established that spirits receive effect from something else. As for the fact that spirits affect others, some of them hold that which affects is one only. This is because the beings which are possible are sharers in the meaning of possibility and the meaning of possibility stands in need of an agent which affects either a definite agent in itself or an indefinite agent in itself. It is, however, absurd that possibility should depend on an indefinite agent, as what is essentially not definite does not exist *per se*, and what does not exist *per se* cannot impart existence to something else. When this second thesis is reduced to absurdity, the first is necessarily established, *viz.*, the possibility stands in need of something which is definite in itself. Every possible thing stands in need of the definite, as demonstrated. Hence,

there is only one affecting agent.

Again, they say, spirits cause change; they are not affecting agents. Others say, spirits produce effect in the corporeal world, they set bodies in an order and organise them. This view has been supported by philosophical arguments and has been strengthened by prophetic revelations. Allah has said describing the angels: "By those winds who distribute (blessings) by command", and said, "By those who govern the event".⁵

When this has been established, it is evident that according to either view the world of spirits is in between the Divine world and the corporeal world not by way of shape and direction but by way of nobility and rank. Therefore, in so far as they (the spirits) produce effects in corporeal objects, they are not below the physical bodies. Undoubtedly, the rank of the spirits is in between the first two ranks (the Divine World and the Physical world).

When you have known this, we say, "The spiritual objects⁶ are of different ranks and positions. The highest position is held by those who [Fol. 260b] have completely lost themselves into the light of the glory of the Nourishing Lord so much so that they hardly find time for administering the corporeal universe, their food being Tawhīd, Oneness of Allah", and their drink التوحيد and التفريد (separating Him from everything else as Unique and exalting Him). They have lost themselves in the lights of His Grace and are never free for anything other than Allah—They are the Angels who (by their service and worship) stand close to Allah. This rank has been indicated by the Divine Book in the expression: "And those who dwell in His Presence are not too proud to worship Him, nor do they weary".⁷

Again, this category of spiritual beings occupies ranks in gnosis to which there is no end and which are

known only to Allah. This is because we have explained that lights of the glory of Allah have no end. Similarly the ranks of gnostics have also no end in their gnosis.

Now, since this category of spiritual beings have no other description except their absorption in the Divine gnosis and their understanding of those August glories, the Metaphysical philosophers necessarily call this category of Spirits pure Intellects. This is because although they are substances which exist in themselves, the abundance of their number and strength of their gnosis have made them appear as though they were identical with the intelligibles and were same as their realizations.

If anybody says: "On what basis do you say that for this category of spiritual beings nothing remains but to accept existence from the True one and sanctity from the lights which reveal the glory of the True one. This is all passivity and acceptance of casuality. Now, where is the capacity to cause effects and where is action"?

We shall say: Though the spiritual beings are deeply absorbed in the understanding of the Divine Everlasting Lights, it is not a remote possibility that they emit their impressions to the world of the Celestial Spirits or the heavenly bodies in the same way as light emanates from the sun and life from the spirit. On this assumption they are active agents. It is also not a remote possibility that the spirits occupy a grade out of the grades accorded to the illuminating souls, when they are in a lower state than others. They receive lights from this 'other' who is more perfect than themselves. Take, for example, the sun and the moon. Although both the sun and the moon are two high noble substances in the corporeal world, the moon is evidently weaker in condition than the sun, and necessarily

derives light from the sun. But, after receiving light from the sun the moon becomes generous and transmits it to the low terrestrial world. It is not unlikely that the same is the condition of the spiritual beings.

To the Second rank of the world of Spirits and Souls, however, belong those who attend the administration of the world of bodies and who do not go to excess in their absorption into the passion for the August Eternity so as to become unmindful of attending the horizon of the lowest corporeal body. This rank also varies in nobility, the nobler and stronger the body they understand, the higher and more illuminating are they in themselves.

Since the most sublime of all that exists in the corporeal horizon is the Throne⁸ (العرش), the strongest of all the spirits related to the administration of bodies in the Spirit that rules the globe of the Throne. It is by no means a remote possibility that this Spirit is called the greatest spirit⁹, nor is it unlikely that it has faculties and offshoots which exist in the sides of the globe. These off-shoots may have other branches which have been referred to in the Qur'ānic expression: "and eight (angels) will uphold the Throne of their Lord that day, above them".¹⁰ Reference has been made to the branches of the offshoots in another Qur'ānic expression: "And thou (O' Muḥammad) seest the angels thronging round the Throne, hymning the praises of their Lord".¹¹

The next rank belongs to the Spirit that rules the Chair, as Allah has said, "His throne includeth the heavens and the earth".¹²

This second rank is followed by the Spirits that administer the sphere of the Zuḥal (Saturn), next the rest of the spheres of heavens and the orbits of stars in accordance with their various ranks and positions until

we come to the spirits that administer the sphere of the moon, the sphere of the air, the water, the oceans, the earth and its mountains. All this we have mentioned in accordance with the speech of the law-giver. The Prophet has [Fol. 261a] said, "There came to me the angel of oceans¹³ and said so and so, the angel of mountains, the angel of thunder, the treasurer of the Paradise and the treasurer of the Hell". 261a

All that we have mentioned and explained has been established by proof and has further been stressed by the revelation and the Qur'ān.

Know that you have now realized that the first kind is nobler than the second kind among the categories of spiritual beings. It is not unlikely that noble and high lights flow¹⁴ from the first kind over the second kind and impart strength to the spirit to administer these bodies through the lights that flow from the first.

You should also know that it is evident from what we have explained that the worlds of the souls and Spirits begin with the noble ones gradually descending to the lower ones till they reach the parts of the ranks touching the terrestrial spirits which are in relation to general spirits like the relation that the bodies enjoy with each other. Now, the terrestrial spirits vary among themselves very much in nobility and debasement, the loftiest and noblest of them being the human spirits which are followed by the animal spirits which are followed by the vegetative faculties which also belong to the genus of spirits, and are the last of the ranks of the realm of spirits. This is the discussion on the ranks of the Third Division which deals with existents that affect and receive effects at the same time.

The fourth kind, that is, the existent which neither affects nor receives an effect cannot exist among the

intellects. For, when we have proved that anything other than the One, the True, is essentially possible in existence, necessary due to something else, it follows logically that what is other than the One has received effects from the One, and exists due to the One, and has come into being through the One. Hence, this kind is impossible.

Some people hold that the sphere that has no end and the duration that has no limit belongs to this kind. But it involves many delicate, hidden mysteries which do not deserve to be mentioned in this place.

NOTES

1. ولحقيقة هويته : Cf. al-Qaiṣary: *Sharḥ Fuṣūṣ al-Hikam*:

الذات الالهية اذا اعتبرت من حيث هي اعم من ان تكون موصوفة بصفة او غير موصوفة فهي مسماة عند القوم بالهوية و حقيقة الحقائق ، واذا اعتبرت مجردة عن الصفات الزائدة عليها فهي المسماة بالاحدية ، واذا اعتبرت متصفة بجميع الصفات الكمالية فهي مسماة بالواحدية ، والالهية مشتملة عليها ، وهذا احد الفروق بين الاحدية والواحدية .

2. هو صفة القيوم : God must be essentially One and all else is possible depending on the One Who will, thus, be a cause for establishing everything else in general. Thus Allah must be Qayyūm. Cf. al-Rāzī: K. Lawāmi' al-Bayyināt, al-Sharafiyyah Press, Egypt, 1323 A.H. p. 226:

.... يكون الواحد واجبا ، والباقي ممكنا ، فذلك الواحد يكون واجبا بذاته يكون قائما بذاته ، غنيا عن غيره ، ولما كان كل ما سواه ممكنا ، وكل ممكن فهو مستند الى الواجب كان كل ما سواه مستندا اليه وكان هو سببا لوجود كل ما سواه ، فكان هو سببا لتقوم كل ما سواه ، فثبت ان ذلك الواحد قائم بذاته على الاطلاق ، وسبب لقوام كل ما سواه على الاطلاق فوجب ان يكون قيوما لانها مبالغة من اقيام ، وكمال المبالغة انما يحصل عند الاستغناء به عن كل ما سواه واقتدار كل ما سواه اليه . فثبت بهذا البرهان النيرانه سبحانه هو القيوم الحق بالنسبة الى كل الموجودات -

3. Sūrah al-Baqarah: 255.
4. Sūrah Muḥammad : 38.
5. Sūrah al-Dhāriyāt : 4 ; al-Nazī'āt : 5.
6. الروحانيات مراتب : The spiritual beings are the angels. See Note No. 6 (Ch. I).

According to the Christians, Angels are in reality immaterial rational souls. They further hold that if these souls are pure and good they are angels, but if they are evil-natured and vicious they are Satans.

Philosophers hold that Angels are self-supporting independent substances which have no *حيز*, shape, and which differ in

quiddity from the human rational souls. Moreover, they are more perfect than the human souls in power, knowledge, and are divisible into two—one group having no duty of administering the heavens, for example, and remaining fully absorbed in Divine gnosis, love and obedience, and another group looks after the heavenly affairs. Some philosophers speak of some other kinds of angels—those which are terrestrial and administer the worldly affairs, the good and virtuous which are called angels, ملائكة, and the vicious are the satans. See al-Tafsir al-Kabir, I. pp. 376-77.

7. Al-Anbiyā': 19 also Al-A'rāf: 205.

8. العرش: The philosophers call it "Falak al-Aflāk", the highest heaven. Cf. M. A'lā al-Thānawī: Kashshāf Iṣṭilāḥāt al-Funūn, Vol. II, Calcutta, 1862, p. 981:

العرش بالفتح وسكون الراء والمهمله في لسان اهل الشرع ،
هو الذي سماه الحكماء فلك الافلاك ،

According to the Sūfis العرش الاكبر applies to the heart of the "Perfect Man": op. cit.

والعرش الاكبر عند الصوفية قلب الانسان الكامل

9. الروح الاعظم: The Great Spirit. But Sayyid Sharif applies it to the human spirit (الروح الانساني). He says:

'الروح الاعظم الذي هو الروح الانساني مظهر الذات الالهية من حيث ربوبيتها ، ولذلك لا يمكن ان يحوم حولها حائث ولا يروم وصلها رائث لا يعلم كنهها الا الله تعالى ، ولا ينال هذه البغية سواه وهو العقل الاول ، والحقيقة المحمدية والنفس الواحدة والحقيقة الاسمائية ، وهو اول موجود خلقه الله على صورة وهو الخليفة الاكبر ، وهو الجوهر النوراني ، جوهرته مظهر الذات ونورانية مظهر علمها ، ويسمى باعتبار الجوهرية نفسا واحدة وباعتبار النورانية عقلا اوليا ، وكما ان له في العالم الكبير مظاهر واسماء من العقل الاول ، والقلم الاعلى والنور والنفس الكلية والروح المحفوظ وغير ذلك له في العالم الصغير الانساني مظاهر واسماء يحسب ظهوراته ومراتبه في اصطلاح اهل الله وغيرهم ، وهي السر والخفاه والروح والقلب والكلمة والروح والفؤاد والصدر والعقل والنفس -

Taftazani's exposition distinguishes three conceptions of angelology: there is that of Islamic orthodoxy; there is that of

our *falāsifa*, dividing the angelic hierarchies into pure Intelligences or Archangels—Cherubs, and Angels—Souls entrusted with the government of a body; finally, there is that of the Aṣḥāb al-Tilimsat, the theurgic Sages, a designation that can here include the "Sabians" of Harrān and the Ishrāqiyun theosophists. Their doctrine has the peculiarity that it does not stress the 'aql, the Angel's organ of self-intellection, which permits the philosophers their angelological deduction of the cosmos, pressing the hierarchy of the heavens as a sort of phenomenology of the angelic consciousness. The theurgic doctrine lays more stress on the Rūh: instead of al-'Aql al-Awwal, it says al-Rūḥ al-A'zam, the Supreme Spirit; it recognizes, for each species, for each category of beings, a governing and protecting Angel. This notion is in harmony with the fundamental notion of Ishrāqī Neo-Zoroastrianism, and it finally leads to that of the Perfect Nature.

The exposition drawn from Fakhrudīn Rāzī has the advantage of defining a principle of systematization from the outset. Everyone, Fakhr declares, agrees upon the existence of Angels, regarding it as the supereminent prerogative of the world above, and conceiving them as personal essences subsisting of themselves. The divergence arises at the point of determining whether these pure essences occupy space or, on the contrary, cannot be situated in space.

(Corbin: Avicenna & the Visionary Recital, 1960, London p. 51 sq.)

10. al-Hāqqah: 17.

11. al-Zumar: 75.

12. al-Baqarah: 255.

13. The ḥadīth could not be traced. The idea that an angel is incharge of ocean is supported by the following expression of Ibn 'Abbas recorded by Imām Aḥmad in his Musnad, Vol. V, p. 382:

.... سئل ابن عباس عن المد والجزر، فقال ان ملكا مؤكل بقاموس البحر، فاذا وضع رجله فاضت، واذا رفعها غاضت،

14. ساح الماء سيحا و سيحانا: جرى على الارض

also, al-Qurtubī (Abū 'Abd Allah Muḥammad b. Aḥmad

al-Anṣārī) Vol. VIII, Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyyah, 1938, p. 270, also T. al-Kabīr : Al-Khairiyyah, Cairo, 1308, Vol. IV, p. 504. Imām Rāzī uses this word in a particular meaning. He says that when a man follows the path of submission to Allah and refrains from eating, drinking and mating, he keeps himself away from the evils of passion and the doors of wisdom open to him and the lights of the universe of Grace become manifest for him :

ان اصل السياحة الاستمرار على الذهاب في الارض كالماء الذي يسبح والصائم يستمر على فعل الطاعة وترك المشتبه ، وهو الاكل والشرب والوقاع وعندى فيه اخر ، وهو ان الانسان اذا امتنع من الاكل والشرب والوقاع وسد على نفسه ابواب الشهوات انتتحت عليه ابواب الحكمة وتجلت له انوار عالم الجلال ، ولذلك قال عليه الصلوة والسلام : من اخلص لله اربعين صبا حظرت يتابع الحكمة من قلبه على لسانه فيصير من السامعين في عالم جلال الله المتقلين من مقام الى مقام ومن درجة فيحصل له سياحة في عالم الروحانيات .

In the text the peculiar meaning of Imām Rāzī is, obviously, understood. His reference to Ḥadīth is, however, strange, as it does not find place in reliable collections of Ḥadīth.

CHAPTER III

ON EXPLAINING THE RANKS OF HUMAN SPIRITS

You must know that the precise discussion of this subject cannot be made in a regular manner without advancing an introduction which is as follows : We evidently know that we like something and dislike some other thing. We, therefore, say that here there is either something which is essentially liked or something which is essentially disliked.

Or, it may be said that a thing must either be liked because it contains something, or disliked because it contains something else. The second possibility is absurd, as it leads to a continuous¹ chain of argument (تسلسل) or to a circular² argument (دور, with) infinite regress) both of which are absurd.

Even if we agree with the genuineness of continuity (تسلسل) and circularity (دور), it is certain that on the supposition of the continuous or circular matter there is no such thing as to be liked or disliked in itself. According to this view everything that is liked is disliked in itself. According to this view everything that is liked is liked because it contains something else. It is therefore necessary to hold that there is nothing which is absolutely desirable or absolutely undesirable. But we have explained that it is evidently known that there is surely something which is liked or disliked. Hence, the case is contrary to the assumption. It is, therefore, established that there is someone who is essentially liked

and something which is essentially disliked.

Now, after a thorough discussion and consideration we find nothing about which it may be possibly said that it is essentially liked, except "pleasure" and "perfection". Truly speaking, there is no difference between the two, since what is "pleasant" is the cause of achieving a perfect state of pleasure, and what is "perfect" is "pleasant". Only we call what is physically pleasant "pleasure" and what is spiritually pleasant "perfection".

Again, what is essentially disliked is "pain" and "loss" which have, in fact, for the reason mentioned above, no difference in reality. For, 'perfection' is essentially liked due to its essence in so far as it is perfection, and 'loss' is essentially disliked due to its essence in so far as it is 'loss'.

261b After the strong argument has been cited, this [Fol. 261b] introduction is well-established by several reasons:

1. Firstly, when an imperfect one is described with the attributes of praise and eulogised, he feels pleased though he is aware that the speaker is a liar. And when a perfect man is condemned with the attributes of disparagement, he feels aggrieved though he is aware that the speaker has lied. This is only because of the fact that the very idea of achieving perfection is 'pleasant' in its essence and that of incurring loss is repugnant in its essence.

2. Secondly, when you listen to the story of Rustam and Isfandiyar³ and hear of their immense courage and their victory over their contemporaries, you feel in your heart extreme admiration for them. This is the reason why the story-teller causes the people to crowd around him by telling stories of a similar nature and induces them to take money out of their pockets and offer him. This indicates that "perfection"

is desired for its essence.

3. Thirdly, when we undertake any kind of trade, we put the question to ourselves: "Why have we undertaken to bear the burden of this profession?" We answer, "We have only undertaken this to make money". When we ask, again, "Why do we seek money?" The answer is given by us: "We need money in order to be able to secure pleasures". When we repeat by saying: "Why should we seek pleasures?" We say and our intellect decides that we seek pleasure for its own sake. The case is similar to "perfection" which is also sought for its own sake.

When this introduction is established we say: "Perfection causes strength either in the essence or in the attributes. Perfection in the essence must be essentially necessary in so far as it does not accept, in any way, the absence of existence and annihilation. But to achieve this perfection is not possible, since a thing is either essentially necessary or not. If it is essentially necessary the necessity will be achieved for the essence. What is achieved cannot further be achieved, and if it is not essentially necessary, it becomes impossible for it to turn into what is essentially necessary. Now, that of which the existence is not possible cannot be an object of desire.

It is, therefore, established that the perfection achieved through inherent necessity cannot be the desired object. On the other hand, what is essentially possible comes into being only through something else, and whenever it exists due to something else it is a necessary being as long as this "something else" exists. Hence, it is this 'something else' through which the necessity of its existence is accomplished. When the necessity of existence is desired for its own sake, then anything that causes it is also desired. Now, due to

this concept anything that causes the existence of an object and its continued subsistence in accordance with its best possible condition will be desired for its own sake; and anything that causes the non-existence of something in itself due to the absence of its excellent conditions will be disliked for its own sake.

Since the True, the Exalted and the Eulogized, is a Necessary Being in His Essence, He is the Lover of His Essence, and is the Beloved by virtue of His Essence, and since it is a necessary function of His Essence to cause the possible objects to emanate from Him and we have already explained that which emanates from the beloved is also lovable, therefore, the actions of Allah are lovable. It is for this reason that Allah said: "He loves them and they love Him."⁴ Some of the leading Sufis who listened to this verse said: "It is sure that though Allah loves them, He, in reality, loves His self only".⁵

As for perfection in attributes, we have pondered but found nothing of this kind except Knowledge and Power. Since Knowledge is perfection in its essence, it is essentially lovable.

When you have known this we say: Human spirits, as you have realized, has no way of achieving the essential necessity. They, therefore, desire to achieve necessity through something else. Hence, everything that is the cause of man's life and the continuity of his existence is dear to him essentially and whatever is the cause of his death and annihilation is essentially disliked by him.

As for the discourse on Knowledge and Power, [Fol. 262a] you have known that human spirits have two functions of receiving effects and acting on their own initiative. When they attend to the Divine world they receive effects and when they attend to the

corporeal material world, they act on their own initiative.

When they receive effects from the Divine world, they sometimes receive existence and sometimes the sacred manifestations and spiritual forms which constitute the sciences.

As for their acting upon the material world, this is because they possess authority over this world in so far as they possess the power of dissolving and composing (things) according to their will.

Since there is no end to the stages of knowledge and power, there is also no end to the stages of human love for the two (Knowledge and Power), nor is there any end to brooding over the means of achieving the two desired objects. But it is impossible that a man should attain knowledge without limitation or have power over the objects without any limitation. The knowledge attained by human spirits is limited despite its wide scope and the power over material existents. Whatever its extent, is also limited. Evidently, the human soul does not reach a stage in knowledge and power where it may achieve unlimited things. Hence, it is impossible for the substance of soul to be free from lust and demand. Human lust for securing wealth is only because he wants power over inanimate beings, his lust for attaining a high position is only because he wants power over the spirits of the intelligents, and his lust for contending with figures and wrestling with the brave ones is only because he wants to be powerful and dislikes to be overpowered. All this goes back in origins to the root of power which is an attribute of perfection.

If a man is able to enforce his commands in a town his self aspires to be able to enforce his commands over the whole country, and when he is able to do this, he

aspires to execute his commands over the countries, seas and mountains; nay, he aspires to gain command over the stars and heavenly bodies. Nevertheless, sometimes he does not want this power due to a cause that renders it impossible for him to achieve such power. Hence, he refrains from such an attempt due to some obstacle that stands in his way, and not because he is devoid of such ambition.

Here there is a delicate point, that is, a man does not very much desire to achieve this position before he enjoys the pleasure of power and authority. His longing for achieving this state increases when he tastes it and becomes familiar with it. His inclination towards this can be compared to the faculty of taste. For example, a man hears the name of a beautiful woman and falls in love with her by merely hearing her name without seeing her. When he tastes the pleasure of executive power and authority over her, he loves the woman because of the fact that he saw her, liked her and enjoyed the pleasure of mating with her. Now, mating simply strengthens his love in the substance of his spirit and adds to his lust for mating with her. Similarly, whenever he has access to lofty positions in state and authority, his lust for having more power and more authority increases. It is, therefore, established that there is no end to the lust of a man for achieving knowledge and power. It is also established that the whole of the corporeal world is limited. So, when we suppose that a man governs the whole of the world, the necessary result is that he enjoys a limited kingdom.

We have already explained that man wants unlimited power. The assertion is therefore that even if man enjoys power over the whole of the corporeal world he does not refrain from demanding more power. If

a man achieves the knowledge of all that is covered by existence, his lust for achieving knowledge necessarily remains, as we have explained that what knowledge and power he has achieved is limited and what is absent from him is unlimited, [Fol. 262b] though it lies within 262b his power that the law-giver (peace be upon him!) said: "There are two greedy persons who are never satisfied a seeker of knowledge and a seeker of the world."⁸

Now that you know this, we say: "Though the achievement of power to exercise sway over the lower sphere, *i.e.*, the corporeal world, is a perfection, it entails a limited affair. I mean, the power of the soul to exercise sway over the corporeal world is conditioned by the continuous connection of the soul with body. But this connection may be severed. Now, when the connection is severed, the power is lost; the loss of the beloved after having a long love-affair and suffering a loss that cannot be repaired necessitates a great catastrophe and a strong desire that brings destruction. As a precaution against falling into this undesirable state, this desired object becomes the object of dislike.

As for the engagement of the soul in seeking perfect knowledge, it is pleasure in the present and a happiness in the future. This is because the authority of the Soul over the corporeal world is conditioned with the connection of the soul with the body.

As for the fact that the soul receives the Pure manifestations⁷ and Divine Knowledge, this does not depend upon the connection of the Soul with the body; rather this connection is, as it were, an obstruction in achieving perfection. When this connection is broken, the Divine Manifestations become illumined. It is, therefore, established by what we have mentioned, that attention to the higher sphere for a seeker who receives the Divine Manifestations necessitates perfection in the present and

in the future.

Attending to the lower sphere for the sake of achieving domination over the corporeal world, necessitates pleasure in the present time but, at the same time, it necessitates great pain after death. This is why the people of intelligence have agreed that it is their duty to keep themselves engaged in attaching their spirit to the higher world by turning it away from the lower world. Those who attend to the world of purity surely enjoy continuity without annihilation, honour without disgrace, pleasure without pain, and peace without fear.

When you have known this, it becomes evident that the souls⁸ are of three kinds:—

1. The highest is the position of those who attend to the Divine World, and sink themselves in these everlasting lights, and in the branches of Divine gnosis (Knowledge) and are sometimes called in the Qur'an, "the foremost", as the Qur'an says: "The foremost in the race, the foremost in the race: Those are they who will be brought nigh"⁹, sometimes they are called, "those who will be brought nigh", as the Qur'an has it. "Thus if he is of those brought nigh".¹⁰
2. In the middle position are those souls which attend to both the worlds. Sometimes, they advance upward to the higher world by obeisance and devotion, and, sometimes, descend to the lower world for the sake of administering the affairs of the world and exercising sway over it. They are the people of the right-hand (or righteousness) and the balanced-people.

3. The third position belongs to those who attend to the lower world and are exceedingly occupied in seeking its pleasures. They are the people of the left-hand and are transgressors.

Now, Knowledge that leads to the path of the nearly-placed souls is the science of the spiritual exercises and discipline, and the Knowledge that leads to the path of the people of the right-hand is the science of morals (Ethics).

NOTES

1. التسلسل: It means to arrange things without any limitation. It can be of four kinds : (1) continuation of entities available in existence, or not. The second is like continuation of events, continuity (3) with an arrangement, or without arrangement; the second is like that of rational souls either naturally, such as continuity of cause and effect ('Illat and Ma'lūl) and صفة, description, and موصوف, the object of description, or in constitution like the continuity of bodies. The last two kinds الترتيب والترتيب الوضعي, التسلسل في العلة والمعلول, الطبعي, like التسلسل في الأجسام, are impossible.

2. الدور: To make a thing depend on something that depends upon the thing itself. It is of two kinds :

(١) الدور المصريح كما يتوقف "أ" على "ب" وبالعكس،

(٢) الدور المضمحل (يتوقف بمراتب) كما يتوقف آ على ب، وب

على ج، وج على آ، والفرق بين الدور وبين تعريف الشيء بنفسه هو أن في الدور يلزم تقدمه عليها بمرتبتين أن كان صريحا، وفي تعريف الشيء بنفسه يلزم تقدمه على نفسه بمرتبة واحدة :

Cf. Ta'rūfāt Sayyid Sharīf, Istanbul, 1318, p. 72.

3. Rustam son of Zāl, the most renowned hero among the Persians. Isfandiār son of Gushtasp of the first dynasty of Persian kings.

4. al-Mā'idah : 54.

5. Al-Qushairy has recorded a saying indicating the same meaning: Cf. Al-Risālah al-Qushayriyyah 1940/1359, p. 158 :

وقوم قالوا : بحجة الحق سبحانه للعبد مدحه له وثناؤه عليه بالجليل فيعود معنى محبته له على هذا القول الى كلامه ، وكلامه قديم .

6. منهومان: The full ḥadīth is recorded by Al-Khaṭīb al-Dimashqī in his Mishkāṭ al-Maṣābiḥ, Niẓāmī Press, Delhi, p. 29 :

وعن عون قال قال عبد الله بن مسعود منهومان لا يشعان صاحب العلم وصاحب الدنيا ، ولا يستويان ، أما صاحب العلم فيزداد رضي للرحمان ، وأما صاحب الدنيا فيتمادي في الطغيان ، ثم قرأ عبد الله : كلا إن الإنسان ليطغى أن رآه

استغنى ، قال ، وقال الآخر إنما يخشى الله من عباده العلماء ، رواه الدارمي ،

The same ḥadīth has also been narrated on the authority of Anas :

وعنه (عن انس بن مالك) ان النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم قال : منهومان لا يشعان ، منهوم في العلم لا يشع منه ، ومنهوم في الدنيا لا يشع منها ، روى البيهقي الاحاديث الثلاثة في شعب الايمان ،

The ḥadīth has been referred to by 'Imām Ghazzālī in his Ihyā', III, p. 232.

7. الجلايا: Al-Jaliyyah means, الخبر اليقين, the sure piece of information, Cf. Ibn Sinā: al-Ishārāt wa'l-Tanbihāt, vol. III, Al-Haydari Press, Tehran 1379H. p. 298.

8. النفوس: In fact human souls differ in nature, some are noble and divine, some mean and debased; some are kind and tender and some despotic, dominating; some do not like the body and some desire to rule and achieve position. They never deviate from their nature and disposition but by training and caution they may change their manners and habits. Cf. Al-Tafsīr al-Kabīr, I, p. 121 :

ان النفوس الناطقة البشرية مختلفة بالجواهر والماهية ، فبعضها الهية مشرقة ، حرة كريمة ، وبعضها سفلية ظلمانية ، نذلة خسيسة ، وبعضها رحيمة عظيمة الرحمة ، وبعضها قاسية قاهرة ، وبعضها قليلة الحب لهذه الجسمانيات ، قليلة الميل اليها ، وبعضها محبة للرياسة والاستعلاء ، ومن اعتبر احوال الخلق علم ان الامر كما ذكرناه ، ثم انانرى هذه الاحوال لازمة لجواهر النفوس ، وان كل من راعى احوال نفسه علم ان له منها معينا وطريقا مبينا في الارادة والكراهة والرغبة والرهبة ، وان الرياضة والمجاهدة لا تقلب النفوس عن احوالها الاصلية ومناهجها الطبيعية ، وانما قاتر الرياضة في ان تضعف تلك الاخلاق ولا تستولى على الانسان ، فاما ان يقلب من صفة الى صفة اخرى فذلك محال ، واليه الاشارة بقوله عليه السلام : الناس معادن كعادن الذهب والفضة ، وقوله عليه السلام الارواح جنود مجندة -

اذا عرفت هذا فنقول الجنسية علة الضم فكل اسم من

اسماء الله دال على معنى معين فكل نفس غلب عليها - ذلك المعنى كانت تلك النفس شديدة المناسبة لذلك الاسم ، فاذا واظب على ذكر ذلك الاسم انتفع به سريعا .

وسمعت ان الشيخ ابا النجيب البغدادي السهروردي كان يامر المريد بالاربعين مرة او مرتين بقدر ما يراه من المصلحة ، ثم كان يقرأ عليه الاسماء التسعة والتسعين وكان ينظر الى وجهه ، فان رآه عديم التأثير عند قراءتها عليه قال له اخرج الى السوق ، واشتغل بمهمات الدنيا فانك ما خلقت لهذا الطريق ، وان رآه متأثرا عند سماع اسم خاص مزيد التأثير امره بالمواظبة على ذلك الذكر ،

واقول : هذا هو المعقول ، فانه لما كانت النفوس مختلفة كان كل واحد منها مناسبا لحالة مخصوصة ، فاذا اشتغلت تلك النفس بتلك الحالة التي تناسبها كان خروجها من القوة الى الفعل سهلا هينا يسيرا ،

As for the three states of the human souls in relation to appetite (هوى), Imām Rāzī has likely described after Rāghib. Cf. al-Dharrī'ah, p. 24: وللإنسان مع هواه ثلاثة أحوال. والله أعلم بالحققة

9. al-Wāqī'ah : 11.

10. Ibid., 88.

CHAPTER IV

ON INVESTIGATING THE QUIDDITY OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SOUL

You must know that some one says, "I have come", "I return", "I have heard", "I have understood", and "I have done", he means by this something other than the external sensible structure,¹ and this is indicated by both Reason and Revelation.

As for Reason, a number of proofs support this thesis.

The First Proof: We say, the soul is one. When it is one, it must necessarily be different from the body and all its parts.

As for the first premise, that is our expression, "the soul is one", we stand in between two states. Sometimes, we claim a self-evident knowledge (cognisance), and sometimes we establish argument for the genuineness of the state.

So far as the first, I mean, the claim of a self-evident cognisance, is concerned, we say, what is meant by the soul is that which is mentioned in the expression [Fol. 263a] "I" and this indicates a particular person, and everyone evidently knows when he refers to his particular person by using the expression "I", that this particular person is one and not many.

If it is said, "why is it not possible that this one particularly mentioned person is composed of several entities?" We shall say, we need not here refute this

question, we should rather say, the person referred to in the expression, "I", is evidently known to be one. Now, whether this one is composed of several entities or is one in itself, in its essence, and in reality, does not need any discussion here.

The second stage is the stage of argumentation, and what leads to the attention of the soul is more than one effect. The first proof is anger, so long as it continues it appears at the time of averting an opponent and desiring something which is agreeable, and is conditioned by the consciousness that the object is either agreeable or disagreeable.

The faculty of anger alone averts the opposite factor by way of choice and deliberation. For, the intention to incline to something at one time, and to avert it at another, is conditioned by the consciousness of the thing, and the thing which has been decisively declared to be meant to avert an opponent by way of volition must possess, in a way, consciousness. Having been an opponent and one possessing anger the object must by itself be perceptible; and what possesses appetite must itself be perceptible. It is therefore established by this argument that perception, anger and appetite are three attributes belonging to one and the single self, and that they are not different attributes in different states.

The Second Proof: When we suppose two independent substances, each of the two is independent in its particular function. It is impossible that the occupation of either of them with its own particular function would prevent the other from occupation with its own particular function.

After we have established this, we say, were the place of thinking a substance, that of anger another substance, and that of appetite yet another substance,

it would be necessary that the engagement of the faculty of anger with its own function would not prevent the faculty of appetite from engaging itself with its own function and *vice versa*. But the second premise is absurd, as the engagement of a man with appetite and his inclination towards it prevents him from anger and inclining to it and *vice versa*. Hence, we know that these three faculties are not independent basic faculties. They are, rather, various attributes belonging to one and the same substance. It is, therefore, evident that the engagement of the substance with one particular function prevents it from the other function.

The Third Proof: When we perceive an object our perception causes the achievement either of appetite or that of anger. Now, if the perceived substance is repugnant to that which has anger or that which has appetite, then, when it is perceived by a percipient it is neither with the one possessing appetite nor with the one possessing anger (because the perceived substance is opposite to them). It is, therefore, necessary that this perception is only affected by the achievement of appetite which is identical with the achievement of anger.

Considering this state we come to know that the percipient agent is same as the agent of appetite and also the agent of anger.

The Fourth Proof: The reality of the animal is this that it is a body without a perceiving, voluntarily moving soul, as soul cannot move voluntarily except with a motive which only means consciousness of the good which is desired to be achieved or that of the evil which is desired to be averted. It, therefore, demands that what is voluntarily moved must itself perceive the good, the evil, the harmful, and the injurious.

It is, therefore, established by what we have

discussed that the human soul is one entity and that the soul is seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching and is itself characterised with having imagination, thinking, [Fol. 263b] remembering, administration of the body and maintaining its welfare.

When you have known this, let us proceed to prove the second premise, that is, when the matter is like this, the soul is not 'this particular body' not even a particle of it.

As for the claim that the soul is surely not the synthesis of 'this body', we evidently know that the faculty of seeing is not operating over all the parts of the body. The same is the case with the faculties of hearing, taste and smell. Similar is the case with the faculties of imagination, memory, and thinking. Similar again, is the case of appetition, anger, and knowledge. It is an axiomatic and primary knowledge that these faculties are not operating over all the parts of the body rather this knowledge is strongly axiomatic, most clear and glaringly evident.

That the soul is necessarily not identical with any part of the body is proved by the fact we know evidently that there is not a single part in the body which would exclusively be described to have vision, hearing, taste, imagination, and memory. On the contrary, there is at the very outset a call directed to the heart that vision is the peculiar function of the eye. Similar is the case with the rest of perceptions and actions.

Now, if it is said that in the body there is a part which is characterized with all the perceptions and all the actions, it is evidently known that such a part does not exist. It is, therefore, confirmed that the human soul is something which is described to have all sorts of perceptions and actions. Hence, it is obviously established that neither the whole of the body is like

this, nor is there even any part of the body like this. Certitude is then achieved concerning the fact that the soul is something different from the body and all its parts. This is what is desired.

Let us confirm this proof in another expression and say, we know obviously that when we see a certain thing we recognize it. When we do so, we either incline to it or dislike it. When we incline to it we move our bodies near it. It is, therefore, sure and certain that the person who sees a thing, knows it, desires it and moves himself to seek its nearness is one and the same person. For, if the seer were one thing, the knower a second thing, the desirer a third thing, and mover a fourth one, then the seer would not have known, the knower would not have desired and the desirer would not have moved. But it is a known fact that the seeing of a thing does not mean an agent possessing knowledge and another agent resembling him. We also know evidently that the seer of the objects of vision is "I". When I see them, I know them, when I know them, I desire them, when I desire them, I want them, and move my body near them. We also evidently know that what is described with "this vision", "this knowledge", "this desire" and "this movement", is one and the same thing and not many.

The wise people say the animal must possess sense-perception and voluntary movement, since if it is devoid of sense-perception, it would obviously not feel something agreeable or disagreeable, it would therefore be impossible for it to draw something to itself, or drive something away. It is, therefore, established that what is moved voluntarily must itself be sensible. Thus what realizes all sorts of perception and what executes the movement of bodies are one and the same thing in man; since when we speak, for example, we understand

264a at first the intended object, then we secondly intend to make the same object known to others, and then, thirdly, by our volition we introduce letters and sounds to make others know through [Fol. 264a] these letters and sounds these meanings which we have understood.

After proving this we say: If the place of knowledge and perception were *per se* the place of letters and sounds it would necessarily follow that the place of knowledge and perceptions were the larynx, uvula and the tongue, whereas it is evidently known that the matter is not like this.

If we say: The place of knowledge and perceptions is the heart, and the place of letters and sounds is also the heart, it is evidently known to be absurd.

But, if we say: The place of speech is the larynx, uvula and the tongue, and the place of knowledge and perceptions is the heart and brain, and the place of energy is sinews, nerves and membranes, we distribute all these affairs among the various limbs but we have already declared this to be absurd.

We have already explained that what perceives every object of perception in the way described and the agent that moves all bodies with every kind of motion are one and the same thing. Now, there remains nothing except to say that the place of perception in the body is something other than these limbs, and that these parts play the role of instruments and tools. Just as, the carpenter, for example, performs different deeds through different instruments, similarly the soul sees with the eye, hears with ears, thinks with the brain and acts through the heart. All these parts of the body are instruments and tools for the soul. The essence of the soul is a substance different from the soul, essentially separate from it but related to it with the relation of operation and administration.

This argument is a dominating proof for affirming this thesis.

The Second Argument: If it were so that man was the expression of this body, man would have either possessed in every one of his parts, life, knowledge, power and volition or not. Either of the two hypotheses is absurd. It is, therefore, absurd to say that man is an expression of this body.

The first case is absurd because it requires that every part of the body must be living, knowing, intending and showing energy independently, and this necessitates that man is not one living being, one powerful being, rather, he is many living, learned and powerful beings. In this case there will remain no connection between one man and many individuals who are related to some others by one chain. But we evidently know the absurdity of this expression, since I find myself as one essence, one living being and not many, and since by supposing that every part of this body is alive independently, none of the parts would have the knowledge of its fellow parts. It would thus be possible that one part intends to move to one side and the other to the other side. This would, then, cause some parts of one and the same body to oppose some other parts, as happens between two individuals. That this is absurd is known evidently.

The second case is equally absurd as it requires that one quality should exist in many places. This is evidently known as absurd. If it were permissible that one quality at a time be available in more than one place, it would be equally permissible to suppose that one body at a time should exist in many places which is evidently known to be absurd. Since by supposing that one quality exists at a time in many places, every particle shall then be living, knowing, having power, and the matter would turn to this that

264b one particular body should be many people and not [Fol. 264b] one. When once the absurdity of the two kinds (mentioned above) becomes clear, it is confirmed that man is not this particular body.

If they say: Why is it not possible to presume that life is there in one part; then this life requires of necessity that all the parts should be alive? We shall say, this is absurd since the meaning of life is no other than the state of being alive (حيثية), and that of knowledge the state of knowing (عالمية). We only say this, because if the single state of living and the single state of knowing exist in the whole of the parts, one single quality would have come to exist in many places which is absurd. If a single state of living and a single state of knowing is supposed to exist in every particle separately, it would entail what we have mentioned before, namely, one man would become many men. This is evidently known to be absurd.

The Third Argument: If it is supposed that what is referred to by man in his expression, "I", exists in space as a body, it does not follow from this that as soon as he refers to himself by his expression, "I", the body occupying space becomes known. But the second premise is false, hence, the first premise is (also) false.

To explain this conditional expression, if that which is referred to by his expression, "I", is a body occupying space, the body forms one of the two parts of the quiddity. It is impossible to obtain knowledge of quiddity except when it is known that it occupies space.

That the second premise is absurd can be explained by the fact that when a man resolves to undertake a serious enterprise, he says: "I have given thought (to this), I have understood, I have realized," and yet he knows his particular self although he remains forgetful

of recalling the quiddity of a specified body and its volume. This asserts the genuineness of what we have said.

If it is said, what is the proof that one who knows the quiddity must possess the knowledge of its parts? It may, then, be added, why is it not possible to say that the particular parts of a quiddity are such a quiddity which must necessarily occupy space? Now, the quiddity of that which entails (something) is different from the quiddity of that which is entailed. Hence, on this supposition, it is not necessary that by knowing our particular essence we must know the quiddity of that which occupies space.

Again, we may say, we do not agree that we understand our particular selves and remain forgetful of the meaning of volume and occupation of space.

His assertion is that we sometimes say, "I have known, I have understood, I have thought", while we remain quite forgetful of the meaning of volume and occupation of space.

We reply: "Why should it not be permitted to say that though the detailed knowledge is absent, a kind of general knowledge is available"?

Again, we say: "Just as we know our particular selves while we remain forgetful of the body, for the same reason, we understand our particular selves while we remain forgetful of recalling the nature of the soul, and an incorporeal existent, or that which does not consist of a corporeal body. Thus, the allegation you have brought against us is applicable to you."

The answer to the first is the fact that the real nature of a composite object is no other than its parts. Now, one who knows the composite object must necessarily know its parts, otherwise it would entail that a single object must be known and unknown together at the

same time which is absurd.

The answer to the *second* is the fact that we evidently know that our souls exist in themselves. Now, if we consider that occupation of space is a necessary description of the soul it would necessitate that occupation of space is a description of ourselves which is absurd, since if occupation of space is considered as a quality of something, this something, if supposed to occupy space must necessarily need another space and this necessitates another space and so on *ad infinitum*. If this something does not occupy space, it must be stripped of position and part while the object which occupies space is particularized with position and part. Now, that which possesses position and space cannot possibly insert itself in that which has no position and space.

To the *third* they have answered by saying that knowledge of something expresses its awareness in such a way that it is distinguishable from something else. Now, when it is possible that we can understand ourselves while remaining forgetful of occupation of space and position and without having been aware of it, our object has, then, been achieved.

265a To the *fourth* the answer is that [Fol. 265a] "my soul" expresses my essence which is immaterial and particularized. It is, therefore, impossible that I recognize my particular essence while I remain forgetful of myself, rather, it is possible that I recognize myself while I remain forgetful of the description of the self because it does not occupy space, nor is it in the position of an object occupying space. But our expression that a particular object does not occupy space nor is it in the position of an object occupying space is an expression which excludes from it all that is something else and is different from its particular essence, since the nature of the existent is not identical with the absence of that

which is other than itself. It is, therefore, confirmed that these "negations"² are other than the particular essence. It is, therefore, possible to know the particular essence while remaining unaware of these "negations".

We have already indicated that by supposing that the soul is a particular body, the body will be a part of the quiddity. On this supposition his awareness of the soul is impossible while he remains forgetful of the body. The difference is, thus, evident.

The Fourth Argument : On the thesis that man is not an expression of this body, we say, the parts of the particular body are changing constantly and every one referred to by the expression "I" remains continuously.

The first premise is, however, clear as the human body is a liquid substance. When heat functions in the liquid it causes it to evaporate which necessitates the emaciation of the human body. This is why the human body needs nutrition to be ready to become a substitute for that which evaporates from it.

It is, therefore, confirmed that reduction and emaciation are always active in the body of man, and that when a man is a boy he is one *man* or two *mans*, or at best, three *mans*. When he becomes a youth he may increase to seventy *mans* or more. The necessitates the parts of man to change. Again, a man grows fat and then becomes thin, and then turns into a fat man again. The parts thus change by increasing and decreasing. We also observe and perceive that corporeal parts suffer reduction through perspiration and other kinds of moisture. It is therefore established that the body constantly suffers reduction and emaciation.

The second premise is that all that is referred to by the expression "I" does not suffer change. The matter is quite clear, since I know evidently that "I" who exists now is same as "I" who existed twenty years

ago. Again, when the hands, legs or eyes of a man are severed from him he obviously knows that he is identically the same man who existed before the incident. It is therefore confirmed by what we mentioned that the body with all its parts is changing. It is also confirmed that everyone who is referred to by the expression "I" is the same as the body, and different from each one of the parts of this body.

You must know that a question here remains unsolved. I mean, why is it not possible to say that this perceived body consists of original parts which remain from the beginning of life till its end free from defect and emaciation.

The rest of the parts, however, suffer change and decreasing. But man is the expression of these original parts. We however say: It is apparent from all suppositions that man is not the whole of the perceived body or the external structure. It may therefore be said that man is all those particular parts which remain unchanged in the development of the body.

But this view, we shall say, is dismissed by the philosophers on the basis of the following two premises:

1. The bodies are alike.³ The proof is that the bodies are undoubtedly [Fol. 265b] equal in the nature of volume and extension. Now, if a soul differs after this in its quiddities, the cause of difference will inevitably be different from that of their being alike. It would, then, entail that these peculiarities must be different from the nature of volume and extension. If the matter be like this, either of the two considerations must be such that one is considered as essence and the other an attribute. But the first (possibility) is absurd, since on this condition the nature

265b

of the volume and extension has got to be an independent essence *per se*.

At least this is sure that another essence has come into being. But the existence of this essence does not necessitate discrepancy in the first essence in which case the discourse reverts to the view that the bodies are alike.

2. Concerning the other alternative that one may be supposed as an essence and the other as an attribute, we say: either it can be said that the nature of the volume is the essence, and that due to which discrepancy has occurred is an essence, or it may be said that the volume through which homogeneity has occurred is an attribute. If the first is the case, all essences must be equal in all quiddity except that they disagree in accidental qualities. This does not render our thesis absurd. If the second is the case, this will entail that the state of volume and occupation of space be declared an attribute—a view which we have already declared as absurd. By this argument, it has been proved that the bodies are homogeneous.
3. The third premise is this that the Necessary Being is essentially '*ʿAmm al-Fayḍ*' (All-pervasive Generous), and it is not possible that one of the two homogeneous is particularized with one characteristic, while the other is not so particularized. This premise is purely a philosophical one.

When this is established we say: those original physical parts are equal to the parts developed later on in all quiddity and reality. Thus the relation of the states

that necessitate decrement and emaciation to those parts and others are on the same par. It is absurd to say that the Necessary Being in its essence selects some of the parts to survive and escape liquidation, since we have mentioned the all-pervasive generosity of the Necessary Being cannot admit of such particularization and selection. When the matter is like this, and emaciation and liquidation occur in all physical parts, the question is dismissed.

The Fifth Argument: What is indicated by the expression "I" is known to him (the speaker) while he remains forgetful of the external and internal physical parts. When a man, for example, undertakes an enterprise he says "I have thought" and "I have heard" in spite of the fact that at the time when he utters these words, he remains forgetful of his face, his hand, his heart, his brain and the rest of his body. Now, that which is perceived is different from what is the object of forgetfulness or it would entail that the one and the same thing is called 'perceptible' while it is not so. This would necessitate the joining together of two contradictions in one and the same object which is absurd. This argument will become complete by referring to what we have mentioned in the third argument.

The Sixth Argument: When we consider the states of the soul we find that its states are contrary to those of the body. This indicates that the soul is not body. It can be asserted in more than one way:

1. All bodies that accept a form receive a different form of the genre only after the complete disappearance of the first form. The wax, for example, when it assumes the form of a triangle cannot assume the form of a circle or a quadrangle before the first form is removed. Then, we find that the case of the soul perceiving the intelligibles is contrary to this. For, the soul which has

not accepted an intelligible form, it is difficult to receive other intelligible forms. When she receives one form, it becomes easier for her to accept another form, and when she receives a second form it becomes all the more easy for her to receive a third form [Fol. 266a]. But the soul in spite of receiving forms in succession always remains in her own state and never suffers weakness. On the contrary, the more she receives forms the stronger her previously mentioned quality becomes, and this quality becomes the more perfect in its manifestation. Hence, the man advances in understanding, and perception with his increased effort in experiments in sciences. It is, therefore, established that the function of the soul in respect of the intelligible forms is contrary to the function of the body in respect of the forms which descend into it. This indicates that the soul is not body.

2. Constant brooding over delicate thoughts and deep considerations has an effect on the soul and a different effect on the body. As for its effect on the soul, it lifts the soul from the realm of potentiality into that of actuality and the soul makes an advance in perception and comprehension. The more the thoughts increase in number the more perfect is the manifestation of the states. This is the highest limit of her perfection and the extreme point of her nobility and grace.

As for its effect on the body; it necessitates the domination of the soul over the body and the appearance of emaciation in it. If this state continues it, indeed, leads to mental disorder and the death of the body.

It is established by what we have said that thoughts necessitate the life of the soul, her nobility and beauty. They also necessitate the death of the body, its decrement and disorder. Now, if the soul were the body the same thing would be in relation to one and the same thing the cause of both perfection and imperfection at

the same time, and the cause of life and death at one and the same time. This is absurd.

3. We have surely observed that the body of a man grows often weak and emaciated. But when there appears to him a light from the light of the world of purity and there flashes into him a secret out of the secrets of the world of absence, the man enjoys great power and strong energy so much so that he never stands non-plussed in the presence of great kings, and never gets frightened before great armies and severely dreadful situations to which he attaches no weight and no value.

Were it not so that the soul was something other than the body and that it lived and grew in strength without the object which kept the body alive, the matter would not have been like this. On the contrary, one who considers carefully realizes that all that is the cause of the life of the body and its strength causes the death of the soul and weakens it, and whatever is the cause of the life of the soul and its strength causes the death of the body and weakens it.

4. Whenever people who develop their spiritual powers through hard understandings resolve to dominate the physical faculties and starve the senseperception, their spiritual faculties get strengthened and their inner faculties get illumined by Divine objects of knowledge. And whenever any man resolves to indulge in eating, drinking and satisfying the physical passions, he becomes like an animal⁴ and becomes deprived of the traces of speaking, thinking, understanding and knowing.

Were it not so that the soul was something other than the body and that its bliss contrary to that of the body, and that the strength of the soul was similarly contrary to the strength of the body, the matter would not have been like this.

5. In the state of sleep man becomes weak in body but strong in soul so much so that while asleep he enjoys those informations which he cannot expect to receive when he is awake.

But if the soul were other than the body, the state of sleep could not be like this.

This is the gist of what we have explained and obtained in establishing that the soul is other than the body. The arguments which have been mentioned by those who precede us are those which we have elucidated in our books and discussed and criticised so thoroughly that no doubt or a chance of doubt remains for anybody for further discussion.

6. Some people say when we investigate the problem of soul we find that the soul acts essentially without standing in need of the body. For, when man conceives intellectually an object, he surely does not perceive it by a physical instrument, just as colours are perceived by the eye and fragrance by the nose. Now [Fol. 266b] the part which contains the soul does not grow hot or cold, nor does it change when it receives intelligible concepts. 266b

NOTES

1. Imām Rāzī asserts in this Chapter that the spirit (روح) or the soul (نفس), which is indicated by the expression 'I come', 'I hear' and 'I do' and so on, is not the external sensible body; it is something else. He then advances arguments from both reason and revelation to support his assertion. This is, therefore, strange that Ibn al-Qayyim in his K. al-Rūḥ, 3rd ed. Hyderabad, 1357H. p. 219, accuses Ibn al-Khaṭīb (obviously he means Imām Abū 'Abdullah Fakhr al-Rāzī) to have stated that the chosen view of the most of the Mutakallimūn is this that man is the expression of 'this body' and 'the particular structure'. He, then, declares this view as more absurd than the view of Ibn Sīnā and his followers. Cf. K. al-Rūḥ :

وقد ضبط ابو عبد الله ابن الخطيب مذهب الناس في النفس فقال : "ما يشير اليه كل انسان بقوله انا ، اما ان يكون جسما او عرضا ساريا في الجسم ولا جسما ولا عرضا ساريا فيه واما القسم الاول وهو ان الانسان عبارة عن هذا البدن والهيكل المخصوص فهو قول جمهور الخلق وهو المختار عنه اكثر المتكلمين ، قلت هو قول جمهور الخلق الذين عرف الرازي اقوالهم من اهل البدع وغيرهم من المضلين وهذا الذي نسب الى جمهور الخلق من وليس وراءه شيء هو من ابطال الاقوال في المسئلة ، بل هو ابطال من قول ابن سينا واتباعه ، بل الذي عليه جمهور العقلاء ان الانسان هو البدن والروح معا ، وقد يطلق اسمه على احدهما دون الآخر بقرينة -

In his Tafsīr also Imām Rāzī declares that "Man cannot be the expression of this particular sensible structure (II, p. 59) :

فتقول : انهم قالوا : ان الانسان لا يجوز ان يكون عبارة عن هذا الهيكل المحسوس

The same view has been expressed in al-Risālah al-Kamālīyah, ed. S. M. Bāqir Sabzwari, Tehran, 1335H, p. 116 :

پس لازم آید که ذات ماحیزی باشد مغایر اجسام واعراض جسمانی ، پس لابد ذات جوهری مجرد باشد -

It may therefore be concluded that Ibn al-Qayyim has either misunderstood Imām Rāzī or has based his charge on hearsay.

2. السلوب (Sulūb) plural form of 'Salb', the negative attributes. Here the word has been used for a particular essence. Usually the term is used for the Essence of Allah—He is no body, no substance, no accident, Cf. Muḥaṣṣal, p. 136 :

اما السلوب كقولنا : ليس بجسم ولا جوهر ولا عرض ،
also p. 111 :
القول في السلوب (مسئلة) ما هية الله مخالفة لسائر الماهيات
لعينها ،

Lawāmi' al-Bayyināt, p. 16:

اما كثرة السلوب فلا توجب كثرة في الذات بدليل ان كل ما هية فردة بسيطة ، فلا بد وان يصدق عليها سلب كل ما عداها عنها ، وذلك يدل على ان كثرة السلوب لا تتدح في وحدة الذات -

also p. 24:

فالوجود صفة حقيقية وافتقار غيره اليه اضافية واستغناؤه عن غيره سلب ، اذا عرفت هذا ، فنقول : السلوب غير متناهية ، وكذلك الاصناف غير متناهية الخ ،

3. In his al-Masā'il al-Khamsūn, ed. Sh. M. Šabri al-Kurdi, Kurdistan al-'Ilmiyah Press, p. 341, Imām Rāzī argues that bodies are alike in bodily quality and vary in descriptions. He says:

انا وجدنا الاجسام متماثلة في الجسمية ومخالفة في الصفات القائمة بها ، كما ان بعضها حارة وبعضها باردة وبعضها رطبة وبعضها باسنة ، وبعضها لطيف ، وبعضها كثيف ، وبعضها سفلى وبعضها علوى ،

Imām Ibn Taymiyyah (Abu'l-'Abbās Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn al-Ḥalīm (728) in his Bayān Muwāfaqāt Šariḥ al-Ma'qūl li Šaḥiḥ al-Manqūl printed on the margin of K. Minhāj al-Sunnah vol. IV, al-Amiriyyah, Bulaq (Egypt), 1322H. p. 148....has criticised the view of Imām al-Rāzī.

4. كالبهيمه : Supra Ch. I. Note No. 22.

CHAPTER V

ON THE PROOFS DERIVED FROM THE DIVINE BOOK WHICH ASSERT THAT THE SOUL IS DIFFERENT FROM THE BODY

You must know that the Divine Book indicates in more than one way the genuineness of the thesis that the soul is different from the body.

1. *First Argument:* The Qur'ān indicates that the object referred to as the particular man survives the death of the particular body, lives, dominates and understands. Allah, the Exalted, says describing the martyrs: "Think not of those who are slain in the way of Allah as dead. Nay, they are living. With their Lord they have provision. Jubilant (are they) because of that which Allah hath bestowed upon them of His bounty."¹ Allah says describing the state of those who are chastised: "The Fire; they are exposed to it morning and evening",² and says, "Because of their sins they were drowned, then made to enter a Fire".³

These *nusūṣ* (texts) indicate most decisively that the object referred to as 'the man' remains alive after the death of the body perceiving pain and pleasure.

That this particularly mentioned body is not alive after death is known evidently. If we consider it permissible to declare it alive, the like of it is possible in all inanimate things which is downright fallacy.

When these two premises have become apparent, we know that what is referred to by our expression "this man" is not the particular body and not even a part of the parts of the body, as we are led to know with inevitable certainty that this particular body has died with all its parts and limbs.

I am, however, very much surprised at those who deny the existence of the soul. This is because of the fact that the attestation of the Qur'ān and the texts concerning the reward of the grave, and the chastisement of the grave, and on the day of Resurrection and emergence can be accepted and comprehended when the existence of the soul is affirmed and all allegations, doubts and difficulties vanish on the basis of this affirmation. When the existence of soul is not affirmed, difficulties would show their face and the allegations would become magnified due to that which urges them to deny the soul, until they fall in extreme darkness.

2. *The Second Argument:* Allah's expression, "Deliver up your souls",⁴ is clear in so far as the soul is different from the body with which it is sometimes connected and sometimes not.

Allah, the Exalted, says: "But ah! thou soul at peace! Return unto thy Lord, content in His good pleasure!"⁵ This indicates that the soul does not die with the death of the body. It, rather, returns from the body to the world of Piety and Grace. Allah says: "When death cometh unto one of you, Our messengers receive him, and they neglect not. Then are they restored unto Allah, their Lord".⁶ This indicates that the particular object referred to as a particular man does not die with the death of the body, rather it is taken back from the particular body to the world of Purity and the Presence of Grace.

As for the expression, "returning to Allah on death", it occurs in the Holy Qur'ān in many places. All this indicates that the thing which constitutes man does not in reality die with the death of the body, rather it returns from the worldly house and the world of sense-perception, to the world hereafter. All this indicates that "man" is something different from the body.

3. *The Third Argument:* Allah, the Exalted, has mentioned the grades of physical creation and said, "Verily We created man from a product of wet earth; then placed him as a drop (of seed) in a safe lodge; then fashioned We the drop of a clot, then fashioned We the clot a little lump, then fashioned We the little lump bones, then clothed the bones with flesh, and then produced it as another creation".⁷

We do not doubt that these stages are differences which occur in physical states.

Again, when Allah wanted to mention the inspiring of the spirit, He said, "(We), then, produced it as another creation". This clarifies that what concerns the inspiration of the spirit is a different genre which differs from the preceding changes occurring to the physical states.

This indicates that the spirit is not from the genus of the body. If you say, this argument goes against you, since Allah says: "We created man from a product of wet earth"; and as the word "min" (من) gives the meaning of تبيض, splitting into particles, which indicates that man is a particle of dust, whereas you say that he is something other than the dust. This is, then, the exposition of the text of the Great Noble Book. We shall, in answer, say: this is extremely remote. For, the word من originally indicates the beginning of the end. You say, for example, "I came out from Basrah to Kufah". His expression : خلقنا الانسان من سلاله من طين

therefore demands that the beginning of the creation of man is obtained from the *أجله* (essence). In accordance with this view we hold that Allah, the Exalted, has levelled the physical disposition and moderated it, and then breathed into it the spirit. The beginning of his creation therefore starts from the *أجله* (essence). It is therefore established that what has been mentioned by them is absurd.

4. *The Fourth Argument* is that Allah, the Exalted, has distinguished the world of spirits from the world of bodies, and then distinguished the commandment from this. This requires that the Commandment must be free from measure and volume. Allah, the Exalted, has, again, explained in a different verse that spirit belongs to the world of Commandment, and not to the world of Creation."⁸ He, therefore, said, "Say the spirit is by command of my Lord".⁹ This indicates that the substance of the spirit is from the world of Commandment and is free from volume, space and measure.

5. *The Fifth Argument*: Allah, the Exalted, says: "So, when I made him and have breathed into Him of My spirit".¹⁰ Allah has distinguished between *تسوية*, perfecting (accomplishing), and inspiration of spirit, since 'perfecting' expresses parts, limbs, moderation of disposition and compositions. Since Allah has distinguished the inspiration of spirit from 'perfecting', and has ascribed the possession of spirit to Himself, it indicates that spirit is a noble substance not belonging to the genus of the body. This is what we desired to prove.

6. *The Sixth Argument*: Allah's expression, "And a soul and Him Who perfected it. And inspired it (with conscience of) what is wrong for it and (what is) right

for it."¹¹ is quite clear concerning the existence of a soul which is characterized with both perception and movement together. For, inspiration expresses perception, and vices and piety belong to the category of action. This verse makes it clear that man is one entity which is characterized with perception and characterized also with the perpetration of vices sometimes and virtuous deeds at other times. It is known that the entire body is not characterized with perception and action together, nor is one particular limb characterized with all the perceptions and all the actions. It is therefore necessary to assert a substance which is characterized with all these matters.

Closely concerned with this argument is Allah's expression, "Lo! We create man from a drop of thickened fluid to test him; so We make him hearing, knowing."¹² This explains that man has got the above description and has to bear Divine responsibilities and commandments of the Lord, and that he possesses the qualities of hearing and seeing.

It is sure and certain that the whole body is not like this. It cannot be said that the human body has been entrusted by Allah to do actions or to abstain from doing them, and thus his hand, foot, the forehead, eyeball, nose or tongue is responsible for its deed. For, what is evidently known is the fact that whenever a man is ordered to do a certain thing or refrain from a certain action, the injunction and the prohibition do not concern a particular organ of his body nor do they concern his whole body, rather, the object which governs the whole physical body is the soul which runs in the entire body,¹³ and is in every part of the body that possesses the qualities described above.

Since it has been established and made clear that

the perception, understanding and responsibility do not concern any particular part or parts, we surely know that it cannot be said that what is described as a single organ can itself be said to possess the qualities of hearing, seeing, bearing responsibility, receiving order, liable to be rewarded and punished. Allah's expression, "We test (Fol. 267 b) him and make him hearing, seeing", indicates that man is something other than the particular body, other than every part of the whole body or of a part thereof, and this is what we desired to prove.

If they repeat and say, "Verily Allah's expression, "Lo! We create man from a drop of thickened fluid",¹⁴ indicates that man is a part of the mixture and that of productive germ, as the word *تبعيض* indicates.

We shall say, 'the reply of this has already preceded and no intelligent person should have any doubt or suspicion left'.

7. *The Seventh Argument:* Allah says, "And be not ye as those who forgot Allah, therefore He caused them to forget their souls."¹⁴ Now, it is sure and certain that no man of intellect forgets this particular figure which is observed, and this particular body which possesses sense-perception. This indicates that the soul which one forgets in the excess of his ignorance is something other than this particular body.

8. *The Eighth Argument:* The Holy Prophet said, "He who recognizes himself, recognizes his Lord",¹⁵ and Allah has said in His Revealed Books: "O man! you know yourself, you will know your Lord." Now, if soul would have meant the apparently observed body and the perceptible figure we would not have surely been ordered to know it, as its knowledge is already available and it is absurd to possess something which is already in possession.

9. *The Ninth Argument:* A large number of *Aḥādīth* explain that man continues to understand, speak, and be intelligent after his death. The Holy Prophet said, "Prophets of Allah do not die, but they transfer themselves from house to house". He also said in the course of a long sermon, "when, at last, the dead is carried in his shroud, his soul remains separate over his shroud and addresses his relations saying, "O my wife, my son, . . .", and the *ḥadīth* was mentioned. The reason of mentioning the *ḥadīth* is to argue that the Prophet (peace be upon him!) has clearly mentioned that the soul of the dead remains on the shroud and some living object continues shouting and saying, "O my wife, O my son". It is certain that the wife is his wife and the son his son and whatever wealth he had collected by lawful or unlawful means, belongs to him the curse of which remains his responsibility and falls on his shoulder. This is an allegory, rather a clarification of "man". The body is dead, placed in the shroud and the particular individual remains alive who speaks and understands.¹⁶ It is clear, then, that man is something other than the perceived body and the visible figure.

Now, if you have learnt the nature of argument clarified by this *ḥadīth* which illustrates the continuity of the soul, it is possible to cite many *Aḥādīth* of this kind which are so numerous as to defy reckoning.

10. *The Tenth Argument:* Allah, the Exalted, has said, "Lo! I am about to place a viceroy in the earth". Man can never become a vicegerent except when he knows what is going on in the universe, and finds it possible to control those circumstances by means of negation and affirmation. Now, this object about which it is said that he is the vicegerent of Allah on His earth must necessarily be described as having the qualities of

perception and action.¹⁷

Again, Allah has explained that "He taught Adam all the names" and realities. It is, therefore, established that this object is the vicegerent and it is necessary for him to know the states of the universe of bodies and to control them. It is also necessary that he himself be the knower of the world of absence (unseen world) and the secrets of the celestial region. Man is therefore a single substance possessing all these qualities, while the totality of the body is not like this, nor is there anyone organ having all these descriptions. It necessarily follows that the substance of man is essentially different from the totality of the body and from each one of its parts and organs.

Let us conclude these Qur'ānic demonstrative proofs in a convincing and positive manner. We have established that it is clear to an observing intellect that we ascribe all the parts of the body to ourselves, and say, 'my hand, my leg, my heart, my brain', and the object of possession (مضاف) is surely other than the object to which possession is ascribed (مضاف اليه).

268 a We, therefore, know that the soul is different from the parts of the body. If they say, "we also say, 'my soul, myself' (Fol. 268 a) which indicates that the soul is different from itself, but this is absurd.

The answer (to this question) is this that when we use the expression we sometimes refer to the soul and sometimes it extends to the perceptible body and the visible image.

As for the soul in so far as the first meaning is concerned, it is clear. The intellect bears witness that it cannot be ascribed to itself, since it is not possible to ascribe a meaning referred to by 'I' to anything other than the meaning.

So far as the second meaning of the soul is concerned it can be ascribed to the meaning referred to as 'I', since this body is like the kingdom in relation to the meaning referred to as 'I'.

Having established this we say: When we say, 'my soul, my essence', it is necessary to understand the soul in its second meaning, not in the first meaning just to avoid discrepancy; and on this supposition the question falls to the ground.

NOTES

1. 'Āli 'Imrān : 169.
2. Al-Mu'minūn : 46.
3. Nūḥ : 25.
4. Al-An'ām : 93.
5. Al-Fajr : 27.
6. Al-An'ām : 61, 62.
7. Al-Mu'minūn : 12, 13, 14.
8. Al-Shahrazuri states that there are two worlds: World of commandment and world of creation or, perhaps, the material world and the spiritual world. See his K. al-Rumūz wa al-Amthal al-Lāhūtiyyah fi al-anwār al-Ḥamūdah al-Malakūtiyyah fi Ma'rifat al-Nafs wa al-Rūḥ, MS. Vatican, Fol. 14 a:
 ان العالم عالمان : عالم الامر وعالم الخلق - أما عالم الخلق فهو كل ماله مقدار ومساحة ويلزمه بالضرورة لون وشكل ونهاية وسائر العوارض اللازمة للحم ، وهذا العالم متفاوت وباللطافة والكثافة ، (Fol. 14 b). وأما عالم الامر فانه ان كانت حقيقة واحدة غير مختلفة الا انه مختلف بالشدة والضعف ، وامور خارجة عن الحقيقة فاشدها لطفا واقواها نورا واتمها كمالا ، المبدأ الاول عز سلطانه فوق اللطف والكمال والجمال والحسن ، ثم يليه في اللطف والكمال وشدة النورية العقل الاول ، ثم العقل الثاني وهلم جرا ، حتى ينتهي الانوار بالضعف والنقصان والكثافة الى نور لا يقوم بنفسه بل يكون هيئة في الجرم ، كلما كثف النور وضعف بعد عن الحضرة الربوبية لبعده المناسبة الموجبة للمجاورة حتى يبلغ النقص والكثافة الى حد يغيب عن عالم العقل ، فيظهر ذلك النور حينئذ على سطح العالم الجسماني ، وصفحاته فيبعد جدا عن الباري سبحانه وتعالى ،

9. Al-Isrā' : 85.

10. Al-Hijr : 29; Šād: 72.

11. Al-Shams : 7.

12. Al-Dahr : 2.

13. Al-Sharazuri: Cf. 20a:

و يجب ان يعلم الانسان كثيرا قد يدرك الشيء ولا يدري انه قد عرفه ، وهذا النوع من المعرفة انما يكون للطف المعروف ودقته وشدة جلالته وظهوره لانخفاضه - فيكون شدة ظهوره و اشراقه حجاب التفتن الى معرفته كالفنفس البشرية وسائر المجرذات ، والنفس اذا التفتت الى ذاتها طالبة بفطنتها بذاتها لم تجد في ذاتها (Fol. 20b) كثرة متعددة لا جسمانية ولا عقلية ولا اخرى مختلفة ولا متفقة بل لا تجد ذاتها الا واحدة واحدة وتلك الواحدة لا تزيد على نفس الظهور المطلق المحض ، اما كونه مطلقا اي انه غير مقيد بجسم او جسماني ،

و اما كونه "مخصوص بيدن خاص" اي له تعلق به و اشراق عليه دائما ، وذلك الظهور الذي هو عبارة عن النفس لا تغيب عن ذاته اي شعوره بالظهور الذي له حقيقة ذاته مستمرا ابدا ، وذلك الظهور سار في جميع الموجودات الجسمانية وغيرها ، ولا اعني بالسريان كونه ملابسا للجسام ، فانه يلزم من ذلك جسمية الظهور المشار اليه ، بل اعني بذلك انه اذا التفتت الى الموجودات الحسية والعقلية فطرت له و ظهرت و تصير كأنه وعاء لذلك الشيء ، الخ ،

14. Al-Hashr : 19.

15. The expression conveys the purport of a ḥadīth quoted below. The Qur'ān has, no doubt, stressed to look into one's own self to understand the world which has been declared as macrocosmos, human soul being a microcosmos. See Imām Rāghib: al-Dharr'ah, p. 12:

و في انفسكم افلا تبصرون ، وقال تعالى سترهم اياتنا في الافاق و في انفسهم حتى يتبين لهم انه الحق ، وكان يقال في الامم السالفة من انكر الباري رجم لكونه جاحدا ، ومن انكر النفس رجم لكونه جاهلا ، و قيل كان في كتب الله تعالى المنزلة : اعرف نفسك يا انسان ! تعرف ربك ، و روى عن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم : اعرفكم بربه اعرفكم بنفسه ، بل قال الله تعالى : ولا تكونوا كالذين نسوا الله فانساهم انفسهم ، تنبها انهم لما نسوا تعالى دل نسيانهم اياه على نسيانهم لها ، وقالت الحكماء قد ركب الله تعالى الانسان تركيبا محسوسا معقولا

على هيئة العالم ، و اوجد فيه شبه كل ما هو موجود في العالم ، حتى قيل الانسان هو عالم صغير ، و مختصر للعالم الكبير ، و ذلك ليدل به على معرفة العالم فيتوصل بهما الى معرفة صانعهما .

16. *حي ناطق فاهم*: Though the two ḥadīth referred to could not be traced, the thesis that the soul survives the body and enjoys life and understanding is supported by the Qur'ānic verse: "Do not call the martyrs dead; they are alive and are sustained". It is also supported by a number of ḥadīth recorded in the reliable collections of the Prophetic sayings like,

عن أبي هريرة رضي الله عنه قال ، قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم :
الليت تحضره الملائكة ، فاذا كان الرجل صالحا ، قالوا : اخرجي
ايتها النفس الطيبة كانت في الجسد الطيب : اخرجي حميدة ،
و ابشري بروح و ريحان

فاذا كان الرجل السوء ، قال : اخرجي ايتها النفس
الغبيشة كانت في الجسد الغبيث ، اخرجي ذميمة الخ
(Mishkāt, Mujtabā'i Press, p. 141); also the ḥadīth narrated
on the authority of al-Barā' ibn 'Āzib, *ibid.*, p. 142.

17. *موصوفا بالادراك و بالفعل*: The peculiar human activity has been mentioned in the Qur'ān in three expressions: (1) that man has been created to populate the earth (وما خلقت الجن و الانس الا ليعبدون) (2) that he has been created to worship Allah (و يستخلفنكم في الارض فينظرون كيف تعملون) (3) that Allah has made man to represent Allah in the earth (و استخلفنكم في الارض فينظرون كيف تعملون) Cf. Al-Dharrī'ah, p. 18.

CHAPTER VI

ON THE DISCOURSE THAT WHAT IS CONNECTED WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SOUL IS THE HEART THROUGH WHICH THE SOUL IS CONNECTED WITH THE REST OF THE BODY

The accepted view of the majority of scholars and enlightened people¹ is this that the heart is the absolute chief for the entire body, and that in the first instance the soul is attached to it; and through its relation with the heart the soul is related to the rest of the body. This is the view of Aristotle and a number of philosophers from among the followers of Aristotle.

A group of people hold that man is the sum-total of three souls—(1) the soul of appetite, primarily connected with the liver, (2) the soul of anger, primarily connected with the heart, and (3) the soul of reasoning and wisdom, primarily connected with the brain²—a view held by a group of physicians like Galen and his followers.

What indicates the genuineness of the first view is that it is identical with a number of reasons understood from the Qur'ān, Akhbār (Ḥadīth and tradition) and reasoning.

There are several Qur'ānic proofs: (1) Allah says: "Say (O Muḥammad, to mankind): Who is an enemy of Gabriel ! For he it is who hath revealed (this

Scripture) to thy heart by Allah's leave".³

(2) In Sūrah al-Shu'arā' Allah says: "And lo! It is a revelation of the Lord of the Worlds, which the True Spirit hath brought down upon thy heart".⁴ Both these verses clearly indicate that *tanzīl* and *wahy* (Revelation) came to the heart. This implies that it is the heart which is the addressee of God and is liable to bear the consequence (of human deeds).

The second argument is Allah's expression: "Lo! 'Therein verily is a reminder for him who hath a heart, or giveth ear with full intelligence." This verse clearly indicates that the locus of remembrance and understanding is the heart.

You must know that the above verse contains a wonderfully delicate point which can only be fully explained by first solving a question, *viz.* it is said that the conjunction *واو* is more apt to "اوالتى السمع" than the dividing *واو* (i.e. او). This is because to enjoy remembrance necessarily implies two things: It must be obtained from the heart, and it must be obtained from إلقاء السمع. For, the heart is the locus where realities are grasped and إلقاء السمع means effort and struggle for achieving these perceptions and objects of knowledge.

It is known that the two objects must necessarily be together. *Wāw Qāsimah* (dividing *wāw*) is therefore more apt here than the conjunctive *wāw*. We declare that we hold, on the contrary, الواو القاسمة is better than الواو العاطفة.

It may be explained here that the rational faculties are of two kinds—(1) Some are extremely perfect and illuminating and are in conflict with the rest of mental faculties in quantity and quality—in quantity, because the obvious, empirical and perceptible premises are in

abundance, and in quality, because to compose these premises in a way that concurs with the true corollaries is easier and quicker.

After you have realized this, we say: A pure soul and a Divine intellectual faculty and their likes do not need learning (Fol. 268b) and seeking help from others in realizing the realities of objects, but its like is very rare and scarce.

As for the other kind of mental faculty which is not like this, it needs speculative knowledge to keep itself immune from error and defect.⁶

When you have learnt this, we say: "Allah's expression ان في ذلك لذكرى لمن كان له قلب is a reference to the first kind of faculty. The word قلب has been mentioned indefinitely only to indicate its extreme nobility and grace. Such a heart is very rarely found.

Allah's expression اذ التى السمع و هو شهيد is a reference to the second division which needs help from others. This rule is a mystery upon which the science of Logic is based. This is indicated in this verse. This distinctive argument has received emphasis from the Qur'ānic explanation, and has attained preciseness and manifestation. Since the first kind is very rare, and the second kind is frequent, necessarily all were ordered to seek and acquire it. He has, therefore, said, "Have they not travelled in the land, and have they hearts wherewith to feel and ears wherewith to hear?"

Now, Allah's expression, "Have they not travelled in the land," applies to the seeking of this faculty and endeavouring to acquire it.

A logician (صاحب المنطق) says, the first kind does not stand in need of seeking the help of Logic, but it is very rare. The prevalence, however, goes to the second kind. All people need Mantīq (Logic),

reasoning, so look at all these deep-rooted secrets. How excellently you find them incorporated in the words of the Qur'ān !

The Third Argument: The verses indicate that liability to reward depends only upon the effort and the desire to seek which is embedded in the heart of man. Allah says, "Allah will not take you to task for that which is unintentional in your oaths. But He will take you to task for that which your hearts have garnered."⁸ He also says, "Their flesh and their blood reach not Allah, but the devotion from you reacheth Him."⁹ He then mentions in a different verse that the place of قلوب is the heart, as He says: "Those are they whose hearts Allah hath proven unto righteousness".¹⁰ He also says, "And the secrets of the breasts are made known".¹¹

The Fourth Argument: Verily, the place of the intellect is the heart. When the matter is like this, the object of commandment, prohibition, reward and punishment is the heart.

We have definitely said that the place of the intellect is the heart, as Allah, the Exalted, says, "Have they not travelled in the land, and have they hearts wherewith to feel".⁷ He also says: "They have hearts wherewith they understand not".¹² "Lo! therein verily is a reminder for him who hath a heart",⁵ i.e. intellect. The name of heart applies to intellect by way of designating that which descends with the name of the place of descendance. Again, Allah has ascribed the contrariety of Knowledge to the heart, and said, "In their hearts is a disease,"¹³ Allah hath sealed their (hearing and) their hearts".¹⁴ They said, "Our hearts are hardened",¹⁵ Nay, but Allah hath set a seal upon them for their disbelief".¹⁶ "The hypocrites fear lest

a Sūrah should be revealed concerning them, proclaiming what is in their hearts";¹⁷ "Nay, but that which they earned is rust upon their hearts";¹⁸ "Will they then not meditate on the Qur'ān, or are there locks on their hearts?"¹⁹ "For indeed it is not the eyes that grow blind, but it is the hearts which are within the bosoms that grow blind".²⁰ These verses indicate that the place of intellect, understanding, ignorance, and negligence is the heart. All this indicates that which we said.

The Fifth Argument: Allah's expression, "Lo! the hearing and the sight and the heart of each of these it will be asked".²¹ It is well-known that the ear and the eye have no other function but to make their objects reach the heart. Any question put to them is, therefore, a question put to the heart in reality." A similar case is what Allah says: "He knoweth the traitor of the eyes, and that which the bosoms hide."²² Surely known it is that the deceits of the eyes can only happen in regard to that which is contained in hearts. (Fol. 269 a). It receives confirmation from the saying of God, "(He it is Who gave you being), and hath assigned unto you ears and eyes and hearts. Small thanks give ye!"²³ These three parts have been particularly mentioned for the charge made against them and they have been called upon to utter thanks.

You, however, know that there is no useful purpose in having ear and eyes except that they deliver their contents to the heart, the heart being the judge, the governor over them.

Similarly, Allah says, "And verily We had empowered them with that wherewith We have not empowered you, and had assigned them ears and eyes and hearts which availed them naught (Since they denied the revelations of Allah)".²⁴ Thus Allah has made these

three the basis of His argument against them. The purpose of all these is the heart which gives its judgement concerning all that is delivered to it by the ear and the eye. Thus this confirms the saying of Allah, "Allah hath sealed their hearing and their hearts, and on their eyes there is a covering." Its parallel is Allah's expression, "They have hearts wherewith they understand not, and have eyes wherewith they see not."¹²

The reason of arguing with this verse is the fact that the purpose of this verse is to explain that they have absolutely no knowledge, and even if knowledge is found in something other than the heart, the purpose will not be served unless it is found in the heart.

The Sixth Argument: Whenever 'belief' has been mentioned by Allah in the Qur'ān it has been attributed to the heart. He says, "... as say with their mouths: 'We believe', but their hearts believe not."²⁵ He says, "save him who is forced thereto and whose heart is still content with Faith."²⁶ He also says, "... for the faith hath not yet entered into your hearts."²⁷ "He hath written faith upon their hearts."²⁸ It is established, therefore, that the place of these pieces of knowledge is the heart. When this is so, the place of intentions is the heart, since intention is conditioned by knowledge. Having accepted that the place of knowledge and intention is the heart the agent must also be the heart. Such being the case, it is also the object to which admonitions are addressed and it is also the object to which reward and punishment are due.

You must know that he who is acquainted with the method of arguing with these verses, it is possible for him to find many Qur'ānic verses of the same kind.

As for *aḥādīth*, reference may be made to what has been narrated by al-Nu'mān b. Bashīr. He said, "I

heard the Messenger of Allah, (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him!) saying: 'Beware, there is a piece of flesh in the body, the whole body prospers when the piece is prosperous and deteriorates when the piece deteriorates. Beware! that piece is the heart.'²⁹ The rest of the body is subordinate to it."

It has been narrated that when Usāmah killed an infidel who had uttered "There is no God save Allah", the Holy Prophet disliked his assassination, and when Usāmah pleaded that he had said these words out of fear, the Prophet said, "Why did you not open up his heart?" This indicates that knowledge and belief concern the heart.

The Holy Prophet used to pray: "O Allah Who turns hearts! Keep my heart firm on Thy faith!"³⁰ This clarifies the point under investigation.

As for rational proofs, a number of reasons and arguments can be cited.

Firstly, we say that the human soul is one. If this is so, the most important part of the body is necessarily the heart.

As for the first premise that the human soul is one, we have already mentioned the appropriate proofs in the chapter containing proofs for affirming the soul. We need not repeat the same. We, however, mention here the argument of those who hold that the soul is more than one and we shall give the reply thereof.

They say: We see that the soul which makes arrangement for food exists separately from the soul which produces anger, and the soul which produces anger exists in many animals without the rational soul. Then, we find that all these three entities exist in man. We therefore learn that each and everyone of these three is an independent substance by itself which keeps its

own entity but is united with others in man.

Our reply is that it has been established in Logic that various quiddities can be combined in equal impressions. When this is established, we say, 'why is it not possible to say that (Fol. 269 b) the vegetative soul differs from the human soul in quiddity, shares the power of nutrition with it and its administration, but is opposed to it in many aspects?' The human soul, for example, has the power of administering the logical (psychological) states while the vegetative soul has no such power. Similar is the case with the faculty of anger.

If they say, how can one soul be the source of various actions that are found in ourselves? Why is this not possible due to various implements? This is an abbreviated discourse in explaining the unity of soul and a reply was mentioned as against the doubt of those who opposed the view.

The second premise is our view that when the soul is one, the chief organ is the heart. Its proof is that the first organ that comes into being in the body is the heart.³¹ When this is so it is necessarily proved that it is the chief organ.

The proof of the genuineness of the first premise is experience and reasoning.

As for experience, the experienced people³² have already borne witness to it.

As for reasoning, it is clear that the semen is a body composed of four elements of earth, water, air and fire, the last two being dominating over it. This leads to the conclusion that the whiteness of fluidity is only due to the mixing of the nature of air with it, as it happens to foam. It is necessarily understood that the whiteness of the semen is due to this reason. What we have

mentioned receives emphasis from the fact that the semen when affected by cold becomes fluid and loses white colour in spite of the fact that cold most aptly causes condensation. This indicates that its whiteness is caused by the elements of fire and air which are mixed with it. When it is affected by cold the particles of the elements of fire and air are separated from it. Hence, the white colour disappears.

When you have realized this, we say, Allah, the Exalted, has destined that the particles of earth and water existing in the semen should form the matter of the physical parts and the particles of air and fire should form the matter of the spirits. But, to begin with, these delicate and condensed particles get mixed up with one another, genus being the cause of mixture. Hence, the delicate parts get mixed up among themselves, and the condensed parts join together.

Since the delicate parts are quick in dilution and self-dissolution, the Divine Wisdom demands that the delicate parts be in the middle and the condensed parts should behave like their protectors, the whole becoming like a globular ball with its inside full of delicate parts of air and fire and the exterior composed of the solid bodies. This is the part which when perfected and strengthened becomes the heart. This is the reason that the anatomists say that the first part of human organs to be generated and the last of them to die is the heart.³³

When this is established, we say: Since the heart is the first of human organs that comes into being and it unites all those parts of the physical body through which spirits come into being, and the medical experiments indicate that the first object to be connected with the soul is the spirit, it necessarily follows that the attachment of the soul with the heart precedes its attach-

ment with the rest of organs and it is through the heart that the soul runs into the rest of organs. It is, therefore, established that the absolutely chief organ in the human physique is the heart.³⁴

The Second Argument asserts the fact that the intelligent people can only understand, perceive and knew through their hearts. We, thus, know that the heart is the place of knowledge in so far as the soul is connected with the heart. When the place of knowledge is no other than the heart, it is the place of intention which is conditioned by knowledge, and when the place of volition is heart (Fol. 270 a) it is also the source of the power to move. Hence, the heart is the place of all these qualities.

Galen says: it is agreed that the heart is the place of anger. But the view that it is the place of knowledge is absurd. His reply is that anger removes the contradictory. Now, for removing the contradictory, it is necessary to possess awareness of the contradictory. When it is agreed that the heart is the place of anger it is necessary to submit to the fact that the heart is the place of knowledge and perception.

The Third Argument: There is no quarrel about the fact that the animal soul must be perceiving and moving with volition. When the soul is attached to the heart it is necessary that the heart should desire the benefit of sense-perception and voluntary movement.

This however demands that the heart should follow perception, awareness and the moving faculty—a fact which contradicts the view of Galen who holds that the matter of perceiving and voluntary movement belongs to the brain and not to the heart.

The Fourth Argument: Sense-perception and voluntary movement are only due to the hot temperature and

not due to cold temperature, as cold temperature prevents them. The genuineness of what we have mentioned is indicated by medical experiments.

After this is established, we say: "the heart is the source of the heat and the brain is the source of cold. Hence, to make the heart the source of sense-perception and voluntary movement is better than to make the brain the source thereof."

The Fifth Argument: Every one who says, 'I', only refers by his expression to his chest and to the direction of his heart. This indicates that everyone knows evidently that what is referred to by his expression, 'I', exists in the heart, not in the rest of the body.

The Sixth Argument: The most explicit of the effects of the rational soul is reasoning. It is therefore necessary that the source of the rational soul is the place from which it springs and from which the instrument of reasoning receives encouragement, but the instrument of reasoning is the voice which is produced by exhaling which is the function of the heart, since the heart wants the agreeable cold breeze to enter it for supplying relief. When this breeze becomes hot and burning it is driven to the exterior. Now, if the purpose of the heart is to admit the air in, at first, and exit it next, then it is better to ascribe this activity to the heart than to the brain which has nothing to do with the soul.

Galen says that the voice arises not from the heart but from the brain, and argues in three ways: Firstly, the primary instrument of voice is the larynx, for the reason that when you take out the pipe of the lungs below the larynx, no voice of the animal is at all audible. It is therefore established that the instrument of sound is larynx which is composed of three sinews. These sinews produce movement through many membranes

which are only moved by muscles springing from the brain. So, it is established that the agent of the voice is the brain.

Secondly, we surely see the membrane of the stomach is extended at the time of producing the hard voice. But the heart does not feel fatigued at the time of producing the voice.

Thirdly, when the heart is opened up and closed it does not nullify the voice of the animal. But if the brain is opened up and closed down, at once the voice of the animal is affected. It is therefore established that the source of the voice is the brain, not the heart and at this stage all these arguments, referred to above, become an argument for the view that the place of the rational faculty is the brain.

The answer is that we have explained with strong arguments that the source of the voice is the heart.

The best of all that can be said in this connection is this that the brain is needed in this action and the lungs as well, and this does not affect our view.

The Seventh Argument: The heart is placed somewhere near the middle of the body—and this is what suits the absolute chief (Fol. 270 b) so that all the faculties that arise from it reach all over the body with equal justice. The brain, on the other hand, is placed on the top of the body—a fact which opposes the fulfilment of this purpose (*i.e.* equal distribution).

The Eighth Argument: People ascribe to the heart the qualities of brilliance and stupidity. They say concerning a particular person that he possesses a brilliant heart, and concerning another person that he possesses a dull heart.

Galen has said, when people describe a man saying that he has a strong heart, they mean his bravery. And,

when they say that he has a weak or no heart they mean his cowardice. The answer is that this indicates that the heart is the place of anger, but this does not contradict the view that heart is also the place of understanding and knowledge.

Galen has argued that the source of perception and understanding is the brain, and this is so for several reasons:

The First is that the brain is the springing place of sinews which are the organ of perception. Anything that causes the organ to perceive must be a mine of the potency of perception. Here are, then, three premisses:

The First Premise: The brain is the source of the sinews. The proof of this is the fact that there are many sinews existent in the brain. As for the heart, it has but a small sinew only. It is therefore necessary that the brain should be the place from where the sinews spring up.

The Second Premise: The sinews are the organs of sense-perception and voluntary movement. The proof is the fact that if you expose a sinew and bind it tight you will find that the lowest portion at the end of the tie is devoid of sense-perception and movement and the highest portion which is on the side of the brain loses neither sensation nor motion. This indicates that the organ of sensation and the voluntary motion is the sinew.

The Third Premise: When the brain is the place from where the organ of sense-perception and voluntary movement arise, it is necessarily the source of the faculty of sense-perception and voluntary motions. This is proved by the fact that the potency of sense-perception and movement only extends from the brain—a fact

which asserts that the source and mine of this faculty is the brain.

The Second Argument: What we have elucidated for Galen is that we say, we need not explain the brain or the heart as the source of the sinew, rather we may say, if the faculty of sense-perception and the voluntary movement proceed from the heart to the brain, then, on binding the sinew with a strong *thread*, the power of sensation and movement should remain on the side which meets the heart and not on the side meeting the brain. But the case is different. We, then, surely know that the power of sensation and voluntary notion proceeds from the brain to the heart and not vice versa. This is a proof which needs no premise such as the one we mentioned concerning the First Argument. This is extremely good.

The Third Argument of Galen: He says philosophers and physicians have agreed that what carries the faculties of sense-perception and movement is a delicate body, *viz.* the spirit, which penetrates the sinews. The matter being like this, we say: Since the brain is the source of the generation of this spirit, it is preferable to the heart. This is so because we find vacuums in the brain whereas there is no vacuum in the heart the right cavity of which is full of blood. There is only some doubt concerning the left cavity, as it is believed that this cavity is full of spirit.

Galen says: the matter is not like this. For, when the heart is opened and its inside is revealed without making any hole into it and without tearing its membranes, the animal does not, in this state, die. Even it is possible for you to continue touching the heart, looking at it and observing it exposed for a long time. You will perceive that his pulse in this state is just like (Fol. 271a)

his pulse before this. But there is one condition in the case. That is when the heart is cold the pulse is slow, weak and variable.

When you have known this we say: In this state when we operate the left cavity, blood flows from it. Were it full of spirit blood would not have surely flowed from it. If, however, the cavity contained spirit in some of its parts and blood in some others, the spirit should have necessarily come out first, and then the blood would have flowed. It was also necessary in this state that blood should not have flowed in this case immediately. Since blood flows, we at once know that the left cavity is full of blood.

Again, when the animal dies we find the clot of blood in the left cavity of its heart.

As for the brain, its body is palpable.³⁵ It is not unlikely that it obtains in its gaps particles of spirit.

The Fourth Argument: The intellect is the most noble faculty. It is therefore necessary that its place must be the noblest, the loftiest of all. It is therefore necessary that the place of intellect be the brain. It is in the position of a great king who resides in a lofty palace. The sense-perceptions surrounding the head seem to be in service of the brain standing all around it in their own positions.

Again, the place of the head in the body is like that of the heaven in the earth, and just as the heaven is the abode of the spiritual beings, the brain is similarly and necessarily the abode of the intellect.

The answer to the First Argument is more than one: I—Firstly, we do not agree that the source of the muscle is the brain. His view that brain has many muscles, and that the spirit is strong near the brain and scarce and weak near the heart does not fulfil all your desires

except when you add to this a second premise. That is, abundance and strength only exist at the beginning, and scarcity and weakness at the end. But we must say that this premise is not demonstrative and is contradicted by more than one reasons:

1. The conduit muscle in the eye is thin near the source. When it reaches the cavity of the bone that contains the eyeball, this muscle extends and grows thick. This is a criticism against the premise.
2. The body from which the stem of the tree grows is very much weaker than the stem of the tree. Why is it not then possible that the small muscle in the heart be like the body from which there have ramified the manifold muscles in the brain?
3. If the discourse of Galen is genuine then it is necessary to say that the source of the beating nerves is the manifold part³⁶ looking like the net in the brain, not in the heart, since the manifold part of the pulses is countless and is very much like the fibres of a tree.

It is therefore established that the premise upon which they had put their reliance is rejected by the above-mentioned three arguments.

Secondly, we agree that abundance and strength are only available near the manifold source. There is no contention that the heart is the source of the pulses. Then, there is no doubt that the germs of these pulses are of the genus of those of the muscle bodies. If this is so, then it is not far from truth that muscles grow out of them.

Now, here there are three premises (1) that the heart is the source of the pulses. This is agreed upon by all,

(2) that the pulses are of the genus of muscles. This is indicated by the fact that the bodies of veins vary and are divided into thick muscles³⁷ which are devoid of sense-perception. It is a pulse which is devoid of blood and sense-perception in themselves. The muscles are like this in all their qualities, as it is indicated that the muscles in themselves have no sense-perception. If you tie a muscle with a rope very tightly (Fol. 271b), the part just below the tie would be devoid of sense-perception. This indicates that the substance of the muscle in itself is senseless. In case it is tied, the power of sensation is only caused by some other source.

It is therefore established that the nerves and pulses share these qualities in common. This obviously indicates that the substance of nerves is of the genus of the substance of muscle.

The third premise explains that when the matter is like this it is not far from truth to say that muscles are only born of nerves or pulses.

It is further explained that these nerves only rise from the heart to the brain, either to cause the blood to reach the substance of the brain, or to cause the spirit to reach the brain. In both cases these nerves which rise are necessarily divided and branched off. They grow thin, small and in their getting divided and rising up, at last, they become the soft hair-like pipes.³⁸ Now, in this state when they reach the cavity of the brain and their places³⁹ it is not strange that the hair-like soft nerves twist one another, meet with each other just to appear in the form of muscles. Then, they start descending from the brain to the lowest part of the body. These hair-like pipes are used for some other purpose, that is, for connecting brain-spirits with distant parts of the body. The philosophers and physicians

have especially agreed on the premise that nature does not pass on to preparing many organs when it is possible for it to fulfil its purpose through a few organs only. In this way nerves have become muscles.

Since the source of veins is the heart, it is necessary that the heart should be the source of muscles in the way we mentioned—a view held by a large group of the followers of Aristotle.

In reply to this discourse, Galen has advanced two reasons: Firstly, he argues for his view that the muscles are not of the genre of veins for more than one reason: (1) The veins move with violence while the muscles do not behave in this way. (2) The veins are conduit while the muscles are not conduit save a little thereof; (3) the veins contain blood for the reason that when they are perforated, the hole causes a calamity to the possessor due to hemorrhage while the muscle has necessarily no blood in itself; (4) the veins consist of two groups: (1) one dissolves into particles which move breadthwise in a globular way, (2) and the other dissolves into parts which move steadily lengthwise.

As for the sinew, it dissolves into a white sinew devoid of blood which moves steadily lengthwise. (5) The fifth is that when the sinew is tied it loses sense-perception and voluntary movement, and this does not stop the movement of the pulse. But when the vein is tied the pulse stops while sense-perception and movement do not stop.

(6) Sixthly, the sinew often stops its activity. Don't you see that sometimes the nerve through which the faculty of vision passes to the surface of the retina, stops its activity in sleep? Similar is the discourse on the rest of the external senses.

But the artery is steadily perpetual in its activity.

Thus it is established that the arteries are not of the genre of sinews.

In the second reply to this discourse Galen says: the root of the artery which originates from the heart is divided into two: one part ascending to the head and the other descending to the lower body. The part that descends to the lower body is undoubtedly divisible, and splits into fine delicate veins. Then, it loses its existence after these fine veins (Fol. 272a) turn into all that becomes sinews (nerves). It thus necessitates that the condition of the arteries which ascend to the brain is also similar.

272a

The followers of Aristotle say: As for the first reply, it is extremely weak. This is for the reason that the qualities of the artery, which you have mentioned, will only be available in the state of its ascending to the brain and penetrating its substance.

As for the reason why you hold that after the arteries return from the substance of the brain, attend to the lower body and remain in their characteristics, it is yet to be explained.

It has been explained that the purpose of creating an artery of the descriptions mentioned is to push the blood up to the spirit from the heart to the substance of the brain. When this object is achieved and nature responds to prepare another instrument to connect the substance of spirit in the brain to the lower body, while it is obvious that these "pipes" are not suitable for being an instrument in this function except when those qualities are removed from them, it is no wonder that nature manages to remove those qualities from the hair-like pipes, and acquires other qualities agreeable to the second function. This is, in general, not remote. Why should we not say this? When undoubtedly these arteries

penetrate into the substance of the brain, get divided and split up into very small ones. It is, therefore, not unlikely that the nature of the brain causes them to change those characteristics into some other characteristics befitting the second function. Especially when they split into very small ones there remains, indeed, no difference between them and the nervepipes, while in accordance with our view, they continue to be there. But these very small veins when they return from the brain and turn to the lower body they resemble in sense-perception to small, thin threads conjoined and clustered together. The peculiar sensible sinews grow from the jumble of these small, thin threads. This possibility is surely not absurd in view of what has been mentioned by Galen.

As for his second reply, it is also weak, because just as the heart spirits reach upwards to the substance of the brain in these very small arteries and remain in the substance, these arteries change their nature because they transpierce the substance of the brain and are mixed with it. Nature, then, needs to prepare an instrument to transmit the brain-spirits to the lower body. But at this stage it is not remote that nature finds instruments for the second function contrary to the part that descends from the arteries to the lower body. For, as soon as they are connected with a different organ they change their nature, while the lower body does not feel any necessity to invent artery-like pipes as instruments for its parts. The difference is manifest in the two cases. This is the sum and substance of the discourse of Aristotle against the proof of Galen for his view that the nerve springs from the brain.

Again, the followers of Aristotle argue in favour of their view that the nerve springs from the heart by

saying that the voluntary movement must have a hard and strong instrument but the brain possesses no hardness in its body. As for the heart, it has varieties of hardness in it: (1) its flesh is compact, strong, hard, harder than the rest of flesh; (2) it possesses a good quantity of membranes, muscles in itself; (3) since it is constantly in motion, it is necessary that its body must be strongest of all *fleshy bodies*.

When this is the case, then those who advocate that the heart is the growing-spot of the nerves which are the instruments of strong movements are preferable to those who hold that they originate in the brain (Fol. 272 b).

Galen meets this argument in two ways: Firstly, this is a reasoning which indicates that the heart is the originating place of the nerve. But sense-perception indicates that it is the brain from which the nerve originates. Now, sense-perception is stronger than reasoning. Secondly, the matter which moves the nerves is not the nerve, rather it is the membranes which consist of nerves, sinews, fine coverings and flesh. The membranes recline on the bones while the nerves favour them with the faculty of sense-perception and voluntary movement as long as they are mixed with sinews; and membranes give them strength and compactness, and keep them free from disconnection. On this supposition it is not absurd to hold that the brain is the source of the nerves.

The followers of Aristotle counter charge by saying: The first reply is weak, since sense-perception indicates only the abundance of sinews and their strength near the brain⁴⁰ and their scarcity and weakness near the heart.

We have already explained that this determined

quantity does not indicate that the brain is the source of nerves.

The second argument is also very weak, since Galen has argued from the abundance and thickness of the nerve that it has originated from the brain.

The followers of Aristotle have, moreover, charged Galen by saying:

If this is the reason which, according to your view, indicates that the brain is soft and the nerve is strong, it is therefore impossible that it should spring from the brain. On the contrary, the fact is that the nerve is strong and hard⁴¹ and the heart is also strong and hard. It, therefore, indicates that the nerve springs from the heart. Thus the argument of Galen is absolutely absurd.

This is the gist of the verbal duel that took place between the two groups concerning the source of the nerve as to whether it is in the brain or in the heart.

ANOTHER REPLY TO THE DOUBT OF GALEN

We say: We agree that the nerve originates from the brain.

We also agree that the nerve is the organ of sense-perception and movement. But, why do you say that this entails that the brain is the source of the power of sensation and voluntary movement?

Its explanation is this. It is not far from truth to say that the heart is the source of sensation and movement. Again, the brain transmits to the heart a second organ from itself in order to obtain through this the power of sensation and movement from the heart. If this possibility is established the view of Galen totally falls to the ground.

The reply to the second argument in support of

the view of Galen has been summarised as follows:

We say: why is it not possible to say that the spirit of the heart has extreme heat? When it has an open passage between itself and the brain, the chill of the brain reaches it to make it moderate and render it fit to receive the faculty of sense-perception and movement. But when this passage suffers derangement the effect of the chill of the brain stops, and it does not remain capable of receiving the power of sensation and motion. This faculty therefore becomes non-existent on the side that is connected with the heart, but the side nearing the brain remains unaffected, since there are many arteries in the brain all of which supply to the brain the power of heat from the heart which leads to sensation and motion.

As for the reply to the *third* argument, we say, if this discourse is correct, then, it demands that there should be absolutely no spirit in the heart. Galen, however, does not contend that the heart is the source of the animal spirits. He agrees with the view that the animal spirit ascends from the heart to the brain, and there it becomes a psychological rational spirit.

In reply to the Fourth Argument we say: it is a kind of weak argumentative proof. We have ourselves advanced similar, rather stronger arguments than these. This is the end of the elucidated discourse on the problem.

You should know that Galen has written a book entitled: "Hypocrates and Plato" in which he has no other purpose but to explain this problem. It is a long book which I have studied and from its study I have derived the gist of his discourse together with a number of reasons which, as you will see, I have added and explained here.

NOTES

1. اصحاب الكشافات: Abū Tālib al-Makki: K. Qūt al-Qulūb, Part I, p. 114:
ومنها نوران ساطعان في القلب عن تخصيص من رحمة راحم وهما العلم والايمان، فهذه ادوات القلب وحواسه ومعانيه الغائبة والآتية، والقلب في وسط هذه الادوات كالمك و هذه جنوده تؤدي اليه، او كاللراة المجلوة، و هذه الالة حوله تظهر فيراها و يقدح فيه فيجدها،
also Cf. Abū Naṣr 'Abdullah b. 'Alī al-Sarrāj: K. al-Luma' fi'l-Taṣawwuf, Leiden, 1914, p. 24:
فاذا قلنا علم الباطن اردنا.... ولا الباطن عن الظاهر
2. اولاً بالدماغ: Ibn Sina declares that man has three main parts: Heart, Brain and Liver, Cf. Al-Qānūn, Vol. I. Nāmi Press, p. 37:
فالاعضاء الرئيسة هي الاعضاء التي هي مبادئ للقوى الاولى في البدن المضطر اليها في بقاء الشخص. او النوع - اما بحسب بقاء الشخص فالرئيسة ثلاثة: القلب وهو مبدأ قوة الحياة، الدماغ وهو مبدأ قوتي الحس والحركة، والكبد وهو مبدأ قوة التغذية، واما بحسب بقاء النوع فالرئيسة هذه الثلاثة ايضاً و رابع ينص النوع وهو الاثنيان الخ.
3. Al-Baqarah: 97.
4. Al-Shu'arā': 193.
5. Q: 37 al-Zumar: 21.
6. مصوباً: That for achieving knowledge it is necessary to keep one's soul pure of dirt and defect is borne out by the following extract from Imām Rāghib's al-Dharī'ah, pp. 20-21:
لا يصلح لخلافة الله ولا يكمل لعبادته وعمارة ارضه الا من كان طاهر النفس قدازيل رجسها ونجسها.... انما سميت الحواريون بذلك لانهم كانوا يطهرون نفوس الناس بافادتهم الدين والعلم،
7. Al-Hajj: 46.
8. Al-Baqarah: 225; al-Mā'idah: 92.
9. Al-Hajj: 37.
10. Al-Hujurat: 3.
11. Al-'Ādiyāt: 10.
12. Al-A'raf: 178.
13. Al-Baqarah: 10.

14. Al-Baqarah: 7.
15. Al-Baqarah: 88.
16. Al-Nisā': 155.
17. Al-Tawbah: 64.
18. Al-Muṭaffifin: 14.
19. Muḥammad (s): 24.
20. Al-Hajj: 46.
21. Al-Isrā': 36.
22. Al-Mu'min: 19.
23. Al-Mulk: 23; Al-Naḥl: 78; Al-Mu'minūn: 79; Al-Sajdah: 9.
24. Al-Aḥqāf: 26.
25. Al-Mā'idah: 41.
26. Al-Naḥl: 106.
27. Al-Hujurat: 14.
28. Al-Mujādalah: 22.
29. والى القلب: This ḥadīth has been recorded by both Imām Bukhārī and Imām Muslim (Vol. I, p. 13, Vol. II, p. 28) on the authority of al-Nu'mān and the text is as follows:
عن النعمان بن بشير قال سمعت رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم يقول، واهوى النعمان باصبعيه الى اذنيه، ان الحلال بين وان الحرام بين، وبينهما مشتهيات لا يعلمهن كثير من الناس، فمن اتقى الشبهات استبرأ لدينه وعرضه، ومن وقع في الشبهات وقع في الحرام كالراعى يرعى حول الحمى يوشك ان يرتفع فيه، ألا وان لكل ملك حمى، ألا وان حمى الله محارمه، ألا وان في الجسد مضغة اذا صلحت صلح الجسد كله، واذا فسدت فسد الجسد كله، ألا وهى القلب.
30. ثبت قلبى: The complete text of the ḥadīth has been recorded in Mishkāt, Nizāmi Press, p. 14, as follows:
و عن انس قال كان رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم يكثر ان يقول: يا مقلب القلوب! ثبت قلبى على دينك، فقلت يا نبي الله امنابك وبما جئت به فهل تخاف علينا؟ قال: نعم ان القلوب بين اصبعين من اصابع الله يقلبها كيف يشاء، رواه الترمذى وابن ماجه.
31. In his K. al-Mukhtārāt fi'l-Ṭibb, Abū'l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Aḥmad b. 'Alī (Cf. First edition, Hyderabad Deccan, 1362 H. Vol. I, p. 67) states the various views of Greek philosophers concerning the formation of the first part of the embryo. According to Aristotle 'heart' is the chief body and is formed first of all.

Hypocrates holds that the brain takes its shape first as it is the source of volition and sense-perception. Some other physicians opine that it is the liver which is formed first of all, as the physical system demands that liver should come first to complete nutrition and growth. Cf:

و اختلف الحكماء في اول عضو يتكون في الجنين هو القلب ، لانه اشرف الاعضاء الرئيسية و هو مستقر الحرارة الغريزية ومنبت الحياة ومنشأ جميع القوى ، فلذلك وجب ان يتقدم على سائر الاعضاء ، ويتقدم فعله على سائر الافعال ،

و اما ابقراط فيرى ان اول ما يتكون من الجنين الدماغ لانه به يتم الحس والحركة الارادية - و بعض يرى ان اول ما يتكون منه الكبد لان النظام الطبيعي يوجب ذلك ، لان الكبد هو العضو الرئيس الذي يتم به قوة التغذية والنمو ، و هي اول قوة يتفصل بها الجنين عن الجماد ، حتى اذا كمل له هذه القوة احتاج حينئذ الى الحيوانية وغيرها بحسب ترتيب الوجود .

و اما اصحاب التجارب فاؤل ما تبين لهم من ذلك هو الدماغ لبياضه .

32. Cf. Supra Note No. 31 for the expression: اصحاب التجارب .
33. Cf. Ibn Sina: Al-Qānūn (al-Kulliyāt), Vol. I. Nāmi Press, India, p. 86:

و كثير من الفلاسفة و عامة الاطباء و خصوصا جالينوس يرى ان لكل واحدة من القوى عضوا رئيسا هو معدنها ، و عنه يصدر افعالها ، فيرون ان القوة النفسانية مسكنها ، و مصدر افعالها الدماغ ، و ان القوة الطبيعية لها نوعان : نوع غايته حفظ الشخص و تدبيره و هو المتصرف في امر الغذاء ليغذو البدن الى نهاية بقائه ، و ينمي الى نهاية نشوه ، و مسكن هذا النوع و مصدر فعله هو الكبد -

و نوع غايته حفظ النوع ، و هو المتصرف في امر التناسل ليفصل من امشاج البدن جوهر النتي ، ثم يصوره باذن الخالق تعالى ، و مسكن هذا النوع و مصدر افعاله هو الاثنان .
و القوة الحيوانية و هي التي تدبر امر الروح الذي هو مركب الحس والحركة يهيئه لقبوله اياها اذا حصل في الدماغ و يجعله بحيث يعطى ما يفسو فيه الحياة ، و مسكن هذه القوة مصدر فعلها هو القلب ،

و اما عظيم الفلاسفة و هو ارسطوطاليس فيرى ان مبدأ جميع هذه القوى هو القلب ، الا ان ظهور افعاله الاولى هذه المبادئ المذكورة كما ان مبدأ الحس عند الاطباء هو الدماغ ، ثم لكل حاسة عضو منفرد منه يظهر فعلها ،

ثم اذا فتش عن الواجب و حقق و بد الامر على ما يراه ارسطوطاليس دونهم ، و يوجد اقاويلهم منتزعة من مقدمات مقنعة غير ضرورية ، انما يتبعون فيها ظاهر الامور ، لكن الطبيب ليس عليه من حيث هو طبيب ان يتعرف الحق من هذين الامرين ، بل ذلك على الفيلسوف او على الطبيعي ، و الطبيب اذا سلم له ان هذه الاعضاء المذكورة مبادىا لهذه القوى فلا عليه فيما يحاوله من امر الطب ، كانت هذه مستفيدة عن مبدأ قبلها او لم يكن لك جهل ذلك مما لا يرخس فيه للفيلسوف .

ثم ان الروح يقبل بها (بالقوة الحيوانية) عند الفيلسوف ارسطوطاليس المبدأ الاول ، و النفس الاولى التي تنبعث عنها سائر القوى الا ان افعال تلك القوى لا تصدر عن الروح في اول الامر كما انه ايضا لا يصدر الاحساس عند الاطباء عن الروح النفساني الذي في الدماغ ما لم ينفذ الى الجليدية او الى اللسان او غير ذلك ، فاذا حصل قسم من الروح في تجويف الدماغ قبل مزاجا يصلح لان يصدر عنه افعال القوة الموجودة فيه بديا ، و كذلك في الكبد و الاثنيين ، و عند الاطباء ما لم يستحيل الروح عند الدماغ الى مزاج اخر لم يستعد لقبول النفس التي هي مبدأ الحس و الحركة

قالوا و هذه القوة (الحيوانية) مع انها مهيئة للحياة فهي ايضا مبدأ حركة الجوهر الروحي اللطيف الى الاعضاء ، مبدأ بسطه و قبضه للتنسج و التفتي -

Aristotle: Generation of Animals, The Loeb edition, 1953, p. 195: "On this account in all blooded animals it is the heart which can first be seen as something distinct, as this is the first principle both of the "uniform" and of the "non-uniform" parts—since this is justifiably designated as first principle of the animal or organism from the moment when it begins to need nourishment, for of course that which exists grows, and, for an animal, the ultimate form of nourishment is blood or its counterpart.

p. 255: "As the source of sensation is in heart, the heart is the first part of the whole animal to be formed, and, on account of the heat of the heart, and to provide a corrective to it, the cold causes the brain to "set", where the blood-vessels terminate above. That is why the regions around the head begin to form immediately after the heart and are bigger than the other parts, the brain being large and fluid from the outset."

34. Supra Note No. 31.

35. مزرد derived from مزرد: a cord by which the throat of a camel is compressed. The word al-Zard (الزرد) is like al-Sard (السرد), meaning the inserting (تداخل) of the rings of a coat-of-mail one into another, as is clearly understood from their usage: الدرع المزود.

36. الشحنة means النصف الملتف المشتبك.

37. الشظية, plural شظايا, a splinter, or piece split off, of a staff, or stick, or of a reed, or cane, or of bone. The author uses the expression الشظايا الكثيفة for العروق الضوارب, arteries i.e. the pulsing veins.

38. الشظايا اللينة as against arteries are soft and hair-like which get together in the brain, vide al-Shaykh al-Ra'is: al-Qānūn, Vol. I, Nāmi Press, 1905, p. 72.

39. These penetrating arteries are no other than the soft hair-like arteries.

40. Cf. al-Shaykh al-Ra'is: al-Qānūn, Vol. I, Nāmi Press, p. 71: والاعصاب مبدأها على الوجه المعلوم هو الدماغ ومنتهاى تفرعها هو الجلد -

41. The actual utility of sinews is that through it the brain imparts motion and sense-perception to all parts of the body. It is only accidental that sinews make the flesh stiff and the body strong. vide al-Shaykh al-Ra'is: al-Qānūn, op. cit., p. 70.

CHAPTER VII

ON EXPLAINING THE FACULTIES¹ OF THE SOUL

You should know that the human soul has vegetative, animal and human faculties.

As for the vegetative faculties, you must know that the body of man is created out of semen and the blood of menses both of which are hot and moist substances. So, as long as the human body lives it remains hot and moist. When heat acts on moisture, the heat is evaporated from it for the reason that the steam particles rise up from the substance, causing it obviously emaciation and extinction. The Wise Creator has, therefore, managed to compensate this and has deposited into it the Nutritive Faculty which supplies from the particles of nutrition the substitute of the particles that have dissolved.

When you have realised this we say: the nutrition must possess a faculty of assimilation and a faculty of retention to assimilate as well as retain nutrition, so that there remain those parts which are assimilated and are acted upon by a faculty which dilates them and makes them agreeable so that they become the substitute of the nutrient. A third faculty of driving away the unnecessary things is also essential to remove those superfluous particles which do not suit the body of the nutrient. Again, when these suitable parts are obtained to take the place of the emaciated and diluted

particles there must be a faculty to make them the substitute of the dissolved particles. This function is accomplished in three ways:

- (1) in supplying the nutritious particles to the substance of the bodies,
- (2) in sticking to them
- (3) in making them just like the bodies.

Through the whole of these three functions nutrition achieves three directions or faculties *i.e.* the faculty of growth; another faculty which separates itself from the particles of nutrition after they reach the substance of the body and adopts characteristics which resemble the characteristics of the body preparing out of these is a productive faculty which performs the function of production. Now, the vegetative faculties are those which we have enumerated.

Again, some philosophers hold that these faculties vary from each other and are contradictory on the basis of the fact that from one there can proceed only one. Some others hold that there is only one faculty, but its functions vary due to the conditions. In the beginning it draws (something), and after drawing it holds, and after holding, it is acted upon by the symptoms of digestion and transformation. After this function the harmful refuse is driven away. The faculty having obtained the substance of blood displays its action and applies the well-cooked, blood-particles to the substance of original bodies with which they get mixed up. The faculty is, then, one but its functions vary due to the variation of its states and conditions.

As for the animal faculties, they are either moving or perceiving. If they are moving they either display movement or cause it. Those which display movement are the faculties which are there in the muscles and whose

function is to move sometimes to attract and sometimes to drive away. But those which cause movement are of different grades:

The first grade of these muscle-faculties is the determined will and the determined desire. The determined will produces from the faculty of Appetition a clot of blood which attracts the agreeable, or from anger which concerns the driving away of the disagreeable. Now, appetite and anger are only produced by the consciousness of man that something is agreeable or disagreeable. If he realizes that the object is agreeable, it is acted upon by the feeling of inclination, and if he realizes that the object is disagreeable, it is acted upon by the feeling of anger.

This feeling is sometimes created and sometimes imaginary. As for the perceiving faculties,² they are either the external perceiving faculties *i.e.* the five senses, or the internal perceiving faculties which are also five (as held by philosophers).

The method of recording this is what we say: These internal faculties are either perceiving or governing. The perceiving faculties either perceive the forms of the sensible which is a faculty in which forms of five senses are gathered and is called according to them *Sensus Communis*, or perceive the particular intentions which are not sensible but which exist in the objects of sense-perception. This is like our judgment that this particular person is a friend and the other an enemy. This faculty is called Phantasy. Either of the two faculties has, again, a depository. The depository of *Sensus Communis* is Imagination and that of phantasy is the faculty of Retention, the total being four.

As for the governing faculty, it is the faculty that governs and acts in the particular forms and particular

meanings sometimes by composition and sometimes by analysis which is called Imaginative Faculty. These are the five internal senses.

They say the human soul has two faculties³—theoretical and practical. The theoretical faculty is the faculty through which the substance of the soul prepares for receiving the simple universal forms. As for the practical faculty, it is a faculty by considering which the substance of the soul prepares itself to administer the body and maintain the well-being of its important objects.

This is, therefore, the discourse on recording the psychological faculties.

You must know that the philosophers have explained elaborately these discourses in terms of faculties and have assigned every action separately to a separate faculty. Then, they have resolved that some of them are corporeal faculties and some spiritual faculties. But we have affirmed in all our books that all these perceptions and all sorts of actions belong to the substance of the soul, and that every part of the body is an organ of the soul in respect of every particular action out of the actions of the soul. The organ of the soul for seeing is, for example, the eye, for hearing the ear, for speaking the tongue. Since we have put forward arguments indicating the genuineness of this discourse in many of our books, we feel there is no need of repeating them in this chapter.

NOTES

1. Imām al-Rāghib explains that man has five faculties—nutrition, sense-perception, imagination, appetite and reasoning. Vide al-Dhārī'ah, op. cit. p. 12.

قد جعل الله تعالى للسان خمس قوى يدل على وجودها فيه ما يظهر من تأثيراتها : قوة الغذاء وبها النشو والتربية والولادة ، وقوة الحس وبها الاحساس واللذة والالتم ، وقوة التخيل وبها تصور اعيان الاشياء بعد غيوبتها عن الحس ، وقوة النزوع وبها يكون الطلب للموافق والهرب من المخالف والرضى والغضب ، والاثار والكراهة ، وقوة التفكير وبها يكون النطق والعقل والحكمة والروية والتدبير والمهنة والرأى والمشورة -

2. القوى المدركة : Cf. al-Rāghib: Al-Dhārī'ah, pp. 12 & 13:

فاما القوى المدركة... لا يبصرون بها ،

3. لها قوتان نظرية وعملية : Cf. The Text infra p. 111. Chapt. II في قوته النظرية والعملية

That the human soul has two peculiar faculties which are not available in other beings has been mentioned by Ibn Miskawayh in his Tahdhīb, p. 47.

”فالكمال الخاص بالانسان كمالان و ذلك ان له قوتين احدهما العالة و الاخرى العاملة ، لان العلم مبدأ والعمل تمام“ -

NOTES

CHAPTER VIII

ON THE INVESTIGATION RELATING TO WORDS AND
EXPRESSIONS

Here there are four words:¹ Soul, Intellect, Spirit and Heart.

Sometimes we mention these words and mean the substance of the soul, and sometimes they are used for something else.

The Soul (نفس) is mentioned sometimes just to mean undesirable morals. Intellect (عقل) is mentioned to mean the sciences necessary for man; Spirit (روح) is mentioned to indicate a particular sensible part (of the body). Let these phrases be precisely known so that they may not be confused, as these words bear more or less a common meaning.

١. أربعة: The Imām has not explained all the four terms elaborately. Imām Ghazzālī has given different meanings in which they are generally used. In his *Iḥyā'*, III. p. 3 he says, "*Qalb* denotes two things—(1) the physical heart, and (2) a "divine entity" (لطيفة ربانية روحانية). *Rūḥ* means the spiritual entity as denoted by *Qalb*. It also means a subtle, vapour-like substance, which issues from the hollows of the physical heart and through the tissues spreads over into the whole body. *Nafs* also signifies the same spiritual entity as denoted by *Qalb* and *Rūḥ*; as also according to the *Ṣūfīs* the combined forces in man of anger (غضب) and animal desire (شهوة). It represents life on the side of passions and appetites as constituting the evil tendencies in man. But *Nafs* is also described by different attributive names in accordance with the different states that predominate at one time or the other. The fourth word '*Aql* (reason) means the Knowledge of the true nature of things (العلم بمقتايق الأمور). It also means the same spiritual entity or percipient mind as denoted by the other three words. See M. 'Umaruddin: *Some Fundamental Aspects of Imām Ghazzālī's Thought*, Aligarh, 1946, pp. 19-21.

CHAPTER IX

ON THE RELATION OF THE FACULTIES TO THE SUBSTANCE
OF THE SOUL

You must know that the savants have mentioned many similes in this connection. The first simile¹ is that the substance of the soul is like a king and the body as its kingdom. This king has two kinds of army²—the army that the eyes can see—it is the external bodies—, and the army that is seen by inner visions which are those faculties which we have already mentioned.

You should know that for the internal faculties engaged in accomplishing the welfare of the soul and in completing the welfare of the body [there is a different faculty].

The First kind of the internal faculties. It is that the perfection of the rational soul consists in realizing the truth in itself and the form by acting through it. But the activity of the form is also conditioned by the light of gnosis. The most important enterprise of the soul is to acquire gnosis. But it has been created *prima facie* free from the knowledge of many things and has been favoured with external and internal senses so that when the soul feels through these senses the sensible objects it awakens to the consciousness of distinction between homogeneous and heterogeneous objects, the form of which enables the substance of the soul to realize

as to why the objects are homogeneous and why they are distinguished; and then the soul obtains the absolute form in itself.

This form is, again, of two kinds: those the mere perception of which necessitates the mental determination of ascribing negation to some and affirmation to some others, and those which are not like this. The first of this kind is the axiomatic truths the existence of which must necessarily be acknowledged. For, were they not present, the mental determination would have surely needed in every case assistance from others and would have entailed either continuation *ad infinitum* or an infinite regress.

The Second Division: It consists of those speculative sciences which are achieved and the mere conception of which does not necessitate the mental assertion of their negation or affirmation. It is therefore established that if there were no senses, the soul would not have been able to achieve either axiomatic or speculative sciences. That is why there goes the saying, "whoever has lost senses has lost knowledge." This explains the assistance of senses in perfecting the substance of the soul. As for their assistance in perfecting the substance of the body, this is clear from the fact, as we have explained, that the body having been hot and moist is constantly suffering decadence and extinction and is therefore in need of importing a substitute for what is being extinguished and it is necessary for it to distinguish between what is agreeable and what is disagreeable.

The senses, thus, assist the man in imparting him awareness of what is useful and what would do him harm. He accordingly engages himself in acquiring the useful and driving away the harmful. This is the explanation of the assistance of the senses in perfecting

the substance of the body.

You must know that this is an attempt to reform the important factors of the substance of the soul. This is because the soul has only entered this corporeal world to acquire useful knowledge and righteous deeds. All the organ that the soul has for achieving this is the body. As long as the organ does not function properly, it will not enable the agent to achieve its object. It is, therefore, established that to undertake the reform of the important functions of the body is an attempt to reform the important functions of the soul.

The Second Simile: The heart in the body is like the governor, its faculties and organs stand in place of the country, the rational imaginative faculty³ is like the sincere adviser, appetite is like the servant who carries food to the town, and anger like the chief of the police. Then, the appetite which is like a servant who brings food to the town may be devilish, deceitful and cunning. He appears in the form of an admonisher whose admonition brings in all kinds dreadful evils, and deadly poisons. He habitually quarrels with the sincere minister in his administration. Now, just as it is necessary for an intelligent king to keep the sincere minister in a dominant position as against the deceitful slave who carries food, and as against the chief of the police, and that he should pay no attention to their intrigues against the minister, in order to keep the affairs of the town in good state, similarly, when the rational soul is illumined with the light of intellect and is enlightened with knowledge and wisdom, and subjugates appetite and anger, the affair of this corporeal life is well-established.

274b (Fol. 274b) Whoever deviates from this path is like one concerning whom Allah, the Exalted, says: "Hast thou seen him who chooseth for his god his own lust?" and

says: (but clung to the earth) and followed his own lust.⁴ Therefore his likeness is as the likeness of a dog;"⁵ and says, "and restrained his soul from lust, Lo! the Garden will be his home."⁶

The Third Simile: The body is like the town⁷ and the rational soul is like king, the external and internal senses are like army, the bodies are like the subject, appetite and anger are like an enemy who quarrels with the king concerning his kingdom and tries to destroy his subjects. If the king intends to subjugate this enemy the kingdom remains in good state and the struggle is removed, as Allah, the Exalted, has said: "Allah hath conferred on those who strive with their wealth and lives a rank above the sedentary."⁸ If, however, the king does not fight with his enemy and destroy his kingdom, his own kingdom would suffer troubles and turmoils and as a consequence thereof it would meet with destruction.

The Fourth Simile: The simile of the rational soul is like that of a horseman⁹ who rides in pursuit of a game, his appetite being his horse, and anger his dog. Now, when the rider is experienced, his horse well-trained and obedient, and his dog trained, he is deserving of success. But when he is burning within himself, when his horse is disobedient and his dog is a devourer, and neither his horse moves in accordance with his intention nor does his dog run as instructed by him, he is apt to perish, rather than attain his object.

The Fifth Simile: You must know that your body is like a perfect house which has been built complete with its treasures (inner portion) and whose doors are kept open, with all necessary materials well-prepared for the master of the house. The head is like the upper chamber on the top of the house and the hole and inlets in the head

like small windows and ventilators in the chamber of the house. The middle of the brain is like lights in the house and the eye like the door of the chamber, the nose like the wall-shelf above the door, the two lips like two sides of the door, the teeth like gate-keepers, the tongue like the chamberlain, the back like a strong wall which is the fortress of the house, the face like the front of the house, the lungs which draw in the cold-breathing like the summer house, the running of the breath into the house like the air that passes through the summer house, the heart with its natural heat like the winter house, the stomach with the cooked nutrition therein like the kitchen, the liver with the blood in it like the tavern, the veins in which the blood flows like the owner of the house, the spleen together with the black-bile which it contains like reservoirs¹⁰ which contain burnt substances, the bladder with the hot yellow bile like the magazine (the house of arms), intestines along with the remnant of food like the latrine, the bladder containing urine like the well, and the two courses in the lower part of the body like the spots through which the filth is disposed of from the house, the two legs like an obedient riding beast, the bones upon which the body has been built like the plank of wood upon which is based the house, the flesh in the midst of bones like the matter, the sinews with which some bones are tied are like boxes. Glory be to Him Who has prepared in the house of your body with the *nails* of your Rational Soul all these wonderful measures and rare beauties! This is what concerns the rooms of this house.

Again, the rational soul in the house is like the king and the authoritative manager who sees with the eye, hears with the ear, smells with the nostrils, tastes with the tongue, speaks with the mouth and holds with the

hands, acts the artful deeds with fingers, walks with the feet, and kneels down upon the knees, sits on the two buttocks, sleeps on two flanks, reclines against the back and carries burdens on two shoulders, thinks (Fol. 275a) with the front of the brain, imagines through the middle of the brain, remembers with the posterior of the brain,¹¹ produces sound with the throat, inhales air through nostrils, chews with teeth and swallows through the nutrition pipe. The purpose of all these organs and instruments is that he should decorate himself with the ornament of knowledge and characterize the human soul with the mood of cognition. This soul then breathes with the soul of celestial region and is equipped with the light of Divinity.

Again, Allah, the Exalted, has entrusted the management of this kingdom to three Chiefs:¹² One of them is Appetition which holds its sway over the liver, and flows with the blood in static veins. For this reason there goes the saying of the Prophet: "The devil moves in the son of Adam like the moving of blood."¹³ This is for the fact that the Appetitive Faculty does not flow with the blood into the veins except from the liver.

The second Chief is the faculty of Anger which is located in the heart. It passes through the veins which move about on all sides of the body.

The third Chief is the administrative psychical faculty which is located in the brain and which passes through the limbs to all sides of the body.

Again, these three chiefs are not heterogeneous, independent in themselves. They are, rather, like tributaries which have originated from one root, like branches that have grown from one tree, like a source from which there flow three streams, like a father who causes the birth of many children, and like a man who

performs three works designated with three names: the blacksmith, the goldsmith and the mason.

These three are like the kings of the surrounding countries who are appointed by the great king. The activities of Appetition resemble the activities of women, children, and idiots from among the people when they go against the will of their fathers and their spouses, whereas the functions of anger resemble those of the strategists and assassins when they do not act according to the commands of their rulers. The functions of the administrative psychical faculty resemble those of the philosophers, jurists and the people of virtue and righteousness.

NOTES

1. The first parable has been mentioned in the *Ihyā'* (Vol. III, p. 6) as follows :

المثال الاول : ان تقول مثل نفس الانسان في بدنه اعنى بالنفس اللطيفة المذكورة كممثل ملك في مدينته وملكته ، فان البدن مملكة النفس وعلها ومستقرها ومدينتها وجوارحها وقواها بمنزلة الصنائع والعملة ،

2. (جندان) Cf. *Ihyā'*, III p. 5:

وله (للقلب) جندان جند يرى بالا'بصار ، وجند لا يرى الا بالبصائر وهو في حكم الملك و الجنود في حكم الخدم والاعوان ،

3. العقلية المفكرة : The words of the second parable have been mentioned by Imām Ghazzālī under the first parable: see *Ihyā'*, III, p. 6:

والقوة العقلية المفكرة له كالشیر الناصح و الوزير العاقل والشهوة له كالعبد السوء يجلب الطعام والميرة الى المدينة ، والغضب والحمية له كصاحب الشرطة ، والعبد الجالب للميرة كذاب مكار ، خداع خبيث يتمثل بصورة الناصح وتحت نصحه الشر الهائل والسم القاتل ، وديدنه وعادته منازعة الوزير الناصح في آرائه وتدابيراته ، حتى انه لا يخلو من منازعته ومعارضته ساعة ، كما ان الوالى في مملكته اذا كان مستغنيا في تدبيراته بوزيره ومستشيرا له ومعرضا عن اشارة هذا العبد الخبيث مستدلا باشارته في ان الصواب في تقيض رائه ، ادبه صاحب شرطته واسمه اوزيره وجعله مؤتمرا له ، مسلطا من جهته على هذا العبد الخبيث واتباعه وانصاره حتى يكون العبد مسوسا لاسائسا ومأمورا مدبرا لا اميرا مدبرا استقام امر بلده وانتظم العدل بسببه ، فكذا النفس متى استعانت بالعقل وادبت بحمية الغضب وسلطتها على الشهوة واستعانت باحدهما على الاخرى تارة بان تقلل مرتبة الغضب وغلوائه بمخالفة الشهوة واستدراجها ، وتارة بقمع الشهوة وقهرها بتسليط الغضب والحمية عليها وتقييح مقتضياتها ، اعتدلت قواها وحسنت اخلاقها ، ومن عدل هذه الطريقة كان كمن قال الله تعالى فيه - "افرايت من اتخذ الهه هواه واضله الله على علم" ٩- وقال تعالى - "واتبع هواه فمثل كمثل الكلب ان تحمل يلهث او تتركه يلهث - وقال عز وجل فيمن نهى النفس عن الهوى "وا اما من خاف مقام ربه ونهى النفس

عن الهوى فان الجنة هي الماوى -

The same expression has been copied with some variation almost verbatim by Rāghib al-Isfahānī in his al-Dhārī'ah, pp. 22 & 23:

اعلم ان مثل الانسان في بدنه كمثل وال في بلده وقواه و جوارحه بمنزلة صناع وعمله والعقل له بمنزلة مشير عالم ناصح ، والشهوة فيه كعبد سوء جالب للميرة والحمية له كصاحب شرطة ، والعبد الجالب للميرة خبيث ما كر يتمثل للوالى بصورة الناصح ، وفي نصحه ذنب العقب ، و يعارض الوزير في تدبيره ولا يغفل ساعة من منازعته ومعارضته ، وكما ان الوالى في مملكته متى استشار في تدبيراته وزيره دون هذا العبد الخبيث و ادب صاحب شرطته وجعله مؤتمرا لوزيره وسلطه على هذا العبد و تباعه حتى يكون هذا العبد مسوسا لا سائسا ومديرا استقام امر بلده ، فكذا ايضا النفس متى استعانت بالعقل في التدبير و ادبت الحمية وسلطته على الشهوة وقواها استتبت امرها و الافسدت ، ولهذا قد حذرنا الله تعالى غاية الحذر من اتباع الهوى ، فقال ولا تتبع الهوى فيضلك عن سبيل الله ، وقال تعالى في ذم من اتبعه : افرايت من اتخذ الهه هواه ، وأضل الله على علم ،

وقال خله الى الارض واتبع هواه ، فمثل كمثل الكلب ، وقال تعالى في مدح من عصاه : وأما من خاف مقام ربه ونهى النفس عن الهوى فان الجنة هي الماوى -

4. Al-Furqān: 43; Al-Jāthiyah: 22.

5. Al-A'rāf: 176.

6. Al-Nāzi'āt: 40, 41.

7. البدن كالدينه : This parable is also taken from the Ihyā', III, p. 7; which elaborates the second parable as follows:

”اعلم ان البدن كالدينه والعقل اعنى المدرك من الانسان كملك مدبر لها.... رجعنا من الجهاد الاصغر الى الجهاد الاكبر،“

Imām Rāghib in his al-Dhārī'ah explains the same parable and uses the same expression as that of the Ihyā'. He says (pp. 23-24):

”ومن وجه اخر الانسان من حيث جعله الله تعالى عالما صغيرا وجعل بدنه كمدنية والعقل كملك مدبر فيها وقواه من الفكر والخيال والحواس كجنده واعوانه والاعضاء كرجله“

والشهوة كعدو ينازعه في مملكته ، وسعى في اهلاك رعيته صار بدنه كرباط وئغر ونفسه كميم فيه مرايط.... وقال تعالى يقول للكافرين يوم القيامة : يا راعى السوء اكلت اللحم وشربت اللبن ، ولم تؤؤ الضلالة ، ولم تجبر الكسير اليوم انتقم منك -

8. Al-Nisā': 95.

9. instead النفس الناطقه Imām Rāzī is cautious in using مثل فارس of العقل as used by Imāms Ghazzālī and Rāghib al-Isfahānī. Cf. Ihyā', III, p. 7:

”مثل العقل مثال فارس متصيد وشهوته كفرسه وغضبه ككلبه.... فهو خليق بان يعطب فضلا عن ان ينال ما طلب،“ and al-Dhārī'ah, p. 24:

”وأياضا مثل العقل مثل فارس متصيد وشهوته كفرسه وغضبه ككلبه.... فهو قمين ان يعطب فضلا عن ان يدرك ما طلب،“

10. Al-Jawābī plural of Jābiyah:

الحوض الذى يجيب فيه الماء للابل والجيا ج اجباء ، والجابية ج جواب ،

11. بمؤخر الدماغ Cf. Al-Mabāḥiṭh al-Mashriqiyyah, Vol. II, pp. 238-39:

وزعموا ان الحس المشرك والخيال مسكنهما البطن المقدم من الدماغ ، واما التخيلة المتصرفه فمسكنها البطن الاوسط من الدماغ ، واما الوهمية فمسكنها ايضا نهاية البطن الاوسط من الدماغ ، واما الحافظة فمسكنها البطن الاخير من الدماغ ،

12. That the soul has three faculties which are also designated as nufūs is beyond contention. Cf. Rasā'il al-Bulaghā', ed. Muhammad Kurd 'Ali, 4th edition 1374/1954, al-Qāhirah, p. 487:

والنفس ثلاث قوى وهى تسمى ايضا نفوسا : النفس الشهوانية والنفس الغضبية والنفس الناطقة ، وجميع الاخلاق تصدر عن هذه القوى : (كتاب تهذيب الاخلاق ليحيى بن عدى).

13. This ḥadīth has been mentioned in the Ihyā' by Imām Ghazzālī. Al-'Irāqī states that the ḥadīth has been agreed upon by both Imām Bukhārī and Imām Muslim. He adds that some ṣūfīs have added the expression; ”فضيقوا مجاريه بالجوع“ to the ḥadīth. Vide Kashf al-Khāfā', p. 221.

CHAPTER X

ON THE QUESTION WHETHER THE RATIONAL SOUL
IS UNIVOCAL OR EQUIVOCAL IN SPECIES

Muhammad ibn Zakariyya has transmitted from the ancient philosophers specially from Plato that all human souls are equal in substance and quiddity. But due to the differences in the organs, they vary in their functions. It is due to this doctrine that the transmigration of souls is permitted by them.

But Shaykh Abū 'Alī ibn Sīna has related from Aristotle and his followers that the human souls differ from those of the rest of animals in quiddity and reality. The human souls are, however, one in nature and species and vary among themselves in intelligence, stupidity, chastity, evil deeds and other manners due to differences in their corporeal temperaments. This is what has been observed by Shaykh Abū 'Alī. A group of ancient philosophers and a group of the later thinkers have held that the human rational soul forms a genre which includes many species. Sometimes they oppose each other in essential, natural and real quiddity, some being essentially good and some essentially evil.

Those who have advocated this view hesitate concerning the fact whether there are in existence two souls equal in the perfection of nature, not in reality, or they do not exist but every soul finds the existence of its species in its own person—a single person,

You must know that the expressions of the Prophet indicate that human souls vary in nature.¹ The Prophet said: "People are mines like the mines of gold and silver".² He also said, "The Souls are protected armies".³ Allah has said in the Divine Book: (It is) "the nature framed of Allah, in which He hath created man. There is no altering in (the laws of) Allah's creation".⁴

What indicates that the rational souls sometimes vary in nature, is the fact that we see a man may be evil and mean in nature, and if this man undertakes difficult exercises to the extent to which it is possible, there would be no change at all in his harmful nature. But it may be that due to the hard struggle or due to warnings he may give up those activities and may not proceed with them. Now, if he forsakes (evil deeds) by himself with the demand of his original natural disposition, it is sure that his nature would incline to the evil. Again, very often his disposition changes from heat to cold, from moisture to dry state and vice versa. The demand of his original disposition is that which is in him and which suffers no change.

Sometimes it so happens that a man is niggardly in accordance with the demand of his original disposition, and then he becomes the king of the earth and the king of the treasures of the world, but this niggardliness is surely not to vanish from the substance of his self. Similarly, if a man who is generous by original disposition happens to become the most needy, and then finds a little of wealth, his generosity shall not forsake his original disposition.

Now, since we see these original states do not suffer a change and alteration not even if there is a change of teachers, we come to know that they are the essential

parts of the original nature. But if we see two men equal in generosity, niggardliness, theft, power and other descriptions, this does not indicate the equality of the two souls in the potency of nature. Since it is established that various things do not share in many essential qualities, it is not possible for us to dismiss the possibility of the mutual resemblance of the souls, rather the possibility remains at the root of all (souls).

Those who hold that human souls are alike in nature argue by saying that without doubt they are equal in their being rational souls. Now, if they differ after this in any matter that happens to them, then surely that due to which they are homogeneous is different from that due to which they are distinct. Hence, the composition in the essence of every soul is inevitable. Everything which is composed is a body, the rational soul is therefore a body. This is a false prediction.

You should know that this argument is weak for more than one reason: Firstly, there is no meaning of their being souls except that they are the matters that administer the body, and the fact that they administer this body is a relative, accidental description. Why is it not possible, then, to say that the substance of the soul is different in the entelechy of their essence, and that they are homogeneous only in this external, accidental attribute? On this supposition it is not necessary that composition occurs in their nature. For, through the entelechy of their natures, the simple different existents are homogeneous in so far as they exist, and are mentioned and known without entailing their composition.

Secondly, we agree the human souls are equal in an essential attribute; and, again, they also differ in an essential attribute. There is, therefore, no contention that it entails their being composed in their natures.

Why do you say, then, that this composition is impossible?

As for his view that everything composed is a body, it is a view that has not been established by argument. But what leads to our view is the fact that the philosophers have said, "Substance is a genus which includes the following five substances: Intellect, soul, body, form, and matter.

So we say the intellect has this in common with the body that it has a substantial homogeneous nature, and opposes the body in its being exclusively an intellect. The abstract intellect is therefore composite and homogeneous in its nature in spite of the fact that it is not a body. Similar is the case here.

NOTES

1. See supra, Chapter III, Note No. 8.
2. This ḥadīth is recorded by both al-Bukhārī and Muslim on the authority of Ḥaḍrat Abū Hurayrah. Cf. al-Khāṭib al-Damīshqī: *Mishkāt*, Muṭṭabā'ī Press, p. 32.
3. Imām Bukhārī: *Al-Ṣaḥīḥ*, *Anbiyā'*, 2; Muslim, *al-Birr*, 159, 160; Abū Dawūd K. 'ādāb 16, *Musnad Imām Aḥmad*, Vol. II, pp. 295, 527, 537. Also *Kaṣḥf al-Khaṣā'*, Vol. I, p. 111.
4. *al-Rūm*: 30.

CHAPTER XI

(Fol. 276a)

276a

ON THE EXPLANATION THAT THE MENTAL
PLEASURES ARE NOBLER AND MORE PERFECT
THAN THE SENSUAL PLEASURES

You must know that dispositions are under the influence of the souls. The strongest pleasures and the most perfect bliss are the pleasures of eating, sexual action, and possession. Now the view that in the hereafter they should not enjoy a pleasure, nor should they find the pleasant food, nor the appetitive sexual pleasures over there, is a view that cannot be maintained according to the learned researchers and the people of mystic exercises. There is more than one reason which leads to this conclusion.

The First Proof: If the nobility of man consisted in fulfilling appetite and executing anger the animal which is strongest in this respect would have been stronger¹ than man and would have felt more pleasure. The lion is, for example, stronger (than man) in controlling his anger, a sparrow is stronger in sexual action than man. As the case is not like this, we are certain that human happiness does not concern these matters.

The Second Proof: Everything exists as a means for obtaining bliss and perfection, and as the object is achieved in greater quantity, bliss and perfection are

achieved in greater quantity. Now, if the fulfilment of the appetite of stomach and sex would have caused the perfection and bliss of man, then man would have made greater progress in the perfection of his humanity and would have attained a higher position by indulging himself in satisfying the appetite of stomach and sex. But the second premise is absurd, since a man realizes the harm² of eating more than he needs, and it is considered a mark of his meanness and avarice, if he does so. Similar is the view concerning all corporeal pleasures. When the matter is like this it is established that it is not bliss and perfection to engage oneself in fulfilling appetitions, rather it is a means for satisfying his needs.

The Third Proof: A man shares with all kinds of animals even the mean ones the pleasure of eating and drinking. If this pleasure could be equated with bliss and perfection, it would have necessarily followed that man enjoyed no superiority over animals. A leech is, for example, pleased to eat dungs just as man is pleased by taking sugar and the like.

This may be asserted by saying: were human bliss concerned with the sensuous pleasures, man would have necessarily been the meanest of animals. As the second premise is evidently absurd, the first premise meets with a similar fate. Hence, there is no necessary connection between the two.

We, therefore, say that the lower animals share the corporeal sensory pleasures with man. But man having been endowed with intellectual ability, considers these pleasures to be imperfect. For, when the intelligent man thinks of the past which was pleasant and sweet, his heart is afflicted with the pain of having missed it. In case the past was annoying and harmful, his heart

feels pained by its remembrance. If he ponders over the present, he is not pleased with what he has achieved. On the contrary, he desires to have more. If he considers the future, a severe fear overtakes him not knowing what his fate will be in the future. It is, therefore, proved that the lower animals are just like man in corporeal sensual pleasures except that his pleasures appear to him to be imperfect, because of his intellect, while the animals who have no intelligence do not think of the future and enjoy their pleasures without considering them imperfect.

It is a known fact that to obtain perfection without any trouble and defect is better and nobler than achieving perfection with trouble and toil. This shows that if the corporeal sensuous pleasures necessarily led to the state of perfection, man would be lower than ants, insects and flies, which is absurd. We, therefore, know that the sensuous pleasures necessarily involve ambition and bliss.

The Fourth Proof: When considered minutely, it is discovered that the sensuous pleasures are no pleasures³; their sum-total, on the contrary, amounts only to the removal of pains. The proof is this: the more hungry a man grows the more pleased he feels in eating, and the less hungry he is the less pleased he feels in eating. Similarly, when copulation is avoided for a long time the semen accumulates in its vessels which feel severe pain, extraction and heaviness. The severer these states grow the stronger is the pleasure obtained from the discharging of the semen. It is for this reason that the pleasure of copulation in case of one whose chances of copulating have been occasional is greater than the one whose chances have been frequent. It is therefore established that these states which are considered to be bodily

pleasures are in reality no other than methods of removing pains. Similar is the case with the pleasure felt by wearing clothes, as the pleasure is achieved only by removing the pain of heat and cold.

Having ascertained that the bodily pleasures result only from removing pains, we say: human bliss does not only mean the absence of pains—a fact which exists even in the absence of mankind. It is therefore established that the real bliss of man is something other than these states.

The Fifth Proof: A man is like the rest of animals⁴ in respect of eating, drinking, cohabiting and doing harm to his opponent. He is, however, undoubtedly nobler in so far as he is a man than in his capacity as animal. This surely entails equality between the point of view of nobility and that of meanness in all that necessitates nobility and perfection. This is absurd.

The Sixth Proof: It is evidently known that the glory and bliss of the angels excel in nobility those of the animals, no matter whether some of them fly, swim, float and run fast even if we leave aside the little insects and the reptiles.

Again, there is no difference with respect to the fact that the angels do not enjoy the pleasure of eating, drinking and cohabiting, nor are the animals nobler and superior in state and position than the angels who are nearest to Allah. Since this is obviously absurd, we know that the foregoing premise is also absurd.

You must know that there is a stronger and higher rank than what we have so far mentioned. I mean there is no relation between the perfection of the Necessary Being, His Grace, Nobility and Honour and the states of those other than Him, notwithstanding the fact that these mean pleasures cannot be applicable to Him. We

are therefore sure that perfection and nobility sometimes exist in states other than the state in which these bodily pleasures are obtained.

If, however, they say that this perfection is only due to attaining the stage of Godhead which is impossible in respect of the created, we answer: There is no dispute that Godhead is impossible in respect of the created, but the Prophet has said, "Adorn yourself with the attributes of Allah"⁵ It is therefore necessary for us to know the meaning of *takhalluq* in order to realize that the perfect state of man is only achieved by means of adopting Divine attributes and not by obtaining bodily pleasures. It is known that this *takhalluq*, that is, adopting Divine attributes, is only achieved by meeting needs and displaying virtues and good deeds, and not by excessive eating and drinking.

The Seventh Proof: Verily when those who decide that human happiness lies in achieving bodily pleasures, (Fol. 277a) see a man abstain from seeking such bodily pleasures and observing, for example, fast constantly and perfectly satisfied with such earthly pleasures as have been permitted, their faith in him grows enormously and they consider him not to belong to mankind but to the genre of angels counting their own selves in relation to him as wretched and mean. And, when they find a man absorbed in obtaining food and drink and copulation, well-known in the courage necessary for finding means which lead to the satisfaction of bodily states and keeping away from knowledge, worship, and renunciation of the world, they give their judgement about him and accuse him of being an animal, a cheat, an absurd man mean and cursed. Were it not well established in their minds that to be preoccupied by these bodily pleasures is a defect, meanness and misery and elevation above all

these states is a blessing and a perfect state, the matter would not have been as we described, or else it would have been necessary for them to have pronounced their judgement against one who turns away from these pleasures saying that he is in a miserable and accursed state and their judgement would have been in favour of the man who kept himself preoccupied with them. Such a man would have been considered to have attained bliss and perfection. Since the matter is not like this but quite the opposite, we are sure of the genuineness of what we have mentioned.

The Eighth Proof: Everything that is a perfection and blessing in itself must display itself without feeling shame and embarrassment, rather it is necessary that it should feel proud of such display and meet with success by its action.

We are obviously sure that an intelligent man does not boast of excessive eating, drinking and cohabitation, nor of his preoccupation all the time with these activities. Again, people do not proceed to mating but in privacy. No one from among the intelligent ever allows himself to agree to mating in the presence of people. This also shows that it is a low and mean action and people feel ashamed of it.

It is also habitual with the low people to abuse one another by mentioning words connected with mating. When a debased person relates in the presence of a big crowd as to how a particular man cohabits with his wife, the man concerned feels ashamed of this speech and feels as if he has been tortured by the speaker. All this indicates that the action of sexual mating is no perfection and no bliss, rather it is an indecent deed and a shameful action.

The Ninth Proof: Every animal that inclines more

to eating, drinking and doing harm and less to exercise, is rated by the people at a low worth, and every animal that inclines to eating and drinking least and is quickest in undertaking exercise, is highly regarded by the people. Don't you see that a horse which accepts training and agrees to exercises, makes a charge, and runs away and moves fast, is sold at a high price? A horse which is thin in waist is most swift and excels the fat one with a big belly. Every horse which does not undergo an exercise and displays none of the actions (described above), and is loaded with a pack-saddle⁶ and bears burdens, and is regarded as the equal of an ass is sold at a low price. When these irrational animals are judged for their merits and excellences not by eating and drinking but by other criteria, what should you, then, think of the rational intelligent animals?

The Tenth Proof: The inhabitants of the remote parts of the earth who have made no progress in their intellects, habits, customs and knowledge, have necessarily grown extremely debased and low. Don't you see that since the inhabitants of the first Iqlim (region),—the negroes,—and those of the Seventh Iqlim (region)—the slaves,—possess but little share of real knowledge and sciences, excellent manners, and intellects necessarily confirm their low positions in the minds of men and prove that their stage of progress is very low? As for the inhabitants of the middle part of the earth,⁷ since they possess real knowledge and sciences and excellent manners, they have necessarily been, by common consent, confirmed as the best of the human races. (Fol. 277b). This indicates that the excellence and perfection of a man is only realised by means of the sciences, knowledge and excellent manners and not by his eating, drinking, and mating.

NOTES

1. It is agreed that certain animals excel mankind in certain activities and possess more power and strength, cf. Ibn Miskawayh, *Tahdhīb*, p. 12:
2. Anything that is not wanted is sometimes harmful and disliked. Cf. Ibn Miskawayh: *Tahdhīb*, p. 12:

..... إذا عرض عليه الامتزادة منها كما يستزاد من الفضائل
أبى ذلك وعافه.... وتادبته،

3. The same idea is expressed by Ibn Miskawayh in his *Tahdhīb*, p. 52:

وان اللذات كلها إنما تحصل للملذذ بعد الام تلحقه لان اللذة
هي راحة من ألم ، وان كل لذة حسية إنما هي خلاص من
ألم او أذى ،

al-Fawz al-Aṣghar, p. 83.

4. This argument has also been advanced by Ibn Miskawayh in his *Tahdhīb* p. 53:

”.... ان من رضى لنفسه بتحصيل اللذة البدنية وجعلها
غايته واقصى سعادته فقد رضى باخس العبودية لآخس الموالى
لانه يصير نفسه الكريمة التى يناسب بها اللاتكة عبداً للنفس
الدنيئة التى يناسب بها الخزائرو الخنافس والديدان وخسائس
الحيوانات التى تشاركه فى هذا الحلال -

5. The ḥadīth is recorded by Imām Mālik in his *al-Muwattā*; and by Imām Ghazzālī in the *Iḥyā*’ but the expression differs as follows:

لا تتم مكارم الاخلاق ، وحسنوا خلائكم

6. ‘Ikāf’ and ‘Ukāf’: packsaddle. Cf. Ibn Miskawayh: *Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq*, Kurdistān al-‘Ilmiyah Press, Cairo, 1329 A.H., pp. 43-44:

7. They considered that the inhabitants of the central regions of the world excelled the people of other parts of the world in knowledge and power of understanding. This is however not correct; nowadays the peoples of Africa and Russia have proved that they have better capacity for intellectual pursuits than the people of the central world. Ibn Miskawayh only confirms the view of Imām Rāzī: Vide *Tahdhīb*, p. 84:

”و اول هذه المراتب من الافق الانسانى المتصل بآخر ذلك
الافق الحيوانى مراتب الناس الذين يسكنون فى اقاصى المعمورة

من الشمال والجنوب كأواخر الترك من بلاد ياجوج وماجوج،
وأواخر الزنج واشباههم من الأمم التى لا تميز عن القروء
الابمرتبة يسيرة ، ثم تتزايد فيهم قوة التمييز والفهم الى ان
يصيروا الى وسط الاقاليم ، فيحدث فيهم الذكاء وسرعة الفهم و
القبول للفضائل”-

CHAPTER XII

ON THE EXPLANATION OF THE CAUSES OF
BLAME AND DEFECT THAT LIE IN SENSUOUS
PLEASURES

You must know that an object is either condemnable *per se* or condemnable due to something else. The sensuous pleasures contain both the cases. That they are condemnable *per se* is indicated by more than one reason:

Firstly, the original and the best of all that has been discussed in this chapter is the fact that these pleasures are in fact no pleasures, rather their net result is to remove pains.¹ The pleasure of eating, for example, means only to remove the pain of hunger, the pleasure of mating to remove the sexual appetite caused by the semen which increases and gets choked in the semen-pods and causes the extraction of the pods and painful vibration, and its discharge removes necessarily those kinds of pain. The pleasure of clothing also consists in removing the pain of heat and cold.

Let us say this in a different way. When a man wants to answer the call of nature—to urine or to excrete—sometimes he finds it difficult to do so due to some external reasons which cause the accumulation of water due to the refuse and the like, and when after severe pain he is able to remove the pain he feels

great pleasure and complete rest. The severer the pain that is caused by choking and contracting, the greater is the pleasure caused by its removal. All this indicates that these pleasures result in the end in the removal of pains.

Having understood this, it is clear to you that what is considered by some people as pleasure is in fact not so, rather it is the effort undertaken to remove pains and to engage the soul in matters like this is another pain. They are, therefore, not at all blessings and perfections.

Secondly, anything that is needed most causes the strongest feeling of pleasure when it is achieved and is most painful when the case is reverse. Whenever an object is wanted least, the pleasure caused by its presence is least. Don't you see when you throw a necklace of pearls towards a dog the dog does not pay any heed to it, as it is not wanted, and when you throw a piece of bone it would leap to it, snatch it away and fight for it with all those who would contend with him? The case is quite different with a man who feels happy and overjoyed on finding a necklace of pearls. He feels pleased either by the idea of decorating himself with it or by selling it at a profit. If a piece of bone is thrown to him he would pay no heed to it, as he does not want it. It is therefore established that pleasure and demand are in accordance with the extent of need. But the need is a calamity, a trial and a misfortune and the object which is only obtained by a trial and calamity is also of a similar nature. It is thus established that the bodily pleasures are like a poisoned sweet in the bodies which feel pleased with its sweetness although it is a whim and a deadly poison.

One may, however, point out that this objection is applicable to you concerning the spiritual pleasures

as well. But we say: the reply to this will come soon.

Thirdly, these pleasures are so called in so far as they are pleasures *per se*. But to enjoy them is only possible when they come into being. If they continue they do not remain pleasant, the reason being that the pleasure which is signified on their accomplishment perceives the agreeable and is influenced by them—a state which arises only in the beginning of their occurrence. The state after the occurrence of pleasures is one of continuity and persistence and in this case there is no impression and, therefore, no awareness, and when there is no awareness there cannot be any feeling of pleasure.

Fourthly, when a man enjoys these pleasures to the extent of his want and sufficiency, he does not feel pleased in employing the means for the furtherance of those pleasures, rather he feels satiated and disgusted with them. Then, after feeling disgusted with them if he is urged to fulfil them a second time, he surely feels pain in perceiving them. For example, when one eats to his fill and is compelled to overeat, one would feel pain. Similarly, if he who has accomplished mating to his utmost desire is compelled to do it in excess, he is sure to feel pain in it. This indicates that these pleasures hold no goodness and bliss in themselves but they are useful only as long as they meet a need. When the need is fulfilled these things become a burden and a curse on the souls and spirits.

Fifthly, the objects which are considered to be pleasant and desirable in the world are sometimes described with undesirable and hateful descriptions, and they may turn up again like that. Don't you see that wheat before growing into wheat gives bad smell in the moisture of the earth? Then, it grows into a plant and drinks the moisture of the refuse and dung. Then,

when it stands erect and is fully prepared it is eaten and is mixed with the moisture in the mouth and the saliva which if it were seen by the eating agent would be disliked by him and he would consider it filthy. Again, it turns, in the end, into a bad smelling-dung and an object which is thrown away. Similar is the case with meats, sweets and fruits. When an intelligent man ponders over it, he finds it originally obnoxious in smell, filthy in substance and corrupt in origin.² But Allah, the Exalted, has conferred on them a colour, smell and taste for a small period of time to the extent of what is useful for a matured man, so that he may be able to obey Allah and understand what is beneficial for him in his livelihood. Then they, shortly, return to the original filth and natural corruption.

Sixthly, surely the use of these pleasures conflicts with the essence of humanity. This is because a man is a man only in so far as he attains the light of intelligence and is aware of the unseen presence (of God) and of the Divine Lights. Now, when a man is engaged in fulfilling these bodily pleasures his intellectual faculty becomes hazy, the door of knowledge is closed to him, and he remains overpowered by animality, and devoid of humanity.

Since the nobility of man lies in fulfilling the sensuous pleasures which nullify the meaning of humanity for him, it is confirmed that to be preoccupied by these pleasures is extremely reprehensible.

Seventhly, the real human condition is to engage oneself in knowing Allah, the Exalted, in order to be able to obey Him and to lose oneself in His Love. His enagement in bodily pleasures and permissible objects of sense prevents him from worshipping and remembering Allah. Since these objects of knowledge

are the noblest ideals for a human creature and the sensuous pleasures prevent one from them, these pleasures are the lowest of all objects. Whenever there is a noble object worthy of attainments its opposite object which prevents a man from achieving the good is low to that extent.

All these arguments indicate that the world is *per se* condemnable.

As for the reasons which indicate that the world is condemnable due to matters which are necessarily connected with it, they are many. We shall mention some of them as follows:

1. The world is transient and nearing extinction, and it is known that when a man likes something or meets his beloved he enjoys pleasure in its company and association. But when he faces separation, or keeps apart he feels the pain of separation. The pain of separation felt by him is the same in extent and intensity as the pleasure achieved by his meeting. The matter being so, the severer the love for the worldly life the stronger and severer is the pain felt by separation after death. Then, though the pleasures and pains seem to be equal in this respect the preference is claimed by the side of pains, since the pleasures come to an end, while the pains are interminable. It is for this reason that to the people of intelligence the bodily pleasures are condemnable.

2. The worldly pleasures are not pure. They are mixed with pains and loss, rather, if the man ponders over this, he is sure to find that the pleasure is like a drop of water and the pain like an ocean that flows for him. We warn against the knotty problems of this preference.

We say: this preference is caused by more than one

reason: (a) the harm caused by it, it is three-fold and concerns the past, the present and the future.

As for the past, we say: the conditions available to a man in the past are either the means of bliss and pleasure or those of pleasure and pain, or they cause neither bliss nor pain. If we suppose that they necessitate bliss and ambition, then either it is said that they have persisted or not, both of which necessitate bliss. If they have persisted till the present time, it is a known fact that there is no stage over and above which there are not more stages, each more sublime and more perfect than the previous ones. The matter being so, whenever a man is pleased with the bliss which he enjoyed in the past, and which has continued up to the present time, his mind is fully conscious of all the stages which he has found and attained. He will therefore feel in his heart various kinds of sorrow due to the bliss which he has missed. But if the past conditions necessitated bliss but they did not persist and vanished away, then whenever the man would recall the memory of those lost stages the fire of sorrow would get kindled in his heart due to losing them after they had been achieved, and their passing away after their coming into being.

If, however, these conditions were neither means for bliss nor for misery then they were something useless which carried no value. And whenever a man remembers those conditions he recognises that he has wasted the part of his life in vain without having any gain though it was possible for him to spend his time in attaining higher blessings and greater positions. At this time, he will find his heart blazing with the fire of melancholy and sorrow due to the wastage of his age. Then, he often finds his mates and friends that they have attempted in their past life to achieve excellences and have succeeded

in their efforts and have attained high achievements and noble positions. But when he finds himself descending low behind his companions and mates, he dies of sorrow and misery. It is therefore confirmed that his remembrance of past conditions would only bring him sorrow and misery.

As for the persisting condition which continues, it is surprising, because it is indispensable and must be the end of the past and the beginning of the future. When this is the position, it must be divisible. But it is not so. For, if this time were divisible some parts, already in operation, must precede some others. The whole will not then be present. This is contrary to the proposition.

Having learnt this, it is clear that time, which is as short as the twinkling of an eye, cannot be present, because in this time the eye-lid moves on the surface of the eye-ball which is divisible into a numberless divisions according to the philosophers, and into a limited number according to others, and on this supposition the present 'now' is a part from the multitude of parts which are beyond limit and numeration belonging to one and the same glance. This little part is so insignificant that it is not perceived by mind nor is it recorded in perception and imagination. Hence, it is not possible to feel pleased, and have, in fact, real enjoyment. What is beyond the indivisible 'now' is either the past in parts or the future which both do not exist in the present. It is therefore established that the objects that are considered blessings are *per se* not so. They are, rather, absurd ideas and useless whims.

279a

(b) It is the habit of man (Fol. 279a) that he does not feel pleased with, nor does he incline to, anything that is available to him in actual fact. On the contrary,

he feels only pleased in getting what is missing and wanting that which does not exist. We know therefore that man does not feel pleased with what exists in the present. As for the future, it may agree or disagree with him. Such being the case, he will not see things in the future due to severe fear and complete awe. It is, thus, established by what we have mentioned that there are three times, past, present and future, and his looking into any one of these necessitates severe sorrow, pain, dislike and excessive fear. It is therefore confirmed by what we have mentioned that man never escapes from sorrow and distress and other such states.

(c) The second thing that necessarily causes a man to be afflicted by sorrow and distress is the fact that the man either lives in the society of people or separately. The first state is a strong cause which inflicts sorrow, distress and strange feelings upon him, because keeping the company of some people necessitates dissension in the present or in the future, in all affairs or in some affairs and the dissension necessarily causes either of the two rivals to dominate the other in a way. The domination necessarily causes sorrow and distress.

The other state, that is, his living separately from the society is also a strong factor in causing him distress, since man is a creature whose interests cannot be secured except by living in large populations. Once separated from the mass of men his interests become different. It is therefore confirmed that the living of a man in the company of others necessitates trouble and turmoil, while by living in separation he is afflicted with sorrow and sadness. Thus it is confirmed that he has no escape from sorrows and pains.

(d) The third factor that necessitates sorrow and distress is that man is either more perfect than another

or equal to him or more defective than him. If he is more perfect than another man, this other man must be defective. But defect in itself is disliked and is essentially loathed.

Now, what is defective cannot drive away its defect but by nullifying what is more perfect and by attaining all that entails the purpose essentially. It is for this reason that the imperfect man plans to try to nullify the perfection of the perfect either by nullifying perfection in itself essentially, or by concealing the perfection from the eyes of the people. Either state is essentially contrary to perfection and necessitates sorrow, pain and disturbance of heart.

In case both are equal, we say, perfection is desired essentially, so either of the two will necessarily intend with determination to make himself more perfect, noble and sublime than the other. Now, either of the two cannot be higher than the other. It is for this reason that there would occur severe fighting and struggle between them and you have learnt that the struggle is a cause of fear, sorrow and loneliness. Again, if either of the two equals become subordinate, the heart of the other would be afflicted with pain, because subordination is essentially disliked, and it distresses the heart. In case one dominates the other, the heart of the dominated would be distressed.

Then, the dominated would try his utmost to remove domination. But the removal of domination would necessitate the disappearance of the domination of the dominating agent which is essentially disliked by the agent. The dominating agent therefore fears the loss of his power—a fear that entails pain. It is therefore established that if a man finds himself with his equals he is not free from sorrow and melancholy. If he

happens to be dominated in relation to someone else, then whenever the dominated will look at the dominating person he will find him in a high position full of pleasure and happiness, and will find himself deprived of all these. So, without doubt, the fire of sorrow and loss shall burn his heart. Again, the dominating person will render the dominated a target of the troubling objects and the harmful things. All these distress the heart. It is therefore established that a man, no matter whether he is more perfect or less perfect than the other, or equals to him, never escapes sorrow, loss, heartache and pain of heart.

(e) The fourth cause which entails sorrow and distress is the fact that man possesses undoubtedly intelligence which guides him aright, and passion that destroys him. The latter has many accessories which are appetite, anger, greed and external and internal senses.

But the intellect does not find any other quality in the essence of man which could give it strength. For this reason the intellect is inevitably weaker than desire. Again, man is, from the beginning of his nature, submissive to the sensuous pleasures, is devoted to them and readily accepts them.

As for the light of intellect, it does not appear in him except after a certain period of his age. And, they say: knowledge in childhood is like an engraved image in the stone. The philosophers say: repetition causes the achievement of rational habits. The matter being so, the attraction of the soul to the sensuous pleasures must be stronger than the mental pleasures. Desire means nothing but absorption in physical pleasures and sensuous happiness. It is therefore established that the side of desire is extremely dominant over the side of the intellect.

When you have known this, we say: the sum and substance of what we have mentioned is this that most of the actions coming forth from man are in accordance with the demand of desire and belong to the *genus* of blameworthy actions. Then, after man ventures upon them, accomplishes them and turns away from them, his intellect becomes free from the contention of desire. It is in this state that man becomes aware of their deformity, ugliness and their containing many undesirable and blameworthy means. But, since man becomes aware of these evils through his intellect only after their occurrence and after the act is complete, these evils cannot be removed or prevented. Therefore, man is left only with sorrow, shame, and repentance.

Since we have explained that man mostly ventures upon the demands of his desire just in accordance with the argument we have advanced, he mostly remains in sorrow, and repentance. This indicates that man is necessarily in most of the cases attached to sorrows and is afflicted by deep sighs.

(f) The fifth cause that necessitates distress is the fact that stages of bliss and nobility are unlimited and to achieve that which has no end is impossible, the result is that all positions cannot be achieved by man. It has been established that the repetition of intellect causes habit. So, whenever man is more constantly attached to the bodily pleasures, the greater and stronger is his inclination to the seeking of these pleasures. When his inclination to seeking pleasure is stronger, his care for achieving that which is missing is greater. Since the achievement of the stages which have no end is impossible, it entails, at the end, the excessively repeated demand of seeking endless pleasures, will continue with the impossibility of achieving the end, and

this would, then, inflict pain.

It is established that to incline to pleasures causes pains in case they are achieved. In case they are not obtained, the appearance of the pain is manifest. It is for this reason that some deeply learned philosophers have said: Whoever intends to be free from the world through the world is like one who wants to extinguish fire with straw. It is therefore established by all these arguments that it is impossible that the worldly pleasures be free from sorrow and pains, rather they are all pains and defects.

Then, when you ponder over the conditions of the poor people you will think of their affairs and the troubles they find themselves in—annoyance, attachment to the painful, advancing straight to the enemies, association with sorrows—you will find them as if they were an ocean without a shore, whereas the pleasure obtained by man is like a drop in the ocean. It is therefore established by what we have mentioned that the bodily pleasures are mixed with pains, diseases and harmful things. Therefore, there is no doubt that they are blameworthy.

3. The third external cause that necessitates the condemnation of the world is the fact that mostly a man who is mean in himself, in his faculties, position and lineage, excels in physical pleasures the one who is noble in himself, in his mind, position, lineage and faith. That is why the Prophet said:³ Had the world to Allah weighed as much as the wing of a fly, He would not have surely allowed an infidel even a single drink out of it.

4. As for the fourth cause, it is the characteristic of the corporeal pleasures that whenever you repair a breach in it there would open up a multitude of breaches to you and this would occur without any limit. For

example, when a man finds himself too weak to do anything and purchases a horse, he needs a servant to look after the horse, a village to obtain its food, a stable wherein he would tie the horse. Now, his need to have each one of these objects would open up a multitude of the doors of need more than what preceded. This continues without a limit. It has, for this reason, been related on the authority of Jesus Christ (peace be upon him) that he said:⁴ Surely the important affairs of the world 'are not accomplished by improvement and perfection but are only accomplished by abandoning them and withdrawing from them.

NOTES

1. Cf. Imām Ghazzālī: *Ihyā'* III, p. 97:
فإن شهوة الطعام والوقاع على التحقيق الأم يريد الإنسان
الخلاص منها، فيدرك لذة بسبب الخلاص.
2. السنخ, Sinkh means origin.
3. The ḥadīth: لو كانت الدنيا تزن عند الله جناح بعوضة الخ has
been recorded in the Sunan Ibn Mājah, Abwāb al-Zuhd,
Aṣaḥḥ al-Maṭābi', Lucknow, 1315 H., p. 312. See also Jāmi'
al-Tirmidhī, al-Maṭba' al-Majidi, Cawnpur, Vol. II, p. 59,
under ابواب الزهد:
عن سهل بن سعد قال قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم ،
لو كانت الدنيا تعدل عند الله جناح بعوضة ما سقى كافرا منها
شربة ماء -
4. An exact expression could not be traced. The following
quotation, however, conforms to the text: "....I want you to
be wise in regard to good things and pure concerning evil
things," Romans 16, 19.

PART TWO
ON THE TREATMENT OF WHAT
CONCERNS APPETITION

PART TWO

On the Treatment of what Concerns Appetition It Consists of a Few Chapters

CHAPTER I

ON THE LOVE OF WEALTH

You must know that there are many verses in the Qur'ān which praise wealth and some others which condemn it.

The verses of praise are Allah's expressions:

"Say: That which ye spend for good (must go) to parents and near kindred (The Cow: 215); O ye who believe! Spend of that wherewith We have provided you . . . (The Cow: 254); . . . and seek of Allah's bounty . . ." (The Congregation: 10).

As for the verses that condemn wealth, they are as follows: "O ye who believe! Let not your wealth nor your children distract you from remembrance of Allah. Those who do so, they are the losers.

"(And know that) your possessions and your children are a test. Rivalry in worldly increase distracteth you"

Since these verses apparently contradict each other it is necessary to explain their agreement. The only possible way of harmonizing them for man is to explain the ascending degrees of excellence and these are three: (1) those belonging to human soul such as sciences, excellent manners, (2) those belonging to the

body such as health and beauty, (3) those that are external, some of which are proximate such as food and drink which serve the body, and the body serves the soul, and the soul perfects itself with sciences and excellent manners, body and soul being the two masters in general. (Some are remote like wealth) which serves in general. For, if wealth is spent in the acquisition of sciences and excellent manners, it is praiseworthy, and if it is spent for sensuous pleasures which have already been known as condemnable, it is condemnable. So, this is the way to find agreement between these texts, because through the first the eternal bliss is secured and through the second eternal misfortune befalls man.

NOTES

1. The Imām has not mentioned the verses in praise of wealth as he has mentioned the verses containing condemnation of wealth. The place for the *آيات المدح* is left blank in the manuscript. Some of these verses are supplied as follows:

(1) قل ما انتقم من خير فقلوالدين والاقربين الخ

Vide al-Tafsir al-Kabir II p. 312.

(2) يا ايها الذين امنوا انفقوا مما رزقناكم الخ

al-Kabir II p. 460.

(3) وابتغوا من فضل الله

Surah al-Jumu'ah. In the above verses wealth has been declared as *خير*, good, *رزق* sustenance (lawful sustenance according to the Mu'tazilites) and *فضل الله*, the Grace of Allah respectively.

Imām Ghazzālī has quoted certain other verses describing wealth as *Khair* as well as certain *Aḥādīth*. He says: Vide *Iḥyā'* III pp. 228-29).

اعلم ان الله تعالى قد سمي المال خيرا في مواضع من كتابه العزيز، فقال جل وعزه "ان ترك خيرا — الآية"، وقال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم "نعم المال الصالح للرجل الصالح"، وكل ما جاء في ثواب الصدقة والحج فهو ثناء على المال اذ لا يمكن الوصول اليهما الا به، وقال تعالى: "ويستخرجنا كنزهما رحمة من ربك"، وقال تعالى: "ممتنا على عباد: "وتمدكم باموال" وبنين ويجعل لكم جنات ويجعل لكم انهارا" — وقال صلى الله عليه وسلم "كاد الفقر ان يكون كفرا"، وهو ثناء على المال.

2. Surah al-Munāfiqūn: 9.

3. al-Anfāl: 28.

4. al-Takāthūr: 1.

5. These three Faḍā'il (excellences) have been enumerated by Imam Ghazzālī as means of achieving Sa'ādah, happiness. Cf. *Iḥyā'* III p. 229.

وهذه السعادة لاتنال الا بثلاث وسائل في الدنيا: وهي الفضائل النفيسة كالعلم وحسن الخلق، والفضائل البدنية كالصحة والسلامة، والفضائل الخارجية عن البدن كالمال وسائر الاسباب، واعلاها النفيسة، ثم البدنية، ثم الخارجية فالخارجة اخسها، والمال من جملة الخارجات.

CHAPTER II

ON THE METHOD OF USING WEALTH FOR ATTAINING
SPIRITUAL BLISS

Wealth is either spent by a man to profit himself¹ or to profit somebody other than himself. As for the first, man has been created in such a manner that he is in need of food, clothing, dwelling and marriage. If he does not fulfil these needs he would not be able to secure perfections in his speculative and active faculties. But these needs cannot be met and fulfilled except by means of wealth (Fol. 280b). In this respect wealth assists man in securing spiritual bliss.

In the second case, when man spends his wealth for the good of somebody else,² this somebody is either specified or not specified.

In the first case, when the wealth is spent for a particular person, it is spent either for removing some trouble,³ when, for example, an amount is handed over to some tyrant in order to enable a person to escape from his oppression, or to a poet whom he fears lest he may compose a satire, if he does not give him some amount.

Or, the wealth is spent for securing some gain which may be either worldly or other-worldly.

The first is of two kinds. Either he is engaged always in earning psychological excellences—sciences and morals—and is never free to look after his worldly affairs, and is therefore in need of someone to serve him in respect of these affairs and therefore spends a portion

of his wealth as wages for such service.⁴ Or, he would, secondly, spend a portion of his wealth for the sake of manliness⁵ and for showing respect to guests. All this is good and praiseworthy.

As for the expenditure which is for the benefit of the other world, it is like *Zakāt* and *Ṣadaqāt* (alms).

The other case, in which wealth is handed over to an unspecified person, is like building mosques, bridges, caravansarais, hospitals, digging wells, establishing factories, fixing water-jars in streets, all these are good⁶ and explain how one can benefit from one's wealth.

As for the explanation of the misery wealth causes, it is for more than one reason:⁷

1. The bodily desires dominate temperaments. When the ability of attaining these pleasures is available the action occurs in the absence of an obstacle and the presence of ability with the motive.

2. When wealth is available, man enjoys the obviously permissible objects. Since the motive is there and the obstacle is absent, the action will therefore occur. Then, when he becomes fond of the enjoyment, his wealth becomes scarce while it is not possible for him to have patience so that he may defer his enjoyment. As a result he falls, due to this habit, on unlawful earning, and there open up before him the doors of all sorts of condemnable moral habits.

3. To preserve wealth is very difficult and unless man puts forth his best efforts wealth cannot be preserved. The attention of his heart to this enterprise prevents him from engaging himself in the remembrance of Allah the Exalted, since "Allah hath not assigned unto any man two hearts within his body".⁸

NOTES

1. Cf. Ihyā, III p. 230:

.. ان ينفق (المال) على نفسه اما في عبادته او في الاستعانة على عبادة، اما في العبادة فهو كالاستعانة به على الحج والجهاد، فانه لا يتوصل اليهما الا بالمال، وهما من امهات القربات... اما في ما يقويه على العبادة فذلك هو المطعم والملبس والسكن والمنكح وضرورات المعيشة فان هذه الحاجات اذا لم تتيسر كان القلب مصروفاً الى تديبها فلا يتفرغ للدين.

2. Ibid.

النوع الثاني ما يصرفه الى الناس، وهو اربعة اقسام: الصدقة، و المروءة، و وقاية العرض، و اجرة الاستخدام.

3. Cf. Ibid.

و اما وقاية العرض فنعني به بذل المال.... من الحفظ الدينية. قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم "ما وقي به المرء عرضه كتب لديه صدقة"، وكيف لا وفيه منع المغتاب عن معصية الغيبة.... و الانتقام على مجاوزة حدود الشريعة.

4. Cf. Ihyā III p. 230:

"و اما الاستخدام فهو ان الاعمال التي يحتاج اليها الانسان لتهيئة اسبابه كثيرة.... و كل ما يتصور ان يقوم به غيرك ويحصل به غرضك...."

5. Cf. Ibid.

و اما المروءة فنعني بها صرف المال الى الاغنياء و الاشراف في ضيافة و هدية و اعانة و ما يجري مجراها، فان هذه لا تسمى صدقة، بل الصدقة ما يسلم الى المحتاج، الا ان هذا من الفوائد الدينية، اذ به يكتسب العبد الاخوان و الصداقة، و به يكتسب صفة السخاء.... و هذا ايضاً مما يعظم الثواب فيه، فقد وردت اخبار كثيرة في الهدايا و الضيافات و اطعام الطعام من غير اشتراط الفقر و الفاقة في مصارفها.

6. Cf. Ibid.

النوع الثالث ما لا يصرفه الى انسان معين و لكن يحصل به خير عام كبناء المساجد و القناطر و الرباطات و دور المرضى و نصب الجباب في الطريق، و غير ذلك من الاوقاف المرسدة للخيرات.... و ناهيك بها خيراً.

7. The three kinds of harms mentioned by the Imām are based on the Ihyā III p. 231.

"اما الاثام.... ثلاث: الاولى ان تجر الى المعاصي فان الشهوات متفاضلة.... فاذا استشعر القدرة عليها انبعث داعيته، و المال نوع من القدرة يحرك داعية المعاصي و ارتكب الفجور.

الثانية: انه يجر الى التمتع في المباحات.... و سائر الاخلاق الرديئة

الثالثة.. و هو انه يلهيه اصلاح ماله عن ذكر الله تعالى.

8. al-Aḥzāb: 4.

CHAPTER III

ON GREED AND MISERLINESS

Greed lies in making full effort to secure wealth in its absence or scarcity.

Miserliness¹ lies in making full effort to keep wealth when it is available. Love of wealth is, thus, obtained in both cases, the only difference lies in the fact that the love of collecting and obtaining (wealth) is greed and the love of keeping (wealth) is miserliness.

When you have realized this we say: The love of wealth is caused by two reasons.² Firstly, wealth is the cause of power which is a perfection; and perfection is loved *per se*; and that which leads to the beloved is loved, wealth is therefore loved.³

Secondly, wealth demands the removal of want, and the removal of want is desired, and whatever leads to the desired object is also desired, the difference between the two is manifest. For, an old patient who is nearing death and who possesses huge wealth beyond limitation, feels excessive pain on hearing even in this critical state that his wealth has been stolen or looted in spite of his knowledge that his wealth was of no use to him. The pain that he suffers from is not because he needs the wealth, since he is aware that he will die next day. This indicates that he feels pain because he is niggardly. Surely his power is removed on account of the fact that value has disappeared from his wealth, the disappearance of power being the disappearance of perfection which

last is a defect that is abhorred *per se*.

Having realized this, let us look (Fol. 281a) into the treatment of niggardliness which has a number of reasons :

1. *Firstly*, a man should endeavour to lessen his needs. For when his needs are scarce his trouble and inclination towards the achievement of that which will meet his needs are scarce. (This is also) because to cause the absence of something before it is obtained is not intelligible. This need is undoubtedly either that of the agent himself who is benefited by wealth, or it is the need of his descendants.

(a) The need of the first kind can be treated by increasing hope and expectation⁴ through frequent remembrance of death, consideration into the death of the friends and associates, and by turning his thoughts to the fact that it is not possible to be benefitted by wealth except in the present moment. Then, he should be contented with the least of food, clothing and dwelling that he needs, and should close to himself the means of seeking pleasures—this would lessen his greed for securing wealth for the sake of his own self.

(b) The need of the second kind can be treated by not attending to his children in view of the fact that Allah has created the child and has simultaneously created his sustenance. Besides, how many children there are who inherited naught from their fathers but became richer than him or the richest of the creation; and many a child inherited huge wealth but became most needy of mankind.⁵

2. *Secondly*, he should ponder over the relevant verses and traditions of the prophet which condemn miserliness and commend excessive generosity, promising great reward in case of generosity, and giving warning of severe chastisement in case of miserliness.⁶

3. *Thirdly*, the frequent consideration into the conditions of niggardly people, the dislike shown by the excellent people towards the misers, and the agreement of the people of the world on condemning them. For, a miser is sure to condemn miserliness in others. He can know how others feel about him,⁷ by looking to his own feelings about the miserly people.

4. *Fourthly*, he should consider the nature of wealth and should know that he has no way of deriving benefit from wealth except by parting with it. The gains are either bodily, which are mean and scarce and in the obtaining of which huge wealth is not needed or the benefits are spiritual, in which case he is sure and certain that wealth is of no use to him in securing these spiritual profits and useful purposes. Therefore, to strive after wealth is as though one severs one's ties from the desired objective, which is ignorance.

5. *Fifthly*, he should think that though he goes to excess in the keeping of wealth, sometimes there occurs something which causes wastage of wealth leaving behind no praise and reward. But when he turns to the means of attaining virtues,⁸ the praise and reward shall remain with Allah, the Exalted, just as He says: "That which ye have wasteth away, and that which Allah hath remaineth".⁹

6. *Sixthly*, when man is unable to spend wealth, he remains like a prisoner in the dominating hand of the love of wealth, and when he is able to spend he becomes dominant and powerful over it; and it is better for man to be dominating than to be dominated by something

else, since the first is the attribute of Truth and the second is the attribute of matter, as has been said by Allah: "And Allah is the Rich and ye are the poor".¹⁰

7. *Seventhly*, when a man keeps wealth and does not spend it, his wealth inevitably remains after his death and is possessed by somebody who boasts and says: "This wealth was only hoarded by the miser, the cursed". He, then, spends it for the welfare of his ownself, and only mentions the dead man with a curse. Thus, no trace of his (owner's) right survives in his wealth except condemnation in this world and evil consequence in the next world.

But, when a man spends his wealth in virtuous deeds glorious eulogy remains for him in this world and ample reward awaits him in the next world.

8. *Eighthly*, the co-sharers of the miser in his miserly qualifications are all wretched misers, who are condemned and debased. A generous philanthropist shares his glory with the prophets, the Friends of Allah, the eminent philosophers and great people.

9. *Ninthly*, experience shows that Allah, the Exalted, opens the doors of sustenance, comfort, and mercy to the generous. But the misers are always excessively in trouble, misery and are gloomy of heart. Mostly it so happens that they are forced to spend most of their wealth all at once beside their disgrace and dishonour, the reason being that all universal means turn to do good to the needy. Now, whoever adopts this profession of doing good, these universal means strengthen him, and whoever opposes this is pitted against the universal means.

10. *Tenthly*, the generous man is praised and commended by all, and the miser is abhorred¹¹ and looked down with contempt. The generous man spends the wealth and finds his honour in the possession of spirits,

and the miser keeps his wealth and remains deprived of the possession of spirits. Since the human spirits are from the substance of angels and gold and silver from the genus of inorganic matter the difference between the two is great.

Again, there is another reason here. That is, since generosity is loved by all people they assist the generous in his enterprises, and the miser is abhorred, so he remains deprived of this assistance.

People assist him in attaining his demands for the explicit reason—the abundance of his wealth. And, though generosity apparently causes loss of wealth it increases it in respect of what we have mentioned. Miserliness is useful apparently for protecting wealth but it necessarily causes the loss of wealth in respect of what has been mentioned.

Again, there is another reason, namely since people are sure that the particular man is generous, their ambitions help him in achieving huge wealth in the expectation that he would hand it over to them; and when they know that he is a miser their ambitions help in keeping him deprived of wealth. It is, of course, recognized that the ambitions of the people are extremely effective.

11. *Eleventhly*, wherever a generous man is present, hearts surely feel pleased with his presence and spirits rejoice when he proceeds towards them. The case is quite opposite with the miser. That is why, it is said the best soul is like the illuminating sun.

12. *Twelfthly*, surely the miser inevitably desires, as he approaches death to spend and do good to the people, since his lust is an expression of his strong desire to keep his wealth for himself, so when he is sure that he is facing death he realizes that it is not possible for him to preserve the wealth in the worldly life, and knows that there is no way of carrying it with himself. It becomes

easy for him, then, to spend it in various items of welfare at the time when death approaches him.¹² It mostly so happens that in such a critical moment he does not find a legible tongue or a guiding intelligence and remains troubled by the pang of death while his kith and kin pay no heed to his words—this causes him to feel great distress at heart, to which Allah has referred by saying:

“And spend of that wherewith We have provided you before death cometh unto one of you and he saith: “My Lord! If only thou wouldst relieve me for a little while, then I would give alms and be among the righteous. But Allah reproveth no soul when its term cometh”.¹³

It is therefore confirmed that the lust of a greedy person and the miserliness of a miser only drag him to grief, and sorrow before death and at the time of death. And as for his plight after death, we seek refuge from it with Allah !

13. *Thirteenthly*, it is necessarily known to the intelligent that there is no limit to the wealth which a man can enjoy. For example, the possession of one hundred thousand gold coin is pleasant but the possession of a thousand of thousand gold coin is more pleasant.

Having confirmed this, we say: “the soul does not reach a particular stage out of these stages but its pleasure grows stronger by attaining the high stage while it is aware that a still higher stage lies ahead and the pleasure of attaining this stage is much greater.

It is therefore confirmed that hoarding of wealth does not cure the disease of lust, rather, it strengthens it and increases its power.

But when the soul is prohibited from reaching the stage, the subject becomes like a lover who is barred from

enjoying his beloved. Then, the love decreases and the disease disappears.

14. *Fourteenthly*, it is not possible for a man to try to obtain wealth except when he is assisted by others and his need for wealth is expressed to them. This need and the disgrace it contains are persistable, whereas the achievement of the wealth and achieving the benefit from it is imaginary and surely it does not behove an intelligent man to bear the harm which is involved in obtaining a debased and imaginary gain.

Again, when he needs assistance from others he becomes like a slave to his assistant, doing what they intend and giving up what they dislike. But a contented man keeps himself away from them and does not attend to them, while the object of desire is forbidden. And, mostly it so happens that they serve and incline to meet him who pays no heed to them and they behave like slaves to him. The greedy is thus a slave and the contented man is free and noble. It has therefore been said, "Be in need of anybody you like and become his captive, pay no attention to the great whom you consider so and become equal to him and do good to anybody you like and you become his leader".

15. *Fifteenthly*, when seeking pleasure from abundance of wealth becomes habitual, the seeker may have a cause that necessitates the destruction of wealth. He, then, feels pain by losing the habits of enjoying pleasures, and puts all his efforts to earning and hoarding in his old age and decaying health and so suffers from excessive misery.

16. *Sixteenthly*, it is necessary for him to realize his responsibility in so far as wealth is never used but as a means for attaining bodily pleasures. Then, he should ponder over what we have mentioned about the

treatment of bodily pleasures.

17. *Seventeenthly*, it may be that he finds it troublesome to earn wealth at present, then he dies before deriving any benefit from it. Thus, the trouble will be his and the gain will accrue to others. But when he spends it for general welfare the actual gain comes back to him even though he undergoes troubles, since he becomes an alien after the death of the body.

18. *Eighteenthly*, to prefer contentment continuously leads to the habit of being free from need, and to enjoy the pleasant objects of the world and its pleasures leads to the habit of becoming rich with something and being in continuous need of it. To be free from something is more perfect than becoming rich with an object, as the first is the attribute of God and the second that of the created, and because the first is pure richness and the second is richness mixed with need.

19. *Nineteenthly*, if his sustenance is determined for him there does not arise the occasion of seeking it, if it is not determined then effort or lust would not do him any good.

One may say: If the sustenance is determined, then this would necessitate that he should make no effort for attaining knowledge and earning excellences. Nor would there be any need of obtaining food and drink and removal of harm. For, if it is determined, it would be available without effort and if not determined it would not be available even with effort.

The answer is that research and inductive effort lead us to understand that sometimes sustenance is available all of a sudden without any endeavour and demand and sometimes we find that it misses one who wants it earnestly and suffers from trouble. But sciences and excellences are scarcely obtained immediately

without any endeavour, learning or some other means.

20. *Twentiethly*, a wealthy man needs make the utmost endeavour for retaining his wealth and protecting it from calamities and destruction. But he is afflicted with severe grief if it is wasted and remains full of fear and bears all sorts of trouble.

As for one who is free from wealth and is occupied with earning perfections of the soul, he is free from this fear and trouble.

21. *Twentyfirstly*, worldly wealth and articles are enemies of Allah the Exalted and His Friends, because they keep a man much too occupied in worldly affairs to attain Paradise. They are enemies of the enemies of Allah, since they drag them to the Hell Fire. They are even enemies of themselves, since some of them consume some others. The possessor of wealth surely needs, for treasuring and retaining them, treasure-houses, locks, and fortification. He also needs treasures, assistants, armies, troops. All these require him to take trouble and incur expenses. It is, therefore, established that wealth destroys itself and consumes a portion of its own self.

22. *Twentysecondly*, whoever is fond of wealth is fond of every part of it and feels pain in case of calamity, defect and loss of that which he loves. Now, whoever possesses more wealth, has more friends, troubles and calamities. Hence, it is inevitable that his troubles will be enormous, his troupes of friends will continue persistently or would get together.

This is the discourse on the treatment of niggardliness, and excessive love of wealth in a theoretical way.

NOTES

1. Imām Ghazzālī defines بخل in his Iḥyā' III p. 254 in the following words:

فالامساك حيث يجب البذل بخل ، و البذل حيث يجب الامساك تبذير ، وبينهما وسط وهو المحمود وينبغي ان يكون السخاء والجود عبارة عنه اذ لم يؤمر .

2. Cf. Ibid. p. 255:

اعلم ان البخل سببه حب المال ، و لحب المال سببان ،

3. Cf. Iḥyā' III p. 229:

.... ومن عرف هذا الترتيب فقد عرف قدر المال و وجه شرفه ، و انه من حيث هو ضرورة المطاعم.... فاذن المال آلة و وسيلة الى مقصود صحيح و يصلح ان يتخذ الة و وسيلة الى مقاصد فاسدة .

4. Ibid: p. 256:

و تعالج طول الامل بكثرة ذكر الموت و النظر في موت الاقران و طول تعبههم في جمع المال و ضياعه بعدهم ،

5. Cf. Iḥyā' III p. 256:

و تعالج التفات القلب الى الولد بان خالقه خلق معه رزقه ، و كم من ولد لم يرث من ابيه مالا ، و حاله احسن ممن ورث ، و بان يعلم انه يجمع المال لولده ، يريد ان يترك ولده يغير و ينقلب هو الى شر .

6. Ibid.

و يعالج ايضا قلبه بكثرة التأمل في الاخبار الواردة في ذم البخل و مدح السخاء و ما توعده الله به على البخل من العقاب العظيم ،

Ibid.

ومن الادوية النافعة كثرة التأمل في احوال البخلاء ، و نفرة الطبع عنهم ، و استباحهم له ، فانه ما من بخيل الا و يستقيح البخل من غيره و يستثقل كل بخيل من اصحابه فيعام انه مستثقل و مستقذرفى قلوب الناس مثل سائر البخلاء في قلبه —

8. Cf. *Ihyā'*, III. p. 231:

فهذه جملة الآفات الدنيوية سوى ما يقاسيه ارباب
الاموال في الدنيا من الخوف والحزن والغم والهم والتعب
في دفع الحساد وتحييم المصاعب في حفظ المال وكسبه
فاذن ترياق المال اخذ القوت منه وصرف الباقي الى الخيرات.
وما عدا ذلك مسموم وآفات.

9. S. *Al-Nahl*: 96.

10. *Surah Muhammad*: 38.

11. Cf. *Ihyā'*, III p. 249:

وقال على رضى الله تعالى عنه قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه
وسلم ان الله تعالى يبغض البخيل في حياته ، السخي عند
موته.

Ibid. p. 250:

وقال يحيى بن معاذ : ما في القلب للاسخياء الاحب ،
ولو كانوا فجارا : و للبخلاء الابغض ولو كانوا ابرارا .

ولقى يحيى بن زكريا عليهما السلام ابلis في صورته فقال
له يا ابلis : اخبرني باحب الناس اليك وابغض الناس اليك .
قال احب الناس الى المؤمن البخيل ، وابغض الناس الى الفاسق
السخي ، قال له لم ؟ قال لان البخيل قد كفاني بخله ،
والفاسق السخي اتخوف ان يطلع الله عليه في سخائه فيقبله ثم
ولى ، وهو يقول لولا انك يحيى لما اخبرتك .

12. A similar expression is found in the *Ihyā'* III p. 255:

فان الانسان لو علم انه يموت بعد يوم ربما انه كان لا يبخل
بماله :

13. *Al-Munāfiqūn*: 10 and 11.

CHAPTER IV

As for its treatment, in a practical way, it can be treated in several ways:

1. To keep the company of the needy and to keep oneself away from the rich and the people in enjoyment of worldly wealth. For, by nature man inclines to it and afflicts the heart either by achieving it or by losing it. Sitting with the needy and those who exclusively devote themselves to Allah favours the heart with happiness, pleases it and lightens the burden. The holy Prophet said: "O my Allah! Keep me alive as a needy man, let me die as a needy man, raise me up in the company of the needy."¹

Richness is likely to keep a man away from Allah just as need is likely to draw a man towards Allah and to turn him away from all that is other than Allah.

2. If a miser considers all that we have mentioned and maintained in condemning miserliness and commending generosity, he will necessarily incline to choose excellences and praise. He should therefore hasten to spend and show generosity before he is overtaken by the devil with a doubt to turn and prevent him from fruitful expenditure, which is the wont of the devil.

It has been related that a certain savant² entered latrine, took off his ring or some of his clothes and called out a student of his, handed it over to him and asked him to offer it to a particular person. He said, "why did you not have patience till you came out?" He said, "I feared that my intention might change or my heart might become niggardly with it. So, I acted with haste."

3. Niggardliness expresses excessive fondness for wealth. When love takes possession of the heart, it is a severe disease and the best medicine for it is to be away from the object of love and to travel away from the town of the beloved in order to have consolation. Similarly, by spending wealth the miser can keep himself away from it. This will remove its love from his heart, and then will vanish the condemnable niggardliness.

4. It is the best design in this matter that the miser should deceive himself by good name and try to gain a reputation among the people for generosity and grace. His soul would then turn away from this disease which would vanish from him. Similarly, he who intends to treat niggardliness should engage himself in spending wealth in any agreeable manner without saying that this particular expenditure is permissible and the other particular expenditure is not permissible. For, the aim and object is to remove the love of wealth from his heart; which can be done only by increasing its disgrace and by distinguishing some ways of expenditure from some others in respect of grace and honour, and not in respect of disgrace. That is why they have said: If the miser throws his wealth into the ocean or into fire to burn it, it would have been better than keeping it. When he realizes that his self is deceived by the name of generosity and grace, he should not have this by way of pride, as pride is another disease which is severer than the previous one. In short, the doctor who treats these evil pro-

pensities tries to suppress one by means of another. For example, he causes appetite to dominate anger in order to break its fermentation and *vice versa*. Similar is the case here.

Niggardliness shows that a man wants to possess wealth while pride shows that he wants to possess the spirits of other men, and to unite them together is not possible. Now, whoever takes either of the two in his heart should treat the other by imposing the first on it on the condition that the first does not exceed the second in strength, lest he become like one who contracts one serious disease in place of another serious disease.

5. If a man fortunately studies under an affectionate teacher, the teacher tries to drive away from him everything that is dear to his heart after keeping it out of his reach, explaining all the time its uselessness and speaking against it till he finds that he is no longer fond of it.

In short, just as a multitude of actions gives rise to a strong and persistent habit, constant separation from it necessitates the weakness of the habit.

NOTES

1. This ḥadīth has been recorded by Imām Tirmidhī on the authority of Anas. It has also been recorded by Ibn Mājah and al-Ḥākim; the latter has declared its Isnād (chain of narrators) on the authority of Abū Sa'īd as free from defect. See also Iḥyā' III. p. 229.
2. Imām Ghazzālī relates a similar story about al-Būḥanji in his al-Iḥyā' III. p. 256.

CHAPTER V

ON THE NATURE OF MISERLINESS AND GENEROSITY

Wealth has been made available to be spent in important affairs (Fol. 283a). To keep wealth on an occasion when it is necessary to spend it is niggardliness, and to spend where it is necessary to keep it is extravagance, and it is praiseworthy to be moderate. To this Allah's expression refers: "And let not thy hand be chained to thy neck nor open it with a complete opening."¹ Allah has said: "And those who, when they spend, are neither prodigal nor grudging: and there is ever a firm station between the two."²

The substance of the discourse is that if wealth is not spent where it is necessary to spend it, this is miserliness. Now, that which necessitates expenditure is of two kinds: (1) necessary by religion, and (2) necessary by manliness. In either case when the subject refrains from his (necessary function), he is called miserly, by one who refrains from the spending of that which is religiously necessary is more niggardly (than the other). For example, to withhold Zakāt, and sustenance from one's family and near relations. Whoever spends wealth in a vicious object, he does not willingly spend his wealth for the sake of virtuous deeds. Such a man is also niggardly.

That which is necessary due to manliness is to prevent the exercise of virtue and to cause narrowness.

To use that which causes narrowness concerning the debased objects is condemnable. The condemnation,

however, varies with the variation of conditions and considerations.

First, the condemnation on account of the agent, as what is considered evil coming from those who possess wealth in abundance is not considered as such from one who has very little wealth. Again, what is considered evil from an intelligent man is not considered evil from a boy and a woman, and what is considered evil from the free man is not considered evil from the slave.

Second, condemnation on account of the relations, as it is considered evil to narrow down the expenses on wife and children, but it is not considered so in relation to strangers.

Third, that which causes narrowness in food is considered evil but that which causes narrowness in something else is not considered evil.

Fourth, condemnation on account of time. For example, to cause hardship, is considered evil at a certain time, and is not considered so at other times.

In short, the above-mentioned conditions cannot be brought under fixed rules; and they only concern the external phase. It is possible to record them and say: It has been established that wealth serves, and drinks and foods serve the body which itself serves the soul, and the soul serves the moral and scientific excellences. Thus, wealth is the last servant, and these objects are served by wealth.

Now, wealth which is spent in attaining a position out of the positions of those objects which we have called *Makhdūmah* is generosity and to refrain from it is miserliness; the wealth which is spent for something other than these positions is spent in extravagance.

NOTES

1. Surah al-Isrā': 29.
2. 'al-Furqān: 67.

CHAPTER VI

You know that the generous man is he who spends as much wealth as is necessary either by the Shar' or for the sake of manliness. The miser is he who does not act like that.

As for the benevolent, his rank is higher than the rank of the generous. This is because the significance of benevolence lies in being of as much use as it is desired from him without any substitute. Whoever, then, offers a dagger to him about whom it is known that he will kill either himself or somebody else with it is not benevolent. Similarly, he who gives something in order to obtain in exchange something else is not benevolent. But the absence of the demand of a substitute in its entirety can only be conceived in respect of Allah the Exalted. A man spends something only for some purpose either for obtaining the rewards of the next world or for obtaining psychological excellence known as generosity and purification of the soul from the vice of miserliness which is known as benevolence.

But if that which stimulates him to spend is fear of a satirical verse, the blame of the people or the expectation of a profit that would reach him from the person who has received benevolence, then this is not generosity. For, the action has been displayed on account of something which he needs.

CHAPTER VII

DISCOURSE ON WORLDLY POSITION

283b You know each one of these states is only caused by believing in the state of a miser. The same is the case in this matter. As for belief, the fact is that when a man believes in others that he is niggardly in a particular religious characteristic the belief gives rise (Fol. 283b) to a particular psychological condition which produces special activities, for example, to stand in his service, to praise him with his tongue, to avoid contention, and show respect and regard and to start with salam; and to submit to the chair in meetings. And *Jāh* or worldly position expresses a belief that necessitates the psychological state which affects these physical conditions.

The Cause that Necessitates the Love of Worldly Position:

Just as possession¹ of gold and silver gives power and ability in achieving objects, similarly dominion over the spirits enables the owner to attain other objects. But to the people of high ambitions worldly position² is dearer than wealth, because dominion over hearts has preference over that of wealth for three reasons:

Firstly, to attain wealth by means of worldly position is easier than attaining position by means of wealth. If the learned and the ascetic who are highly esteemed to hearts intend to earn money, it is easy for them to do so.

But when man belongs to somebody else, his wealth also belongs to somebody else.

But when a miserly man who is not characterised with perfection finds a treasure and intends to attain through it a position, it is not easy for him. The sum total is, that one who possesses a worldly position possesses wealth and not *vice versa*. Position is, therefore, more excellent and desirable than wealth.

Secondly, the spirits belong to the genre of angels, gold and silver to the genre of inanimates, the difference between the substance of angels and that of inanimate beings is very great. The noble is more apt to be loved than the debased. Hence, worldly position is dearer than wealth.

Thirdly, wealth, like food and dress, which are needed by man specially for himself, is not little. Man needs a great deal of wealth so that he may reach a position where he becomes a master of others and others become his servants. And the state of being a master expresses uniqueness in attributes of grace and honour which are loved and desired for its own sake. Position necessitates the attainment of uniqueness without an intermediary, whereas wealth necessitates it through an intermediary. So, the first is dearer.

Fourthly, the dominion over the hearts of men³ grows and thrives by its own power, because when hearts pray for a particular man and believe in his perfection in knowledge, or action, the tongues eloquently praise him and those who listen to the praise also believe in him. It is therefore established that position increases by itself. But wealth does not increase by its own power, the first is therefore dearer.

There are some people who say that worldly position is only desired for the protection of wealth, as those who

have no position find it impossible to protect their wealth from destruction. The subordinate is more debased than its master. Man possesses wealth by virtue of his position. But the animal nature dominates him, because the wealth belongs to the genus of the sensible, and worldly position belongs to the genus of the abstracts. Now, whoever is dominated by animality, to him wealth is dearer in impression; and whoever is dominated by spirituality is more impressed by position.

The Cause that Necessitates the Love for Wealth and Position, and it has two Reasons:

1. The needs of man are unlimited and they cannot be satisfied except by means of the wealth. That which entails the desirable object is desirable. Hence, it follows that love for wealth has no end. Worldly position protects wealth and retains it, therefore, position is also desired to an unlimited extent.

2. We have mentioned that the possession of wealth and dominion over hearts is an ability which is a perfection⁴; and perfection is loved for its own sake. Therefore, these objects are loved for their own sake. This power in relation to wealth and spirits is the dominion of every one who possesses it. Hence, it is loved and demanded for unlimited numbers. Now, the fact that all (Fol. 284a) wealth is possessed and all hearts are possessed demands his uniqueness in mastery, domination, despotism, and to be unique in perfection is also the end of perfection. And perfection is essentially loved and whoever increases the possession of wealth and possesses hearts⁵ withdraws from the company of men.

Whenever uniqueness is essentially desired all that is nearer to uniqueness and to the negation of associates is more apt to be loved. This is the reason for the love of collecting wealth and abundance of treasures, so much so

that had a slave possessed two golden ears he would have surely desired a third one. This is the reason of his liking for an extension of the range of his position, and for his name and fame reaching the extreme horizon of countries which he knows with certainty that he will not be able to reach nor has he ever visited them, or their inhabitants. Thus he does not necessarily obtain any benefit but he feels extremely pleased with the idea that his fame has reached those countries.

NOTES

1. Cf. al-Ihyā', III. p. 273:

كما ان ملك الذهب والفضة يفيد قدرة يتوصل الانسان بها الى سائر أغراضه فكذلك ملك قلوب الأحرار والقدرة على استسخارها يفيد قدرة على التوصل الى جميع الأغراض ، فلاشتراك في السبب اقتضى الاشتراك في المحبة ، وترجيح الجاه على المال اقتضى ان يكون الجاه احب من المال ، ولملك الجاه ترجيح على ملك المال من ثلاثة اوجه :

الاول ان التوصل بالجاه الى المال ايسر من التوصل بالمال الى الجاه ، فالعالم او الزاهد الذي تقرر له جاه في القلوب لو قصد اكتساب المال تيسر له ، فان اموال ارباب القلوب مسخرة للقلوب ومبدولة لمن اعتقد فيه الكمال ، واما الرجل الخسيس الذي لا يتصف بصفة كمال اذا وجد كنزا و لم يكن له جاه يحفظ ماله ، و اراد ان يتوصل بالمال الى الجاه لم يتيسر له فاذن الجاه آلة و وسيلة الى المال ، فمن ملك الجاه فقد ملك المال ومن ملك المال لم يملك الجاه بكل حال ، فلذلك صار الجاه احب .

2. According to Imām Ghazzālī, *jāh* also means to possess hearts. Cf. al-Ihyā', III. p. 272:

ومعنى المال ملك الاعيان المنتفع بها ، و معنى الجاه ملك القلوب المطلوب تعظيمها و طاعتها .

3. Cf. al-Ihyā', p. 273 (III):

الثالث ان ملك القلوب

4. That 'power is perfection' has been maintained by Imām Ghazzālī as well. The theme seems to be derived from the following passage of the Ihyā', Vol. III. p. 275 (Muṣṭafā al-Ḥalabī Press, Egypt):

.... الارضيات التي يقدر الانسان عليها فانه يحب بالطبع ان يستولى عليها بالقدرة على التصرف فيها كيف يريد ، و هي قسمان : اجساد و ارواح ، اما الاجساد فهي الدراهم و الدنانير و الامتعة ، فيجب ان يكون قادرا عليها يفعل فيها ما يشاء من الرفع و الوضع و التسليم و المنع ، فان ذلك قدرة و القدرة كمال ، و الكمال من الربوبية ، و الربوبية محبوبة بالطبع ، فلذلك احب الاموال ..

5. Cf. Ibid:

نفوس الادميين و قلوبهم و هي انفس ما على وجه الارض فهو : يجب ان يكون له استيلاء و قدرة عليها لتكون مسخرة له متصرفه تحت اشارته و ارادته لما فيه من كمال الاستيلاء و التشبه بصفات الربوبية ، و القلوب انما تتسخر بالحب و لا تحب الا باعتقاد الكمال ، فان كل كمال محبوب ، لان الكمال من الصفات الالهية و الصفات الالهية كلها محبوبة بالطبع للمعنى الرباني من جملة معاني الانسان .

CHAPTER VIII

A SECTION IRRELEVANT TO THE DISCOURSE ON THE EXPLANATION OF REAL AND WHIMSICAL¹ PERFECTIONS

You must know that perfection is considered in essence, in attributes, or in actions.

Perfection in essence has two aspects:

1. The existence of a Necessary Being in its own essence is not at all related to anything else. The Necessary Being is so in all its attributes and in all respects. If it needs anything else in any attribute, this will entail that it needs some being other than itself as has been explained concerning the positive sciences.

2. That he should be unique in and by his essence in this perfection without having equality in perfection, as equality necessitates defect. But the flow of perfection from him does not at all necessarily cause defect. A perfection that is secured by the effect is in reality secured by the cause. The illumination of the light of the sun, all over the horizons, for example, does not cause the sun any harm. It is, on the contrary, an indication of its extreme perfection. But if another sun equivalent to the present sun in rank and illumination is found, it will cause defect to the present sun. It is known that all that is beside the essentially necessary, is perfect in and by itself for the above-mentioned two reasons.

The perfection of attributes is, however, in knowledge and power. As for the perfection of knowledge it belongs to Allah the Exalted, in three ways:

1. Allah, the Exalted, knows all the objects of knowledge. Hence, the more advanced in knowledge a man is the nearer to Allah he is.²

2. If knowledge is explicit³ and perfectly manifest, it excludes the possibility of mixing up contraries. Similarly, the more explicit and purer is the knowledge of man the nearer he is to Allah the Exalted.

3. The knowledge⁴ must be continuous and unaffected by change. Hence, the farther from evil is the knowledge of man the nearer he is to Allah the Exalted.

The objects of knowledge are of two kinds: transitory and eternal.⁵ The transitory is such that its change affects its knowledge. If it survives after the change, it is sheer ignorance and no knowledge. If it does not continue, it is the desired object. Such kinds of knowledge do not represent perfection.

Those objects of knowledge that survive, their knowledge continues, such as the knowledge of abstract quiddities, and the confirmed pieces of knowledge which are not affected by changes, such as the knowledge of the necessity of necessary beings, and the impossibility of impossible objects.

It is therefore established that the perfection of knowledge is only caused by these considerations. So, the knowledge attained by a man of these descriptions is a perfection for the man; and what is not so is surely not a perfection.

The first kind of knowledge which is an attribute of perfection continues with man before death, (Fol. 284 b) at the time of death and after death; and this knowledge becomes the light of the gnostics⁶ after death a light which "will run before them and on their right hands: they will say, Our Lord! Perfect our light for us."⁷ That is, these sciences may become a capital

through which one achieves the manifestation of that which is not manifest in the world, such as one who has a dim lamp with him can cause additional light, rather can burn another lamp more powerful than the present one. But he who has not obtained anything of these sciences in this world has no desire to perfect this light after death and remains after death like one whose likeness is that of darkness never getting out of it, rather like "darkness on a vast, abysmal sea. There covereth him a wave, above which is a wave (above which is a cloud)".⁸

The second kind contains those sciences which are related⁹ to the transitory objects like the science of Lexicon, Tafsīr (Exegesis), Fiqh, (Jurisprudence), and History, out of which nothing continues nor does the soul at all attain perfection due to them. The power of their perfection consists in being benefited by impression, invention, creation and bringing into being from not being.

I add that al-Ghazzālī (Allah's Mercy be on him!) explained that the perfection of essence is not achieved except when it is one and unique.¹⁰ Now, it is necessary for him to know that nobody except Allah, the Exalted, is effective in bringing out something from non-being into being, since if others share with him this quality of effectiveness it is certain that it will undermine the belief that the Divine Power is Perfect. If Imām Ghazzālī holds to this principle, then it necessarily follows that nothing except the Power of Allah can effect anything. But this repudiates the very root of Philosophy.

Imām Ghazzālī also says : As for power, man has not real perfection in his power, he has only real knowledge. The real power only belongs to Allah, he Exalted, and anything that originates consequent

upon His Will and Power originates by the origination of Allah, the Exalted.¹¹

One may say, your view on this problem is not different from the view of the philosophers. To the philosophers the power along with the urging event causes necessarily to display the action attributed to Allah, the Exalted, in the sense that Allah, the Exalted, alone has created the power and the urge which necessarily cause this action. He also holds that in case this power is shared defect follows of necessity. In this case, it has been admitted that man has real knowledge which necessitates the appearance of defect in the knowledge of Allah, the Exalted. If it does not necessarily follow then how has he (Ghazzālī) claimed that if there were anything equal to Allah, the Exalted, in the necessity of His being, defect would necessarily follow.

It is therefore established that these are weak discourses concerning the treatment of the love of wealth. This is so for a number of reasons:

1. Verily the love of wealth and worldly position is an impression and feeling. It is a passive action of the soul in relation to wealth and position. Now, impression and passivity is a weakness and defect, while the absence of the love of wealth and position is a power of the soul due to which the soul is not impressed by wealth and position. Whereas the first condition is an attribute of matter the second condition is an attribute of Truth. What proves this, by way of simile, is that when a man places his finger on a body and reclines on it, the body feels the impression. This indicates that the affected body has a weak nature which receives impression from the strong.

But that which does not get impressed, like iron, indicates that the body has a strong, severe nature which

imparts continuity and eternity. That which gets impressed indicates perfection of weakness and yielding to an annihilation. But resistance to impression indicates power, continuity and eternity and independence. So, when the soul is impressed by the love of wealth and position, it indicates the weakness of the substance of the soul.

Again, the stages of this impression are manifold. The stronger and severer the impression the weaker and severer in baseness is the soul. Also, whenever the resistance to impression and attention (Folio, 285a) is severer the stronger and more perfect in existence the soul grows and more distant it becomes from the nature of non-existence and passive action. Those who are well-versed in Ethics express the idea explained above and say that the first kind is a soul characterised with the nature of submission and the habit of matter, and the second kind is a soul characterised with freedom, purity of substance and the absence of impression.

285a

NOTES

1. Cf. al-Iḥyā', III. p. 276:

بيان الكمال الحقيقي والكمال الوهمي الذي لا حقيقة له،

2. Cf. Ibid:

من حيث كثرة المعلومات وسعتها، فانه محيط بجميع المعلومات فلذلك كلما كانت علوم العبد اكثر كان اقرب الى الله تعالى،

3. Ibid:

.... و كون المعلوم مكشوفاً به كشفاً تاماً، فان المعلومات مكشوفة لله تعالى باسم انواع الكشف على ما هي عليه فلذلك مهما كان علم العبد اوضح وايقن واصدق و اوفى للمعلوم في تفاصيل صفات العلوم كان اقرب الى الله تعالى.

4. Ibid:

من حيث بقاء العلم ابداً لا يباد بحيث لا يتغير ولا يزول، فان علم الله تعالى باق لا يتصور ان يتغير فكذلك مهما كان علم العبد بمعلومات لا يقبل التغير والانتقال كان اقرب الى الله تعالى.

5. Ibid:

والمعلومات قسمان : متغيرات و ازليات، اما المتغيرات..

6. Cf. al-Iḥyā', III. p. 276:

.... و يبقى كاملاً للنفس بعد الموت و تكون هذه المعرفة نوراً للعارفين، بعد الموت — يسعى بين ايديهم و نوراً اي تكون هذه المعرفة رأس مال يوصل الى كشف ما لم يتكشف في الدنيا كما ان من معه سراج خفى فانه يجوز ان يصير ذلك سبباً لزيادة النور لسراج اخر يقتبس منه. فيكمل النور بذلك النور الخفى على سبيل الاستتمام و من ليس معه اصل السراج فلا مطمع له في ذلك فمن ليس معه اصل معرفة الله تعالى لم يكن له مطمع في هذا النور فيبقى كمن مثله في الظلمات ليس بخارج منها — بل كظلمات في بحر لجي يغشاه موج من فوقه موج من فوقه معاب —

7. Al-Taḥrim: 8.

8. Cf. Al-Ihyā', III. p. 276: Supra Note 6; Al-Nur: 40.
 9. Cf. al-Ihyā', III p. 277:

ومنها (من المعارف) ماله منفعة في الاعانة على معرفة
 الله تعالى كمعرفة لغة العرب والتفسير والفقه والخبار فان
 معرفة لغة العرب تعين على معرفة تفسير القرآن . . الى
 معرفة الله ،

10. Cf. Al-Ihyā', III. p. 274:

فاذن معنى الربوبية التفرد بالوجود و هو الكمال :
 و كل انسان فانه بطبعه محب ، لان يكون هو المنفرد
 بالكمال و لذلك قال بعض مشايخ الصوفية : ما من انسان الا
 وفي باطنه ما صرح به فرعون من قوله — أنا ربكم الاعلى —
 ولكنه ليس يجد له مجالا —

11. Ibid. p. 277:

”و اما القدرة فليس فيها كمال حقيقى للعبد ، بل للعبد
 علم حقيقى وليس له قدرة حقيقية ، و اما القدرة الحقيقية لله
 وما يحدث من الاشياء عقيب ارادة العبد و قدرته و حركته
 فهي حادثة باحداث الله ،

CHAPTER IX

ON THE EXPLANATION THAT SOMETIMES SEARCH FOR
 POSITION IS NECESSARY, SOMETIMES COMMENDABLE
 AND PERMISSIBLE, AND SOMETIMES UNDESIRABLE AND
 FORBIDDEN

So, we say: wealth and position are either obtained spontaneously or through a process of effort and achievement. There is no harm in the first, because no position is greater than the position of the Messenger of Allah, (Allah's blessings & peace be upon him:), and the position of the rightly-guided Caliphs and those learned in religion who followed them. They have, indeed, grace and grandeur in their position and incur no blame.

The second kind, that is seeking wealth and position: this is of many grades, as we say:

1. The first grade is that it is necessary; and this consists of two kinds: it sometimes concerns the other world and sometimes this world.

That which concerns the other world, and is necessary is the fact that the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) was sent to the world to call the people to Truth. It was therefore inevitable for him to appear to the people in the best possible manner, so that his good appearance should urge them to accept his view. If he did not appear in his best manner, his external behaviour would drive them away. Hence, it is necessary to search for position to the extent to which one needs it. Abraham (peace be upon him), says: "And give unto me a good report in later generations".¹ Again, for the learned people to whom

reference is made in matters relating to religion and fatwa, it is necessary to search for position to the extent that fulfils their purposes relating to faith.

As for that which concerns this world, it is a fact that man has been created needy. He cannot meet his inevitable needs except with wealth which cannot be retained except through position, and that through which something necessary is accomplished is also necessary; therefore, it is essential to seek worldly position to the extent which is necessary for meeting one's needs.

Again, we say, the need is either corporeal or spiritual. As for the corporeal, it is the fixed quantity of food, drink, clothing and dwelling and if it is not provided for man, he is sure to fall ill or suffer death. It is therefore necessary for him to secure as much position and wealth as is necessary for retaining the needed quantity of these things.

As for the spiritual the fact is that search for knowledge very often needs good food, drink and clothing and other materials over and above the first quantity. Now, if this knowledge is necessary for him, the search for wealth and position through which alone the knowledge is obtained is equally necessary.

2. The second stage: Sometimes the achievement of wealth and position is not necessary but is desirable, since the position without which life cannot continue, and through which alone the essentials of faith can be achieved is something else; and the position without which the perfection of these actions cannot be attained is also something else. Now, just as the first kind is necessary, the second is preferable (desirable). For, if man is not free of anxiety and is not in good humour, it will not be possible for him to attain the knowledge of delicate sciences, nor will he be able to

comprehend the deeply-hidden discourses. Now, if this state cannot be achieved except through wealth and position the demand for them will necessarily be desirable and commendable. This is why Joseph, (peace be upon him) said: "Set me over the store-houses of the land. Lo! I am a skilled custodian,"² and desired wealth from the king, the reason being just as we have mentioned.

3. The Third Stage; Demand of wealth and position (Fol. 285b) on the condition that the demand is permissible. That is, whenever there appears a kind of excellence out of his excellences he stands truthful concerning them in order to win position and rank in the hearts of some of the people. This, however, concerns the chapter of the permissibles. But the continuation of this condition up to the proper limit is very difficult. For, when man feels pleased in seeking position, his pleasure urges him to search more of it. It is not possible to demand this additional position with a veracity free from doubt and confusion. Hence, falsehood will take place. But, since the continuation of this situation which has been described as permissible to this extent is a difficult matter, the best thing is to avoid it.

4. The Fourth Stage is the disliked (undesirable), that is, when man realises that he is strongly inclined by nature to seek worldly position and feels pleased with it. In such a case, he dislikes the search of position, by veracity because since the natural motive is strong and one feels pleased with it and becomes devoted and attached to it and enjoys it. This condition undoubtedly necessitates his indifference to the remembrance of Allah, the Exalted, and its being fraught with danger necessitates that the demand of nature should be abandoned altogether.

5. The Fifth Position is the forbidden. That is to seek position by means of show, and falsehood, and this inspires the heart of the people with making designs and creating confusion. Moreover, it turns people away from truth and righteousness and urges them as well as others to go astray. It is, therefore, forbidden.

Again, seeking position by manifesting praiseworthy attributes while the man is free of them has many stages, without having any end in scarcity, abundance, weakness and severity. In this position the four stages have necessarily no end.

NOTES

1. Al-Shu'arā (26): 84.

2. Yūsuf : 55; also see al-Ihyā, III p. 279:

....فانه (يوسف) طلب المنزلة في قلبه بكونه حفيظا
عليما و كان محتاجا إليه و كان صادقا فيه—

CHAPTER X

EXPLANATION OF THE REASON FOR LOVING PRAISE AND PANEGYRIC AND ABHORRING SATIRE AND BLAME

For the love of praise there are several causes—(1) At the time of praise the soul becomes aware of perfection. And perfection is liked for its own sake.¹ Anything that is liked causes pleasure when it is realized. Hence, it is pleasant to listen to panegyric. To illustrate it, the description with which he is praised is either clear and manifest or concealed and implicit. Now, if it is explicit and evident, the feeling of pleasure will not grow strong. A dominating ruler, for example, whose power is grand and whose territory vast does not feel happy when he is praised for his power and kingdom, since he is aware of all that he has achieved. The purpose of praise is to obtain this awareness which is already there. This praise does not, therefore, achieve any object and is useless for to try for something which is already in possession, is wasted effort.

Again, there is another point here. It may be that a man possesses a number of qualities every one of which is manifest in existence. He, therefore, does not feel pleased on hearing all that is manifest. But he enjoys hearing about the sum-total of the qualities, the reason being that the mind does not feel aware of the whole. When this is so, the whole is more concealed than every one of them. Hence, man feels more pleased when he is praised for the whole of descriptions than when he is praised for them

separately. Again, the achievement of every one of the qualities is frequent and usual, but the achievement of the sum-total of these qualities is scarce. So, praise for the whole is nearer to the awareness of his being a unique person. We have already mentioned that this is the real perfection. Whenever praise is nearer to this, it will be nearer to real perfection. To make others to listen to it is, therefore, more pleasant.

As for the second kind, I mean, to be praised for achieving the attributes of perfection in either asceticism or in power and domination. This causes pleasure due to several reasons:

286a 1. The praised person is often afflicted with doubt concerning himself. Now, the assertion of the praiser plays the part of an evidence which confirms (Fol. 286a) his belief that he has obtained the perfection, and the doubt is dispelled by panegyric. Since the achievement of perfection is loved for its own sake, the power of belief in its achievement is stronger and more pleasant. But this pleasure is achieved in this way only when the eulogy comes from those who do not speak falsehood nor do they oppose. But if the person who praises is a liar and exaggerator, his panegyric would not result in pleasure.

2. The composition of a praise by a praiser indicates that he accepts it in the belief that the praised one is perfect. To believe in his excellence urges the imperfect necessarily to obey the perfect and to become devoted to him. This praise thus enables the praiser to enchant the praised by means of the praise—this is a kind of power, and power is a perfection and perfection is loved. That is why the higher in rank the praiser is the greater the feeling of pleasure engendered by his praise. But to have power on a great king means domination over his subjects and not *vice versa*.

3. The praise is listened to by those who are present and reaches those who are absent. On this occasion the listeners believe in his excellence and grace and become devoted to him. This necessitates that the praise is tantamount to the assertion that he is the most excellent. The assertion also implies that the speaker is imperfect whereas one's assertion of one's own imperfection is undesirable and condemnable. It is, therefore, established that one who denies the excellence of others stands there. But when a man proceeds with this assertion it indicates that whoever asserts this excellence has necessarily reached considerable position in power, so much so that he stands in spite of the presence of a negator. The power cannot be free from one of the two cases. For the good qualities have either reached a power and manifestation which cannot be denied by a praiser, or, they are expressed even when they are missing. This is only because the praiser is so much afraid of the praised that he proceeds with the praise in the presence of two truthful and powerful witnesses viz. (1) the admission of the excellence of others and (2) to advance to falsehood. The matter being so, it is established that the one praised is extremely powerful and the praiser is extremely weak and debased, while power is an attribute of perfection which is loved. The praise indicates this perfection, so there is no doubt that it is loved.

These four causes necessitate love of praise and eulogy. Now, if all of them co-exist collectively, the feeling of pleasure increases to its extreme height.² But in case some of them are available, the feeling of pleasure rises to the extent to which these causes have been achieved. As for the first cause it is to realize perfection. This is removed by the fact that the one praised knows that the praiser is not true in his praise, but it is

too short in one respect, and too brief in another respect. I mean the person concerned with praise knows that the panegyrist proceeds with falsehood and manifests his devotion just to win his favour and turn his attention to the respect and enchantment displayed by him. This is an indication of obtaining power in some way. Now, if 'the praised' believes that the praiser has not composed his praise for any want or need, it turns into a laughter and jesting with the person praised.

NOTES

1. Imām Ghazzālī says that since 'perfection' is a Divine Attribute, it is essentially liked. Vide al-Ihyā', III. p. 275.

.... فان كل كمال محبوب لأن الكمال من الصفات الالهية ، و الصفات الالهية كلها محبوبة بالطبع ،

See also p. 279.

اعلم ان لحب المدح والتذاذ القلب به اربعة اسباب .
السبب الاول وهو الاقوى شعور النفس بالكمال ، فاننا بينا
ان الكمال محبوب وكل محبوب فادراكه لذيقه ، فمهما شعرت النفس
بكمالها ارتاحت و اهنزت وتلذذت ، و المدح يشعر نفس
الممدوح بكمالها ، فان الوصف الذى به مدح لا يخلو اما ان
يكون جليا ظاهرا او يكون مشكوكا فيه ، فان كان جليا ظاهرا
محسوسا كانت اللذة به أقل —

2. Cf. al-Ihyā', III. p. 280:

فهذه الاسباب الاربعة قد تجمع في مدح واحد فيعظم
بها الالتذاذ ،

CHAPTER XI

ON THE TREATMENT OF THE LOVE FOR
WORLDLY POSITION

You have realized that worldly position has no meaning except to win the hearts of the people. This, though pleasant considering the achievement of power which is an attribute of perfection, involves undesirable consequences.

1. The search for wealth and position is a passive action of the soul which contains the love of wealth and love of position. Now, passive action and receiving impression are the attributes of matter and are perishable (Fol. 286 b).

But the absence of attraction to wealth and position expresses a power in the soul and a severity in consideration of which one refrains from being acted upon by something else, and this is the attribute of the Necessary Being. In short, to look for a position is to look for power, and power is a perfection in a certain quality. The fact that the soul is affected by this search for position, indicates that its essence is acted upon and affected which is a defect in the essence. When there is a contradiction between the 'defect in the essence' and 'the defect in quality' the first is more apt to be removed.

2. Position cannot be achieved except by achieving those objects which necessitate it. These objects if they ever appear to them manifestly, they believe in them as an excellence distinct from all that they believe as

debased not by way of hypocrisy and the root of destruction. Now, if this man ever meets the people who believe in a resemblance (an image) he would inevitably manifest his own inclination to the Oneness of Allah. You can guess on the line of this example all those conditions which oppose each other in respect of this world and the next world. Then, when he displays the condemnable hypocrisy he constantly fears that he will be exposed and his hypocrisy will become manifest. All sects will, therefore, turn away from him. Having fallen in these calamities the soul surely goes astray, suffers loss and perishes.

3. If one dominates hearts and is fortunate enough to escape this sort of trial and his death is delayed, rather, if all that is in the East and West prostrate¹ themselves before you the prostrator and the prostrated will not last fifty years with this blessing which is sure to decay. It does not, therefore, deserve to be preferred to the blessing that lasts from eternity to eternity. This treatment is not completed except when the duration of life is ascribed to that which will soon come out from non-eternity. This is only because it deserves the meaning of eternity in the way we have summarized.

4. Worldly Position means to be alone in decision, domination and superiority. It is known that if you obtain worldly position in this sense, every one else will remain deprived of it, and to be deprived of what is needed is essentially disliked.

When you have realized this, it becomes manifest to you that the condition of everyone else belonging to the East and the West, will be such that they will compete with you in search of position and take measures to deprive you of it and to prevent you from reaching it from among those who seek position. Every one in the East and West will be driven to contend against him, to

nullify his life and all his perfection. It is known that you are one of them. Now, if you are able to stand against anybody, you can stand against one or two. When the entire people agree to oppose you, they will subjugate you. Especially if the people of the East and the West get together they are sure to dominate you and do you all sorts of evil and trial, by my Lord! except when you are strengthened by Divine Heavenly assistance or by rare unique heavenly chances, then only you can remain in peace from them for a limited duration. But the rare is not to be relied upon and preferred to.

It is therefore established that whoever seeks position it is as though he moves the great ocean of calamities offering himself as a target to be smashed by waves from all directions without having a place of escape from it and without a deliverer—a state to which no intelligent person will dare to expose himself.

5. The achievement of position is based on the inclination of heart, and the inclination of the heart to the admission of the excellence of others is not achieved except by admitting his excellence which is an accidental matter, especially an accident which quickly disappears. It is for this reason that the original belief of man concerning the fact that somebody other than him is more excellent than him is non-existent. If, however, it materializes, it disappears soon. Now, since position depends on this view which is transient and since the essential is stronger than the accidental especially from the accident that passes away quickly, again, since it is supposed that man turns from the pleasure of position to the disgrace of rejection and absence of position, all that is derived from the world is extremely (Fol. 287a) sorrowful while the pleasure obtained from the feeling of position does not admit of this disgrace. It is therefore confirmed that the best thing is to give up seeking position.

287a

6. The pleasure of position means the advancing of the soul to the world of the sensibles and its preoccupation with the pleasures derived from the sensibles which prevent the soul from advancing to the world of things spiritual and from being occupied by the high pleasures.

You have already realized that there is hardly any harmony between the pleasures that flow from the spiritual world and the pleasures which are corporeal.

7. The pleasure of a hungry man is not a dominating external pleasure which would remove from the heart the desire of sensual pleasures. But the desire for the pleasure of position cannot find its way to fulfillment except by the giving up of sensual pleasures, in spite of the fact that all the time, he has been remembering them and making the soul interested in them. Now, this man, though blessed by the feeling of the pleasure of position, feels wretched by losing the pleasure of appetite. Thus he has lost the good and the appetite as though he possesses no pleasure at all. As for the pleasure excited by advancing to the world of the spirituals, it is a strong, dominating sense of pleasure with which there remains no sense of a corporeal body, not to speak of any inclination towards any interest in it. Now, the intellectual pleasures are pure and unmixed with any pain, whereas the pleasure of position is mixed with the pain of losing appetite. The first is, therefore, better (than the other).

8. If the possessor of position thinks that he dominates the hearts of the people, the fact is that he is wrong, as he has to serve, in reality, all creatures and take care of them. For, when your heart inclines to the fact that the people of the world should believe in you firmly and you should rule over them, you will be afraid to do anything that might cause any one of them to go out of your control instead of obeying you, or turn away from you

and all those who are engaged in your service. This necessarily demands that you must constantly look into their condition, and continuously search their agreeable and disagreeable aims and objects so much so that you are constantly aware of their intentions. You, thus, become a slave in charge of everyone of the disciples. If you are informed that a particular disciple from among them has rejected his belief in you and has withdrawn his allegiance from you, your heart would surely feel pain and your thought would be confused.

It is therefore confirmed that he who makes himself the leader of a group is, in fact, like a pure slave to everyone of them and feels no pleasure except in brooding over them and feels no sorrow except when they turn away from him. As for those who perform *bay'at* (take the oath of allegiance) every one of them is surely in the care of one man. The *murīd* is thus not but a slave of one man. As for the *murād* (the leader), he is the slave of every one of the disciples. Similarly, the possessor of position designs to capture hearts while he has, in reality, reached the extreme limit of slavery.

9. The possessor of position is not free from either of the two possibilities.

Either (1) in decorating himself for the people and in finding ways to attract their hearts to himself, or (2) in removing things which would diminish the impression of grace on him.

When you have known this, we say: The ways that necessitate the love of position are nothing but ways of expressing what is believed by the people as an excellence. The affairs which are believed by people as excellences differ in cities, times, temperaments, kinds and habits and have no fixed rule and no known regulation. Since the matter is like this, the ways which

necessarily cause the decay of the position are also uncertain and unrecorded. The possessor of position is then engaged in his thought in arranging that which has no arrangement in bringing into being and causing non-existence.

This urges him to stop thinking, arrest the soul and incur distress, all of which prevent him from all sorts of good actions relating to this world and the other world. He thus remains throughout his life engaged in finding ways and means which he knows as absurd and far from truth, passing his life (constantly) in the fear that somebody would remove the veil which conceals them and would disclose his shame and disgrace. It is known that this is a calamity which is not superseded by any other calamity (Fol. 287 b), nor is there any trouble greater than this. 287b

10. All those who derive great pleasure through position their pain is greater and more unbearable, when they remain deprived of position and when it is lost. Since these feelings meet a kind of loss, they contradict each other and disappear. Hence, it is necessary to remain in the original condition. This is thus the hint towards the practical treatment.

NOTES

1. Cf. Al-Iḥyā', III. p. 280:

وقد بينا أن ذلك (كمال القدرة على الأشخاص و القلوب
أي حب الجاه) إن صفا و سلم فاخره الموت فليس هو من
الباقيات المصالحات، بل لو سجد لك كل من على بسط الأرض
من المشرق الى المغرب فالى خمسين سنة لا يبقى الساجد ولا
المسجود له،

CHAPTER XII

PRACTICAL TREATMENTS ARE OF SEVERAL KINDS

1. By committing certain permissible actions¹ a man incurs blame so much so that he falls in the estimation of the people, his pleasure of receiving (the desired object) vanishes and he chooses to remain obscure. This is the method of the group of the people known as *Malāmatīyāh* (those who intentionally appear in a bad and undesirable appearance just to be condemned by the people). But some of them even proceed to do apparently immoral actions in order to be looked down upon by the people, and thus, they escape the troubles which come from the attainment of worldly position.

Imam Ghazzālī says: There are, however, certain conditions for incurring condemnation of the people:

Firstly, this is not allowed to one who is followed by the people, because the displaying of undesirable deeds would weaken faith in the hearts of the Muslims.

Secondly, he is also not allowed to² undertake clearly prohibited objects for the same reason. Yes, he can be permitted to do such permissible things which would bring him down from his position in the eyes of the people.

It is related that a certain king intended to see a certain ascetic who knowing that the king was near him hastened to his food that was with him and started taking it voraciously in big morsels, laughing before the table and clapping his hands. When the king saw the ascetic

in this condition, he fell in his estimation and the king retired (without seeing him). The ascetic thereupon uttered, "Thank Allah Who turned you from me!"

The practical treatment of a man who intends to be cured of this disease is possible either (1) in the place where he became well-known for position and high rank, or (2) in a place where they did not know him for his position and high rank.

The first kind of treatment is only possible through two ways: (1) by removing that which creates position for him, or (2) by creating that which removes it.

As for the first, we say: There is no doubt that what urges a man to attain position is nothing but the desire to manifest one's excellence. Whoever intends to treat this disease must stop manifesting those excellences through which position is achieved. If it does not achieve the purpose other means considered to be contraries of excellences should obviously be adopted. This is because the immediate contrary removes the preceding contrary.

You must know that just as it is possible to manifest that which is no excellence in such a way that it is apparently considered as an excellence, it is equally possible to manifest something which is in itself excellent in a way that it is apparently considered as mean. For, whoever eats a good deal of food with explicit greed, laughing and clapping, at times refusing and running like children and mad people, with the intention of getting rid of the love of position and purifying the heart for the sake of Allah, the Exalted, these actions are in reality great excellences, though they are considered as vicious. Similarly, whenever a man concentrates persistently on prayers, and fastings with the intention of capturing the hearts of the people, these actions are in reality vicious

deeds though they are considered as virtues. The second kind of treatment, that is, to remove position at a place where he is not known for his worldly position, can be resorted to in one way: that is, he should undertake journey to a country where people do not know him, nor are they aware of his conditions. Then, he mixes himself with the masses without doing anything which would distinguish him from the commonalty and would indicate his excellence. When he does it he escapes the troubles of the position entirely.

It is said that when the Emperor Kaykhusro ruled over his kingdom, his soul inclined earnestly to the Divine World and he realized that it was not possible to have both the worldly kingdom and the nearness of the Divine World. He, therefore, abandoned his kingdom and journeyed to a place which nobody knew him and engaged himself with Allah. This is the method in this respect.

NOTES

1. These treatments have been apparently taken from the Iḥyā'. The author has referred to Imām Ghazzālī and has explained that some kinds of treatment are not permissible. Cf. al-Iḥyā', III. p. 281:

واما من حيث العمل فاسقاط الجاه عن قلوب الخلق بمباشرة افعال يلام عليها حتى يسقط من اعين الخلق وتفاقره لذة القبول، و يأنس بالخمول ويرد الخلق ويقنع بالقبول من الخالق، وهذا هو مذهب الملامية اذا قتحموا الفواحش في صورتها ليسقطوا انفسهم من اعين الناس فيسلموا من آفة الجاه وهذا غير جائز لمن يقتدى به فانه يوهن الدين في قلوب المسلمين.

2. Ibid.:

واما الذين لا يقتدى به فلا يجوز له ان يقدم على مظهر لاجل ذلك بل له ان يفعل من المباحات ما يسقط قدره عند الناس كما روى ان بعض الملوك قصد بعض الزهاد، فلما علم بقربه منه استدعى طعاما و اخذ يأكل بشره و يعظم اللقمة، فلما نظر اليه الملك سقط من عينه وانصرف، فقال الزاهد الحمد لله الذي صرفك عني،

CHAPTER XIII

(Fol. 288a)

EXPLANATION OF THE CURE OF DISLIKING SATIRE

You must know that the actions of the most people depend upon what satisfies them in their expectation of praise and fear of condemnation. It can be treated in more than one way:

(1)

The attribute for which a man is praised either exists or does not exist. If it exists it would either necessitate praise in reality or not. If it exists and necessitates praise, it is necessary that happiness is not caused by this praise for a number of reasons.

(a) *Firstly*, this is a reward of Allah, the Exalted, which necessitates gratitude. What is manifest is that man does not stand to thank Allah as he ought to do. Having been conscious of his inability to thank Allah for His blessing, the man feels necessarily prevented from the happiness that it confers as he fears that the consequences are not persistent, hence the blessing may disappear. The fear of its disappearance does necessarily prevent him from feeling happy with its achievement.

(b) *Secondly*, feeling happy with the praise of the panegyrist makes you indifferent to the remembrance of Allah, the Exalted. Now, if the achievement of the attribute necessitates happiness, the attainment of all that resists the remembrance of Allah causes sorrow. The happiness that causes sorrow leads to its non-existence.

(c) *Thirdly*, that which is effective in achieving the excellence is the generosity of Allah, the Exalted, particularly in favouring you with this bounty.

As for the expression of the praiser, it is a true statement of achievement, and it depends upon the praiser. Now, that which affects an object is stronger than the effect which is useful for him, but it does not affect this condition by its presence or absence. It, therefore, follows that man's absorption into the knowledge that Allah, the Exalted, has particularly favoured him with this bulky endowment, keeps him indifferent to the happiness caused by the praise.

But if there arises no awareness in the heart that it is a reward of Allah, his sorrow arising from this indifference will necessarily be stronger than the happiness caused by the achievement of the reward.

(d) *Fourthly*, the praiseworthy quality is achieved without mentioning any bounty of Allah, the Exalted, displayed by subjects because it is free from all that necessitates self-admiration, pride, boasting and their achievement along with that which necessitates those evil manners which are dangerous. There is no doubt that the bounty which is achieved free from all calamities is dearer than and preferable to their achievement while afflicted with destructive calamities. Thus it is necessary that praise is not desired.

(e) *Fifthly*, human awareness of achieving this excellence while it is free from the praise of the praisers necessarily results in the attraction of the heart to the bounty of Allah and His conferring bounties on man, while his awareness of achieving excellence as related to the praise of the praisers necessarily turns the heart away from God and fixes his attention on God's creatures.

- I. The first is undoubtedly the most preferable.
- II. As for the second kind, when a person is praised

for an attribute possessed by him—an attribute which in reality does not necessitate praise but it is one of those which create the impression that it necessitates praise for strength, noble breed and lineage. The treatment (of the disease) is to ponder over the proofs which lead to the conclusion that they do not cause praise. They are, on the contrary, whims and are, in short, absurd ideas which only aggravate ignorance, emphasize deceit and pride, pile up misdeeds, and cause remoteness from Allah.

III. As for the third kind, when a man is praised for a quality which is not in him, his feeling happy and pleased with this praise is extreme madness. It is, for example, just like one who is praised for prayer, abstinence from the world, occupation with the service of Allah, the Exalted, in spite of the fact that he knows inwardly in his heart that he is devoid of these actions, and that he only displayed these virtues apparently not in obedience to Allah but for obtaining wealth and position. This is a case of cheating, and concealing the fact.

(2)

The Second Treatment of the love of praise is that if the praise is false, since praise is either false or true, then the speaker is liable (Fol. 288 b) to be punished for falsehood and the listener to it who is pleased with it also necessarily incurs punishment for his being pleased with disobedience. If, however, the praise is true, then the speaker who has uttered it has only done so for an immediate evil motive. The listener is sure to have the feeling of pride and boasting which would decrease the reward of his obedience in the next world. That which causes necessarily a kind of pride as well as an excellence free from pride are dearer to intelligent people than the excellence mixed with pride.

(3)

The Third Treatment. Some people though mostly praised are in many cases criticized. Now, if there appears a witty allusion to a man to urge him to feel happy with praise, he confronts many an allusion to cause him pain and feel distressed on account of the criticism. Now, the particular man who has done this has tried in upsetting the well-being of the world for himself on account of abundance of sorrows felt when criticized by the people; he has also tried to upset the well-being of the next world because one who inquires into the conditions of the people is barred from Truth.

The Treatment of Disliking Satire

Whoever condemns you² is either truthful in what he has said or intends to admonish you, or has said the truth with the intention of doing harm, or has lied. If he is truthful, and his intention is to admonish you, then it is not necessary for anybody to condemn him or to be enraged with him, nor should one cherish malice against him. On the contrary, this should be considered as an endowment from him to you. For, whoever guides you to your defects has awakened you from the slumber of ignorance and warned you against a calamity that you may escape. If he is truthful but intends to do you harm, then, in reality you are to derive benefit from him and his expression, since you were made aware of yourself if you were ignorant, or he reminded you of some defect if you forgot it, or he pointed out its vicious character before your eyes if you considered it good. All these are means for your blessing from which you can derive benefit. You should therefore seek those factors which cause blessing and remove those which bring calamity and misery. He has, in fact, prepared for you a way through your listening to his criticism. Don't you see that if you are warned by somebody of your dress

being filthy, and you are asked to clean your dress at the time when you intend to enter upon a king with your cloth carrying some filth on it, you should feel pleased, since this warning is a great opportunity for you?

Similarly, all bad manners³ are destructive, and man does not know them perfectly. Sometimes, he only knows from the expression of his enemies which he should take as a blessing in disguise. But if the enemy intends⁴ to do harm, it is a perfidy displayed by his filthy soul and is, in fact, a blessing from him conferred on you. Why should you then feel displeased with an action which is useful in your case and harmful in the case of the enemy?

As for the Third Kind: it is an allegation fabricated against you about something from which you are considered free⁵ by Allah. You must not dislike it and must not engage yourself in condemning it. On the contrary, you ponder over the following three factors:

(1) If you are free from that particular defect, you are not free from all other defects. You should, therefore, be thankful to Allah, the Exalted, for the fact that He did not make your enemy aware of your other defects which you possess and has kept him occupied with the one from which you are free.

(2) On hearing the allegation one necessarily feels too much indignant to mix with people. Whoever turns away from people inclines to the service of the people inevitably, as man cannot remain without being engaged in some occupation. He has been created active. Hence, the condemnation takes you away from the people and leads you to God whereas praise leads you away from God to the people. How great is the difference!

(3) The soul of the critic has been vitiated by the vice

of falsehood in spite of the fact that Allah has purified you of it. Your gratitude and happiness for this safety should, therefore, make you indifferent to the sorrow caused by the condemnation.

(4) If you believe that the action has been performed by the critic alone, you are guilty of associating him with the power of Allah. You should realize that it is by the Decree and Decision of Allah and that it is absurd, or it is caused by the critic, who is weak and therefore deserves to be excused.

(5) Just as the critic has afflicted your heart with sorrow leading your heart away from the creatures to God, he has, as if, destroyed (Fol. 289a) your world and has built your hereafter. As for the critic himself, he has destroyed⁶ his own hereafter by this expression. It is, therefore, your duty by way of generosity and nobility to try to build his hereafter. This is why the Prophet, peace be upon him, said, "O my Lord! show my people right guidance, as they know naught." 829a

(6) You should keep your heart away from the property of the people and their profits and gains. Having done this you will not mind whether they condemn you or commend you. For, what is expected from their praise is just to receive benefit from them while there is no harm in their condemnation of you, except that their favours will be cut off from you. Now that your heart has no hope of their favours, it is the same to you whether they praise or criticize you.

(7) You should have your soul overcome by the feeling of greatness and to believe about yourself that you are too high to be proud of the commendation of the praisers or touched by the condemnation of the critics, or you will believe that a praiser or a critic follows the track of beasts. When the matter is like this his word

will hardly have any effect or fruit. We have already mentioned a method for its treatment.

(8) If the criticism is true the sin is to be borne by the person who is condemned, since he has acquired a quality which necessitates condemnation. If it is false the criticism is apparently for the person condemned but in fact it condemns the critic himself, since his proceeding with falsehood itself indicates that he has acquired evil morals such as the habit of falsehood, backbiting, impurity of soul and creating doubts in the hearts (of the people).

(9) If the condemnation is true it amounts to the propagation of evil, which is a proof of the badness of the critic's heart and the impurity of soul.

It is therefore necessary for the person condemned to express his gratitude and thanks to Allah for protecting him from this quality. If the condemnation is false it means indifference to the greatness of Allah's commands and to showing affection to the creatures of Allah. Hence, it is necessary for the person condemned to be happy on this, that Allah has saved him from this and made him indifferent to the sorrow caused by the condemnation.

(10) The person who condemns attempts to inflict sorrow on the heart of the person condemned. In case the sorrow is felt, the object of the enemy is gained, and in case it is not felt, his endeavour goes waste and his attempt fails. This indicates that the person condemned does not hold him in high estimation at all and considers him of the stock of animals and inanimate beings. He should not therefore feel aggrieved on hearing the condemnation, so that his enemy may not reach his goal and object.

NOTES

1. Cf. al-Iḥyā', p. 282:

وإن كانت الصفة التي مدحت بها أنت خال عنها فحرك بالمدح غاية الجنون، ومثالك مثال من يهزأ به إنسان ويقول سبحان الله ما أكثر العطر الذي في أحشائه وما أطيب الروائح التي تفوح منه إذا قضى حاجته، وهو يعلم ما تشتمل عليه أمتعاه من الاقدار والأتان ثم يفرح بذلك فكذلك إذا اتنوا عليك بالصلاح والورع ففرحت به والله مطلع على خباثات باطنك وغوائل سريرتك واقدار صفاتك كان ذلك من غاية الجهل، فإن المادح إن صدق فليكن فرك بصفتك التي هي من فضل الله عليك، وإن كذب فينبغي أن يغمك ذلك ولا تفرح به —

2. Ibid:

أن من ذمك لا يخلو من ثلاثة أحوال: إما أن يكون قد صدق فيما قال وقصد به النصيح والشفقة، وإما أن يكون صادقاً ولكن قصده الايذاء والتعنت، وإما أن يكون كاذباً، فإن كان صادقاً وقصده النصيح فلا ينبغي أن تذهمه وتغضب عليه وتحقد بسببه بل ينبغي أن تتقصد منه، فإن من أهدى إليك عيوبك فقد أرشدك إلى المهلك، حتى تنقيه فينبغي أن تفرح به وتشتغل بإزالة الصفة المذمومة عن نفسك أن قدرت عليها فإما اغتمامك بسببه وكراهتك له وذمك إياه فإنه غاية الجهل، وإن كان قصده التعنت فانت قد انتفعت بقوله إذ أرشدك إلى عيبك أن كنت جاهلاً به أو ذكرك عيبك أن كنت غافلاً عنه أو قبحه في عينك لينبعث حرصك على إزالته أن كنت قد استحسنته، وكل ذلك أسباب سعادتك وقد استفدت منه، فاشتغل بطلب السعادة، فقد أتيج لك أسبابها بسبب ما سمعته من المذمة فمهما قصدت الدخول على ملك و ثوبك ملوث بالعدرة وانت لا تدري، ولو دخلت عليه كذلك لخفت أن يمز رقبك لتلويثك مجلسه بالعدرة، فقال لك قائل: إياها الملوث بالعدرة طهر نفسك، فينبغي أن تفرح به لأن تنبهك بقوله غنية،

3. Ibid:

وجميع مساوي الأخلاق مهلكة في الآخرة، والإنسان إنما يعرفها من قول أعدائه فينبغي أن تغتنمها،

4. Ibid:

و اما قصد العدو التعنت فجناية منه على دين نفسه و هو
تعمّة منه عليك ، فلم تغضب عليه بقول انتفعت به انت و
تضرر هو به —

5. Ibid:

الحالة الثالثة : ان يفترى عليك بما انت برى منه عند
الله تعالى فينبغي ان لا تكره ذلك و لا تشتغل بذمه بل تتفكر في
ثلاثة امور: احدها انك ان خلوت من ذلك العيب فلا تخلو عن
امثاله و اشباهه ، وما ستره الله من عيبك اكثر فاشكر الله
تعالى اذ لم يطلعك على عيوبك و دفعه عنك بذكر ما انت
برى عنه —

6. Cf. al-Ihyā', III. p. 283:

ان المسكين قد جنى على دينه حتى سقط من عين الله و
هلك نفسه بافترائه و تعرض لعقابه الاليم ، فلا ينبغي ان
تغضب عليه مع غضب الله عليه فتشمت به الشيطان و تقول
اللهم اهلكه . بل ينبغي ان تقول اللهم اصلحه ، اللهم تب
عليه ، اللهم ارحمه ، كما قال صلى الله عليه وسلم اللهم
اغفر لقومى ، اللهم اهد قومى فانهم لا يعلمون ، قاله صلى الله
عليه وسلم لما ضربته قومه — راجع البيهقى في دلائل النبوة .

< CHAPTER XIV >

ON THE EXPLANATION THAT PEOPLE DIFFER IN BEHAVING
WITH RESPECT TO PRAISE AND CONDEMNATION¹

People have four modes of behaviour in relation to
one who condemns and one who commends :²

The First mode of behaviour is to feel happy with
praise and praise the praiser, and feel aggrieved with
condemnation and condemn the person who con-
demns. This is the case with most of the people and this
is the basest of all ranks.³

The Second behaviour is not to feel pleased with
praise and to control one's tongue and parts of one's
body so as not to retaliate against it, and to feel aggrieved
by condemnation, but to hold one's tongue in order not
to retaliate against it. This is also a case of loss but in
relation to what precedes, it is a perfection.⁴

The Third mode of behaviour is to meet praise and
condemnation equally,⁵ neither to feel aggrieved on
condemnation nor to feel pleased with praise. Some
people think that this is the case with them, but it is neces-
sary that one should examine oneself. The sign of the
reality of this state is that he does not feel in himself
heaviness for the person who condemns when the latter
prolongs his stay with him more than what he feels in
the case of the praiser. Similarly, he does not feel in
himself more pleasure and happiness in meeting the
needs of the praiser than what he feels in meeting the
needs of the person who condemns. Nor should the

dissociation of the condemning person be easier for him than that of the praising one.

If it is said, how can praise and condemnation be equal to him when praise demands that the praiser should show respect to the state of the person praised which is an obedience,⁶ and condemnation demands that the condemning agent proceeds to harm his Muslim brother (Fol. 289b) which is a sinful disobedience?

We answer: It is certain that if the person who is condemned thinks over the matter, he will know that there are people who commit great sins more than the sin committed by the condemning agent in condemning the person condemned. Such being the case, his nature will not feel scared away from them. And also, the praiser⁷ who praises him continues incessantly to condemn others notwithstanding the fact that he does not feel disgusted with him, as he feels scared away from his praise. Condemnation in so far as it is disobedience does not differ whether it is in respect of him or the condemned or anybody else. It is, thus, confirmed that the condemned person only feels enraged in obedience to his own selfish interests and not in obedience to his Lord. But the Satan makes him think that it is a part of faith and that Allah has made him from among those concerning whom He has said: "Say, Shall We inform you who will be the greatest losers by their works? Those whose effort goeth astray in the life of the world, and yet they reckon that they do good work".⁸

The Fourth mode of behaviour is to dislike praise⁹ and like condemnation knowing that praise will drag him from the Light of the Grace of Allah the True, to the darkness of the sphere of the created, and condemnation guides him to his defects and takes him from the darkness of the sphere of the created to the Lights of the realm of Truth. These are the ranks which have been

mentioned by Shaikh Ghazzālī. I have, in this concern, a Fifth behaviour, I mean, he remains totally free from praise and condemnation, neither does he like them nor dislike them, nor does his heart turn to them. This is the rank of those Truthful who dive deep into the Light of the Grace of Allah the Exalted. In his heart there is no place for anybody other than Allah. He who does not conceive of a thing cannot possibly like or abhor it.

Again, the Shaikh has said: The lowest rank is the first rank, next is the second which is weak. The reason is that if man stops showing respect to a praiser and disgrace to one who condemns, it is inevitable that he stimulates the praiser by indicating that his heart has a great inclination to him and his love for him is deep.

Explanation of Impressions of Praise

Love and hatred are conditions which are liable to excess and weakness. Hence, people are of different positions in this respect.

The First Position is to have great love for praise¹⁰ and panegyric so much so that he thinks that it is nearly a form of worship, and does not care if he commits forbidden things. There is no limit for its making impression on the hearts of the people and making their tongues utter the praise.

The Second Position is to seek praise not by dissimulation and committing unlawful deeds but by doing permitted deeds. This is on the edge of the dreadful stream, since the limits of the speech contained in hearts cannot be comprehended. So, it is almost sure to fall into that which is not lawful for seeking praise and is akin to those who are going to perish.

The Third (impression) is that he does not want praise,¹¹ nor does he endeavour to seek it. But when he is praised, happiness does encompass his heart. If he

does not treat this state by making effort (Mujāhadah) it is likely that due to excessive happiness he may be pulled back to the preceding position.

The Fourth is that he does not at heart feel happy on hearing praise. One who possesses this state is sure always to realize the calamities when he feels at heart pleased, so that he may not fall back into the rank that precedes the present one.

The Fifth is that he dislikes praise¹² when he hears it. But this dislike does not end in abhorring the praiser and disapproving of him.

The Sixth is to dislike¹³ (the praiser), to be angry with and to condemn him while he is truthful. But his heart loves the praiser except that he intends to express his sincerity and truthfulness which is derived from him. Hence, contrary to this, the states differ in relation to a person who condemns and to one who praises. Its first rank is to express anger and its last rank is to express happiness.

NOTES

1. Cf. al-Ihyā', III. p. 284:

بيان اختلاف احوال الناس في المدح والذم —

2. Ibid.:

لنفس اربعة احوال بالاضافة الى الذام والمادح :

3. Ibid.:

الحالة الاولى ان يفرح بالمدح ويشكر المادح ويغضب من الذم ويحقد على الذام ويكافئه او يحب مكافأته وهذا حال اكثر الخلق وهو غاية درجات المعصية في هذا الباب ..

4. Ibid.:

الحالة الثانية ان يمتنع في الباطن على الذام ولكن يمسك لسانه وجوارحه عن مكافأته و يفرح باطنه ويرتاح للمادح ولكن يحفظ ظاهره عن اظهار السرور وهذا من النقصان الا انه بالاضافة الى ما قبله كمال —

5. Ibid.:

الحالة الثالثة وهي اول درجات الكمال ان يستوى عنده ذامه ومادحه. فلا تغمه المذمة ولا تسره المدحة ، وهذا قد يظنه بعض العباد بنفسه ويكون مغرورا ان لم يمتحن نفسه بعلامات ، وعلاماته ان لا يجد في نفسه استقالا للذام عند تطويله الجلوس عنده اكثر مما يجده في المادح وان لا يجد في نفسه زيادة هزة ونشاط في قضاء حوائج المادح فوق ما يجده في قضاء حاجة الذام وان لا يكون انقطاع الذام عن مجلسه اهون عليه من انقطاع المادح ،

6. Ibid.:

واكثر العباد فرحهم بمدح الناس لهم مستبطن في قلوبهم وهم لا يشعرون ، حيث لا يمتحنون انفسهم بهذه العلامات وربما شعر العابد يميل قلبه الى المادح دون الذام ، والشيطان يحسن له ذلك ، ويقول الذام قد عصي الله بمذمتك ، والمادح قد اطاع الله بمدحك فكيف تستوى بينهما؟ وانما استتقالك للذام من الدين المحض ، وهذا محض التلبس ، فان العابد لو تفكر علم ان في الناس من ارتكب كبائر المعاصي اكثر مما ارتكب الذام في مذمته ، ثم انه لا يستثقلهم ولا ينفر عنهم ،

7. Cf. al-Ihyā', III. p. 284:

ويعلم ان المادح الذي مدح لا يخلو عن مذمته غيره ولا يجد في نفسه نفرة عنه بمذمة غيره كما يجد لمذمة نفسه ، والمذمة من حيث انها معصية لا تختلف بأن يكون هو المذموم او غيره ، فاذن العابد المغرور لنفسه يغضب ولهواه يمتنع ،

ثم ان الشيطان يخيل اليه انه من الدين حتى يعتل على الله بهواه فيزيده ذلك بعدا من الله ، و من لم يطلع على مكاييد الشيطان و آفات النفوس فاكثر عباداته تعب ضائع يفوت عليه الدنيا ويخسر في الآخرة و فيهم قال الله تعالى — قل هل ننبئكم بالآخسرين اعمالا الذين ضل سعيهم في الحياة الدنيا و هم يحسبون انهم يحسنون صنعا .

8. Sūrah al-Kahf: 103, 104.

9. Cf. al-Iḥyā', III. p. 284:

الحالة الرابعة و هي الصدق في العبادة ان يكره المدح و يمت المادح اذ يعلم انه فتنه عليه قاصمة للظهر مضرة له في الدين و يجب الظام اذ يعلم انه مهد اليه عيبه و مرشد له الى مهبه و مهد اليه حسناته ، فقد قال صلى الله عليه و سلم "رأس التواضع ان تكره ان تذكر بالبر و التقوى"

10. Cf. al-Iḥyā', III. p. 285:

ان من الناس من يتمنى المدحة و الثناء و انتشار الصيت فيتوصل الى نيل ذلك بكل ما يمكن حتى يرائي بالعبادات و لا يبالي بمفارقة المحظورات لاستمالة قلوب الناس و استنطاق السننهم بالمدح و هذا من الهالكين و منهم من يريد ذلك و يطلبه بالمباحات و لا يطلبه بالعبادات و لا يباشر المحظورات و هذا على شفا جرف هار فان حدود الكلام الذي يستعمل به القلوب و حدود الاعمال لا يمكنه ان يضبطها فيوشك ان يقع فيما لا يحل لنيل الحمد فهو قريب من الهالكين —

11. Ibid.:

و منهم من لا يريد المدحة و لا يسعى لطلبها ولكن اذا مدح سبق السرور الى قلبه فان لم يقابل ذلك بالمجاهدة و لم يتكلف الكراهية فهو قريب من ان يستجره فرط السرور الى الرتبة التي قبلها —

12. Cf. al-Iḥyā', III. p. 285:

و منهم من يكره المدح اذا سمعه و لكن لا ينتهي به الى ان يغضب على المادح و يتكر عليه —

13. Ibid.:

واقصى درجاته ان يكره و يغضب و يظهر الغضب و هو صادق فيه ، لا ان يظهر الغضب و قلبه يحب له فان ذلك عين النفاق لانه يريد ان يظهر من نفسه الاخلاص و الصدق و هو مفلس عنه ، و كذلك بالضد من هذا تفاوت الاحوال في حتى الظام و اول درجاته اظهار الغضب اخرها اظهار الفرح —

< CHAPTER XV >

DISCOURSE ON HYPOCRISY AND ITS LAWS

The word (روية) (Riyā) is derived from (رأى) (Ruyat), to see and سمعه¹ (Sum'ah) from سماع, to hear. It is defined as to manifest a behaviour² out of the behaviours which are believed by the people who are present on the spot as excellent behaviours for the reason that they should believe that he is adorned with this (Fol. 290a) excellent behaviour while he is in fact devoid of the particular excellent character.

290a

You should know that this happens sometimes in worldly affairs and sometimes in the affairs that relate to the Dīn, religion (the other world).

The First case is that of a man who behaves in a manner to impress upon the people that he is a wealthy man, while, in fact, he is not wealthy. His purpose in doing so is to induce the belief that he is a rich man among those people who hold that worldly wealth is an excellence.

The second case is like the one who commits certain actions which indicate his abstinence from the world and devotion to Allah, to induce people to believe that he is a hermit whereas, in reality, he is not. Now, the definition which we have mentioned is an extreme hypocrisy concerning the affairs of the next world, religion, and this world. But the second kind is usually known which is hypocrisy concerning religious affairs. As for hypocrisy concerning the worldly affairs, it is called "seeking position and high life."

Having realized this we say: (In hypocrisy) there must be three pillars: The first is called al-Murā'i (the showy), he who commits actions with the intention of rendering something ambiguous. (2) The second is those against whom ambiguity is made current. They are "al-murā'i lahum", for whom the show is executed: (3) the third is "al-murā'ai bihi" (that through which the show is displayed)—it is the actions and conditions by which the show of rendering something ambiguous is made usually effective among the people.

Having realized this we say: "al-Murā'a bihi", the means of hypocrisy, are many and can be compressed in five kinds: (1) the physical body, (2) the dress and appearance, (3) expression, (4) action, and (5) external things.

Just as the religious people make a show-off through these five means, the people of the world also make a show-off through these means except that the attitude of showing off differs with the different people.

Now, the first kind of hypocrisy, which is in respect of the body,⁴ is to pretend that one is emaciated and become pale in order to let people believe that he endeavours his best in his religious life, feels greatly distressed on matters relating to the faith, and is overwhelmed by grief in matters relating to the next world. By emaciation he wants them to believe that he takes little food, and by turning pale he lets them think that he keeps awake whole night. Similarly, dishevelled hair shows that he is deeply concerned with the religious affairs and has little or no time to comb his hair.

When these conditions appear, people are led to believe in the cases just mentioned. Almost similar is the case with lowering the voice, keeping the eyes down and himself thin in order to indicate that he keeps fasting and has great respect for the Faith.

The Second kind is hypocrisy in appearance and dress.⁵ As for appearance, he keeps the head cast down in walking in order to indicate his deep thinking; similar is the case with keeping the mark of prostration constantly on the forehead.

As for the dress, (he wears) coarse clothes, woollen garments, and wears scanty of clothes, having long skirts, narrow sleeves, neglecting all care for clothes taking no notice of burning or tearing and patching. All this he displays in order to give the people an indication through them that he follows the Sunnah and the path of the devoted worshippers, the virtuous from among the ancient saints who express their need to Allah. Had this ignorant man put on lofty sort of garments lawfully with the intention that he is not charged with hypocrisy and grandeur it would have been surely better for him. To this category belongs putting on patched clothes, performing prayer on a special Sajjādah, and putting on blue clothes which are used by the Sufis while he is devoid of the realities of Taṣawwuf (mystical achievement) inwardly.

There is another group⁶ which intends to appear like the virtuous people in clothes and figure not allowing itself to wear base clothes. They want to unite the two kinds together and look for thin woollen, lofty looking dresses and coloured, tattered clothes to wear them but the value of their clothes is as the value of the dresses of the rich and even more. This is by way of pomp and show.

As for the hypocrisy⁷ of the people of this world, they dress in delicate fine clothes, and ride on costly horses decorated with golden implements and gilded weapons in order to indicate abundance of their wealth and, thus, attain an additional position and wealth.

The Third kind is to make a show-off in speech⁸

290b either for the people of the Faith by mentioning (Fol. 290b) admonitions and narrating sayings of the Prophet, the companions and their followers, or by mentioning the arguments used by famous teachers and jurists, the object being to silence the opponents in the presence of the people which would indicate his vast knowledge of sciences, and by moving lips with the remembrance of Allah in the presence of the people and by ordering to do what is good and to refrain from the undesirable, expressing anger in respect of disapproved acts. All this is done just to indicate his power of abstinence.

As for the people of the world, their means of show⁹ are verses, proverbs, parables, witty sayings and anecdotes causing laughter in order to indicate the delicacy of their nature and the abundance of their information on different arts.

The Fourth kind of hypocrisy is to make a show-off in action¹⁰ like the hypocrisy displayed by a *muṣalli* in prolonging *qiyām*, standing, *sujūd*, prostration, *ruk'ū* (bending) and lowering head and similarly by the pretension of fasting, eating a little, going for pilgrimage and sacred war, and by slow walking, avoiding quarrels, lowering eyes and slow-proceeding; but when he finds himself alone he returns to his original nature with all possible haste.

As for the people of the world,¹¹ their showy behaviour is coquetry, walking with pride, movement of hands and walking in close steps in order to indicate position and pomp.

The Fifth kind: showy actions displayed by keeping company,¹² like the one who wants to visit the chiefs, the vaziers, and the associates of the king, so that it is said about him that the particular person visited him just to induce the rest of the people to visit him on account of his excellence, pomp and power. Similar is the

category of those who very often meet saints and undertake journey so that it may be said that he has achieved sciences and benefits. He is, therefore, visited by the people.

As for the people of the world, their showy actions find expression in serving great rulers, and undertaking the enterprises of the king.

This is the collection¹³ of all that by which the hypocrites make a show off. All of them want by it position and place in the hearts of the people.

Explanation of the Ranks of Hypocrites in Hypocrisy

The First Rank is to enjoy the respect and honour of the people through their good faith in him. Many a hermit¹⁴ retires to his temple for many years. Many an ascetic and a worshipper only display zuhd and 'ibādat by retiring into a monastery, or a cave on the top of a hill for a long period, their pleasure and life being to establish their position and having name and fame among the people. If, however, there occurs in the mind of the ascetic the idea that the people do not have that faith in him he would surely die of grief.

The Second Rank is that he should not remain content¹⁵ with their faith and wants that the people should speak of his qualities and shower on him praise and encomium in a good manner and spread his fame all over the towns to induce the people to visit him.

The Third Rank is to find through hypocrisy a means¹⁶ to acquire forbidden things, collect articles, pollute the wealth of orphans, endowments of the needy or the ailing persons. This is the worst of the groups of hypocrites.

You should know that Shaikh Ghazzālī has mentioned this kind with detail. He explains that some

cases of hypocrisy are lawful and some unlawful.

Then, when he starts giving details, he explains that seeking worldly position is sometimes permissible and sometimes forbidden.¹⁷ To me, this is to be realized in more than one way:

1. The grades of seeking position have already been mentioned in the chapter on the Position. So, it is of no use to repeat the same here.

2. Hypocrisy is one thing and seeking position is something different. This is because we have explained that hypocrisy includes the cases of keeping up false appearances,¹⁸ concealment and trying to induce the people to believe in something which in reality does not exist. This is totally forbidden, because to keep up false appearances and to lead astray are both totally forbidden. It is, therefore, established that hypocrisy does not necessarily follow from disregarding the position by way of keeping up false appearances which is wholly forbidden.

The treatment of hypocrisy is either by knowledge or by action. That is, the man should realize what great harms are caused by hypocrisy in religion and in the world.

As for the harm in religion, it is caused in a number of ways:

Firstly, the action is only committed wherever it is done to show respect to Allah. When man acts it and claims (Fol. 291a) that he intends to please Allah the Exalted, in spite of the fact that the intention is not in his heart and he has only committed it for beings other than Allah.¹⁹ This indicates a number of great sins. (1) For example, this indicates that "the other" is of greater significance in his heart than Allah or else he would not have transmitted the right of Allah to someone else. This indicates that the man is ignorant in all respects.

Secondly, had he sincerely obeyed Allah he would have praised Allah to the full extent and he would not have displayed it with hypocrisy. By praising a certain sultan he was led to praise the basest of Allah's creatures. This is nothing but sheer ignorance and stupidity.

Thirdly, when he claims in his words that he has done this form of obedience for the sake of Allah, while he had only done it for some one other than Allah, he is like a person who mocks at Allah.²⁰ It may be explained by a parable *viz.* that a man stands before a king all day long as is the habit of servants. The reason of his standing over there was to look at a certain girl out of the girls or at a particular slave of the king. This is to mock at the king.

Fourthly, this is just like behaving lightly with Allah,²¹ the Exalted, since whoever is present before the greatest of all kings in power, dominance, grace and excellence and presents to Him some of his applications while his heart was not attached to the discourse with the king, his heart was rather attached to a slave, the meanest of all those who were present. This indicates his bad opinion regarding the king and his treating him lightly. The same situation is here. This leads to the conclusion that he believes about the king that he is a liar in his claim of being powerful and generous. It is for these reasons that the Prophet, (peace be on him) said that "hypocrisy is the highest form of polytheism".²²

NOTES

1. Cf. al-Ihyā', III. p. 290:
اعلم ان الرياء مشتق من الروية والسمعة مشتقة من السماع ،
2. Ibid.:
اما الرياء اصله طلب المنزلة في قلوب الناس بايرائهم خصال الخير إلا ان العجاة والمنزلة تطلب في القلب بأعمال سوى العبادات وتطلب بالعبادات ، واسم الرياء مخصوص بحكم العادة بطلب المنزلة في القلوب بالعبادات و اظهارها —
3. Ibid.:
و المرامى به كثير وجميعه خمسة اقسام ، وهي مجامع ما يتزين به العبد للناس و هو البدن والزى والقول والعمل والاتباع والاشياء الخارجة ، وكذلك اهل الدنيا يرامون بهذه الاسباب الخمسة.
4. Cf. al-Ihyā', III. p. 290:
[القسم الاول — الرياء في الدين بالبدن] وذلك باظهار النحول والصغار ليوهم بذلك شدة الاجتهاد وعظم الحزن على امر الدين وغلبة خوف الآخرة ، وليلد بالنحول على قلة الاكل وبالصغار على سهر الليل وكثرة الاجتهاد وعظم الحزن على الدين ، وكذلك يرانى بتشعيت الشعر ليلد به على استغراق الهم بالدين وعدم التفرغ لتسريح الشعر ، وهذه الاسباب سهما ظهرت استدلل الناس بها على هذه الامور ، فارتاحت النفس لمعرفتهم ولذلك تدعوه النفس الى اظهارها لنيل تلك الراحة ، ويقرب من هذا خفض الصوت و اغارة العينين وذبول الشفتين ليستدل بذلك على أنه مواظب على الصوم وان وقار الشرع هو الذى خفض من صوته .
5. Ibid.:
[الثاني : الرياء بالهيئة والزى] اما الهيئة فتشعيت شعر الرأس وخلق الشارب ، واطراق الراس في المشى ... وابقاء اثر السجود على الوجه وغلظ الثياب ولبس الصوف وتشميرها الى قريب من الساق وتقصير الاكمام وترك تنظيف الثوب وتركه مخرقا ، كل ذلك يرانى به ليظهر من نفسه انه متبع للسنة و مقتد فيه بعباد الله الصالحين ومن ذلك لبس المرقعة والصلاة على السجادة ولبس الثياب الزرق تشبها بالصوفية مع الانفلاس من حقائق التصوف في الباطن —

6. Ibid.:
وطبقة اخرى يطلبون القبول عند اهل الصلاح وعند اهل الدنيا من الملوك والوزراء والتجار ولو لبسوا الثياب الفاخرة ، وهم القراء ولو لبسوا الثياب المعققة البذلة اذرتهم اعين الملوك والاعنياء ، فهم يريدون الجمع بين قبول اهل الدين و الدنيا فلذلك يطلبون الاصواف الدقيقة والاكسية الرقيقة والمرقعات المصبوغة والقوط الرقيقة فيلبسونها ولعل قيمة ثوب احد الاعنياء ،
7. Cf. al-Ihyā', III. p. 291:
واما اهل الدنيا فمرا آتهم بالثياب النفيسة والمراكب الرقيقة وانواع التوسع والتجمل الخ
8. Ibid.:
[الثالث : الرياء بالقول] و رياء اهل الدين بالوعظ والتذكير والنطق بالحكمة وحفظ الاخبار والاثار لاجل الاستعمال في المحاورة و اظهاراً لغزارة العلم ودلالة على شدة العناية باحوال السلف الصالحين وتحريك الشفتين بالذكر في محضر الناس و الامر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر بمشهد الخلق و اظهار الغضب للمنكرات ... لاظهار الفضل فيه والمجادلة على تصد افعام الخصم ليظهر للناس قوته في علم الدين الخ ،
9. Ibid.:
واما اهل الدنيا فمرا آتهم بالقول بحفظ الاشعار والامثال والتفاسيح في العبارات الخ —
10. Ibid.:
[الرابع : الرياء بالعمل] كمرا آة المصلى بطول القيام ومد الظهر وطول السجود والركوع واطراق الرأس ... وكذلك بالصوم والغزو والحج ... فان غاب الرجل عاد الى عجلته .
11. Ibid.:
واما اهل الدنيا فمرا آتهم بالتبخر والاختيال وتحريك اليدين وتقرب الخطا ... ليدلوا بذلك على العجاة والحشمة .
12. Ibid.:
[الخامس . المرأة بالاصحاب والزائرين والمخالطين]
كالذى يتكلف ان يستزير عالما من العلماء ليقال ان فلانا قد

زار فلانا أو عابدا من العباد ليقال إن أهل الدين يتبركون بزيارته و يترددون إليه أو ملكا من الملوك أو عاملا من عمال السلطان ليقال إنهم يتبركون به لعظم رتبته في الدين، وكذلك يكثر ذكر الشيوخ ليرى أنه لقي شيوعا كثيرة واستفاد منهم—

13. Ibid.:

فهذه مجامع ما يرائى به المراءون و كلهم يطلبون بذلك الجاه و المنزلة في قلوب العباد.

14. Ibid.:

ومنهم من يقنع بحسن الاعتقادات فيه، فكم من راهب انزوى الى ديرة سنين كثيرة او كم من عابد اعتزل الى قلة جبل مدة مديدة و انما خيأته من حيث علمه بقيام جاهه في قلوب الخلق، ولو عرف انهم نسبوه الى جريمة في ديره او صومعته لتشوش قلبه، ولم يقنع بعلم الله ببراءة ساحته بل يشتد لذلك عمه،

15. Ibid.:

ومن المرائين من لا يقنع بقيام منزلته بل يلتصق مع ذلك اطلاق الاسان بالثناء والحمد ومنهم من يريد انتشار الصيت في البلاد لتكثر الرحلة اليه —

16. Ibid.:

ومنهم من يقصد التوصل (الصحيح التوصل) بذلك الى جمع حطام و كسب مال ولو من الاوقاف و اموال اليتامى وغير ذلك من الحرام، و هؤلاء شرطقات المرائين —

17. Ibid. (p. 278):

و كذلك الجاه و المال وقد يجب كل واحد منهما على هذين الوجهين فحسبهما لاجل التوصل بها الى مهمات البدن غير مذموم و حسبهما لاعيانهما فيما يجاوز ضرورة البدن و حاجته مذموم، و لكنه لا يوصف صاحبه بالفسق و العصيان ما لم يعمله الحب على مباشرة معصيته و ما يتوصل به الى اكتساب بكدب و خداع و ارتكاب محظور، و ما لم يتوصل الى اكتسابه بعبادة فان التوصل الى الجاه و المال بالعبادة جناية على الهين و هو حرام،

18. Cf. al-Ihyā', III. p. 293:

و المعنى فيه (في الرياء) امران احدهما يتعلق بالعباد و هو التلبس و المكروانه خيل اليهم انه مخلص مطيع لله، و انه

من أهل الدنيا يريد من ذلك، و التلبس في امر الدنيا حرام ايضا حتى لو كان من جماعة و خيل للناس انه متبرع عليهم ليعتقدوا انه مخلص و لما فيه من التلبس و مكروا القلوب بالخداع و المكروا

19. Ibid.:

ولو لم يكن في الرياء الا انه يسجد ويركع لغير الله لكان فيه كبر و ان لم يقصد التقرب الى الله فقد قصد غير الله و عظم غير الله بالسجود لكفر كفرا جليا، الا ان الرياء في الخفى لأن المرأى عظم في قلبه الناس فاقضت تلك الشهادة ان يسجد ويركع، فكان الناس هم المعظمون في قلبه من وجه، و مهما زال قصد تعظيم الله بالسجود، و بقيت الشهادة ان كان ذلك قريبا من الشرك...

20. Both the statement and the example were taken from the Ihyā', III. p. 293:

... فاما قصد بعبادة الله تعالى خلق الله فهو مستهزى بالملك قال قتادة: اذا رأى العبد قال الله لملائكته انه يفتخر به كيف يستهزى بي، ومثاله ان يتمثل بين يدي ملك من الملوك طول النهار كما جرت عادة الخدم و انما وقوفه في حفاطة جارية من جوارى الملك او غلام من غلمانة فان هذا مستهزى بالملك، اذ لم يقصد التقرب الى الملك بخدمة بل يقصد بذلك عبدا من عبيده فأي استحقاق يزيد على ان يكون العبد بطاعة الله تعالى مراة عبد ضعيف لا يملك له ضرا ولا نفعا...

21. In fact, the fourth kind is related to the third. Imam Rāzī has used two expressions 'istihzā' and 'istihzā' to give an idea of diversity between the two. Cf. Ihyā', III. p. 293:

و على الله الا لا أنه يظن ان ذلك العبد اقدر على تحصيل اغراضه من الله اذ اولى بالتقرب اليه من الله اذا أثره على ملك الملوك لطلبه مقصود عبادته و اى استهزاء يزيد على رفع العبد عن رتبة العبد، فهذا من كبائر الملكات: و لهذا سماه رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم الشرك الاصغر،

22. The ḥadīth contains *الاصغر* in place of *الاكبر* Imām Aḥmad has recorded this ḥadīth on the authority of Maḥmūd ibn Labīd, and al-Ṭabarānī has narrated the same from Maḥmūd ibn Labīd on the authority of Rāfi' ibn Khadij as follows:

ان اخوف ما اخاف عليكم الشرك الاصغر

Al-Ḥākim has recorded this ḥadīth as a part of the ḥadīth of Shaddād ibn Aws and has declared its *isnād* (the chain of narrators) as genuine: His words are:

كنا نعد على عهد رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم ان الرباء
الشرك الاصغر -

< CHAPTER XVI >

THE EXPLANATION OF CONCEALED HYPOCRISY

You must know that the three Divisions, I mean, whether (1) the aim of reward is not at all considered in committing an act, or (2) it is considered in a secondary sense, or (3) on an equal basis, these three are called concealed hypocrisy.

As for the fourth Division, that in case the purpose of reward¹ is considered with a preferable consideration, it also gains sometimes the purpose of hypocrisy and is therefore called concealed hypocrisy. It can only be recognised by signs.

Among these signs is to feel pleasure in the heart if the people are informed of his worshipful deed. This is because pleasure is a psychological state which is obtained at the time when the object is achieved. If it is not so that when he committed these acts, he expected that others would have the information thereof otherwise he would not have felt happy on getting the information. It is necessary to treat this failing. If it is not treated it would grow firm. If it grows firm the motive which is hypocrisy would change from the state of being affected into the state of equality and from that of being equal into the state of preference.

The second sign is to display the act on the basis of his being excessively habitual with it² such as: maciation, pale colour, low voice, dishevelled hair, frequent weeping

and feeling severely sleepy which all indicate the manifestation of severe boldness.

The third sign is to give up all these affairs. But he considers that people⁴ like to greet him with Salaam, and feel blessed in his presence, and shake hands with him, offer him gifts and declare him as leader and forego to demand their money if he bought something.

They narrate it on the authority of 'Ali b. Abū Ṭālib, (Allah may adorn his face with grace)! that he said,⁵ 'Allah, the Exalted, will say on the day of Resurrection, "is it not that prices were made cheap for you? Did they not begin with salutation? Were your needs not fulfilled? Go away, surely you got your full wages."

You must know that the entire purpose of worship, and forms of obedience, is to keep the soul away from the world of the sensuous things and to cause it turn to the world of spiritual beings so that the man at the time of his death separates himself from the disagreeable to the agreeable. But one who displays virtuous deeds from the motive of hypocrisy has accomplished his attachment to the world of the sensuous things and has gone to the furthest limit in running away from the world of the spiritual beings. Therefore, at the time of death he changes (Fol. 291b) from the agreeable to the disagreeable, from the pleasant to the painful. Thus, there happens a great catastrophe.

You must know that whenever a man is aware of the difference between a man and animal, as far as knowledge of his worship is concerned, his endeavour is caused by hypocrisy.⁶ Since he gives up his hope from the animals, he does not care for the presence of animals. Had he been sincere and contented with the knowledge of Allah he would have surely not turned to others to know of his activity. In case a little of difference occurs, hypocrisy

is sure to appear.

If you say, 'Is it intelligible that he feels happy when others learn of his performing prayer in spite of his being sincere'? We shall answer, 'This is possible in a few cases.'

1. One feels pleased with sincerity when the case is considered from the point of view that Allah informs⁷ the people of his good action and conceals from them his vicious deeds. All this is based on Allah's taking care of him. In this case if he feels happy, this will be considered surely as a case of pure sincerity which is meant by the expression of Allah, "Say, in the bounty of Allah and in His mercy: therein let them rejoice".⁸

2. The thought prevails on him that when Allah has brought into open his good deeds and concealed his evil deeds in the world, it is obvious that He will do him a similar favour in the next world, as is indicated by the expression of the Prophet:⁹ "Allah has not concealed anything for his own slave in this world but shall conceal the same for him in the next world.

3. When his idea is predominantly this that those who will see his good actions will very much like to follow him,¹⁰ then their learning of his virtuous deeds will cause a multiplication of good deeds. Then, his feeling happy on the information of others of his good deeds is pure sincerity and worshipfulness.

4. The criticisms¹¹ against his performing obedience due to the fact that they have considered him great and submitted to him indicate that they are interested in religion and piety. If he feels pleased with their good faith in the religion and the grandeur of Sharī'ah, this is due to his pure belief. But if he feels happy on their getting information of his acts of obedience just to utilize it for deriving worldly gains from them, this is, then, the condemned hypocrisy.¹²

NOTES

1. The aim of expecting reward is the dominating factor which urges one to perform some modes of worship; and this is indicated by the behaviour of the agent himself. Imām Ghazzālī has explained the same in the following words, vide. *Ihyā'*, III. p. 297:

وعلم انه لو لا رجا الثواب لكان لا يصلى لمجرد رياء الضيفان ، واخفى من ذلك ما لا يؤثر في العمل ولا بالتسهيل والتخفيف ايضا ولكنه مع ذلك مستبطن في القلب ومهما لم يؤثر في الدعاء الى العمل لم يكن ان يعرف الا بالعلامات .

2. Cf. *al-Ihyā'*, III. p. 297:

و أجلى علاماته ان يسر باطلاع الناس على طاعته قرب عبد يخلص في عمله ولا يعتقد الرياء بل يكرهه ويرده ويتم العمل كذلك ولكن اذا اطلع عليه الناس سره ذلك وارتاح له . . . وهذا السرور يدل على رياء خفى منه يروى السرور .

3. This is the second indication as explained by Imām Rāzī. This point is also derived from the *Ihyā'*, III. p. 297:

وقد يخفى (الرياء) فلا يدعوا الى الاظهار بالنطق تعريضا وتصريحا ولكن بالشماثل كظهور النحول والصغار وخفض الصوت ويبس الشفتين وجفاف الريق وآثار الدموع وغلبة النعاس الدال على طول التهجد .

4. Ibid.:

واخفى من ذلك ان يخفى بحيث لا يريد الاطلاع ولا يسر بظهور طاعته ولكنه مع ذلك اذا رأى الناس احب ان يبدوه بالسلام وان يقابلوه بالبشاشة والتوقير وان يثنوا عليه وان ينشطوا في قضاء حوائجه وان يسامحوه في البيع والشراء وان يوسعوا له في المكان . . .

5. Cf. *Ihyā'*, III. p. 298:

وقد روى عن علي كرم الله وجهه انه قال : ان الله عز وجل يقول للقراء يوم القيامة ألم يكن يرخس عليكم السعر؟ ألم تكونوا تبتدون بالسلام؟ ألم تكونوا تقضى لكم الحوائج؟ وفي الحديث "لا اجر لكم ، قد استوفيت اجرورهم" . . .

6. Ibid.:

ومهما ادرك من نفسه تفرقة بين ان يطلع على عبادته انسان او بهيمة ففيه شعبة من الرياء فانه لما قطع طمعه عن البهائم لم يبال حضره البهائم او الصبيان الرضع أم غابوا ،

اطلعوا على حركته ام لم يطلعوا ، فلو كان مخلصا قانعا بعلم الله لاستحقر عقلا العباد كما استحقر صبيانهم ومجانينهم . . .

7. All the four kinds of "the praiseworthy happiness" enjoyed by the agent who is declared as free from 'show' (riya') are apparently derived from the *Ihyā'*, p. 298:

"ان يكون قصده اخفاء الطاعة والاخلاص لله تعالى ولكن لما اطلع عليه الخلق علم ان الله اطلعهم و اظهر الجميل من احواله فيستدل به على حسن صنع الله به ونظره اليه و إطفائه به فانه يستر الطاعة والمعصية ، ثم الله يستر عليه المعصية ويظهر الطاعة ولا لطف اعظم من ستر القبيح و اظهار الجميل فيكون فرحه بحمیل نظر الله له لا بحمد الناس و قيام المنزل في قلوبهم وقد قال الله تعالى : "قل بفضل الله وبرحمته فبذلك فليفرحوا — فكانه ظهر له انه عند الله مقبول فرح به ."

8. *Sūrah al-Yūnus*: 58.

9. Cf. *al-Ihyā'*, III. p. 299:

الثاني ان يستدل باظهار الله الجميل وستره القبيح عليه في الدنيا انه كذلك يفعل في الآخرة اذ قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم "ما ستر الله على عبد ذنبا في الدنيا الا ستره عليه في الآخرة ،

The ḥadīth has been recorded by Imām Muslim as a part of the ḥadīth narrated on the authority of Abū Hurayrah.

10. Ibid.:

الثالث اذ يظن رغبة المطلقين على الاقتداء به في الطاعة فيتضاعف بذلك اجره فيكون له اجر العلانية بما أظهر آخرها و أجر السري بما قصده أولا ، ومن اقتدى به في طاعة فله مثل اجر اعمال المتقين به .

11. Ibid.:

.... من اهل الايمان من يرى اهل الطاعة فيمته و يحسده او يذمه و يهزأ به او ينسبه الى الرياء ولا يحسده عليه ، فهذا فرح بحسن ايمان عباد الله و علامة الاخلاص في هذا النوع ان يكون فرحه بحمدهم غيره مثل فرحه بحمدهم اياه .

12. Ibid.:

واما المذموم وهو الخامس فهو ان يكون فرحه لقيام منزلته في قلوب الناس حتى يمدحوه و يعظموه و يقوموا بقضاء حوائجه و يقابلوه بالاكرام في مصادره و موارده فهذا مكروه .

(CHAPTER XVII)

ON THE EXPLANATION OF THE CONCEALED AND MANIFEST HYPOCRISY, WHICH NULLIFIES THE DEED AND WHICH DOES NOT.¹

Hypocrisy appears either after the entire action has been performed with sincerity, or in the course of the action which is begun with sincerity. Or, hypocrisy appears after the action attains perfection which is in two ways:

1. After finishing the action with sincerity it^a so happens that the agent comes to know that a certain king has learnt of his proceeding with the action and feels pleased in his heart, the worshipper of Allah grows happy on learning that a ruler knows of his worshipfulness. In this case it is expected from Allah, the Exalted, that He will not nullify the reward of his action, as his knowledge is adorned from eternity with sincerity and the pleasure that has occurred has not appeared by his volition. It is, therefore, necessarily liable to be forgiven. But the appearance of this state indicates that the man is not sincere and truthful. For, had it been so, he would not surely have turned to informing anybody other than Allah of his obedience after realising that Allah has already seen his condition.

2. When a slave (of Allah) finishes³ his work with sincerity, informs the people of it and makes a display of his acts for them, this hypocrisy destroys the reward of his past deeds, according to some authorities.

They argue with what has been narrated that a man said, "Could I, Messenger of Allah! keep fast for the whole of my life?" He said, 'Neither would you keep fast nor would you break it (for the whole of life)'.⁴

It has been narrated on the authority of Ibn Mas'ūd that he heard a man saying, "Last evening I read the Sūra al-Baqarah". He (Ibn Mas'ūd) said, "This (information) degraded him in the eyes of Allah".⁵

Some of them have held that the agent will be rewarded for his preceding sincerity, and will be punished⁶ for this later hypocrisy. Allah, the Blessed, passes His judgement concerning him with justice in consideration of the good and the distinction between what is an addition and what is defective. They explain away the Ḥadīth by saying that the warning is perhaps an indication to his dislike of the fasting for the whole of life (Fol. 292a) perpetually.

292a

The Second kind includes the following cases: That a man begins his worship with sincerity, then there appears the motive of hypocrisy⁷ in the course of action by an accident according to which it is either mere happiness which does not affect his acts, or a pretension which induces him to act; in case, it induces him to act it either impinges on the results of the action or the root of the action. Thus, this division⁸ contains three kinds:

The First kind is that the accident is nothing but mere happiness which is the basest of its grades. For, Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī says: This pleasure surely nullifies⁹ the action, since when happiness is caused to his heart by the fact that the people have been informed of his piety and worshipfulness, this pleasure induces him to undertake to act. When the pleasure urges him to act it is impossible that the first intention of doing it for the sake of Allah, the Exalted, would induce him to act,

since a single impression cannot be caused by two independent agents and the one in action is better to remove the other than the reverse. Thus the reward of this action is something which resembles the reward of Allah and thus it is necessary that he should feel pleased.

Those who hold that the pleasure under reference will not nullify the reward cite as a proof what has been narrated that a man said, "O the Messenger of Allah! Surely I conceal my action and do not like that anybody should get information of it. But when anyone gets the information of it, it pleases me". The Holy Prophet said, "O my Allah! Thou hast surely two rewards—the reward of secrecy and the reward of divulgence."¹¹ Again, since this additional pleasure does not result in action, it indicates that it is weak and not preferable in relation to the intention of sincerity, and what is not preferred is characterised with non-existence.

But this view has been controverted in three ways¹².

(1) It may be that the pleasure is only felt after finishing the action; (2) it may be that the pleasure is only felt because he believes that others would follow him by the indication that he would be rewarded if some others display the action by way of following him. Nobody from the Ummah has ever expressed (in so many words) that the pleasure caused by the praise of the people is a reward. The utmost result of the praise is that he may be forgiven. (3) The Ḥadīth under reference is weak in the chain of narrators.

The Second kind which affects the modality of the action but not the root of the action is like the case of a person who begins his prayer because he is impressed by the greatness of Allah, the Exalted, feels pleased on realising the presence of a group of people who arrive there in the course of his prayer. Thus, he is induced

by this pleasure to display increased devotion and adoration to Allah which he would now have displayed if they would not have arrived. Hence, here in this case, there is a motive of hypocrisy which affects the mood of the action with additional devotion and attachment.

To cite an example, take the case¹⁴ of a person who begins a supererogatory prayer (*namāz*). In the course of the prayer a certain accident occurs. Now, he desires to look into the matter. But for the presence of some people he would have surely cut short his prayer. But, since some people have arrived there, he completes his prayer fearing they would condemn him (if he cuts short the prayer). Here, there is a case of hypocrisy which affects the root of the action.

You must know that those who happen to be in the first rank, realize that the second is more apt to be absurd and the third is most apt to be absurd.

Then, here there is another delicate matter, *viz.*, the modes of worship are of two kinds: Some are such an independent form of worship by themselves that any other part does not require to be added to them to show their genuineness, such as the recitation from the *Qur'ān*, as the recitation of each and every letter and sentence is a mode of worship. Some modes of worship are not so, some parts of them depend upon the correctness of some other parts, such as *Ṣalāt*, *Ṣawm*, *Hajj*, as when a part thereof suffers from some defect the whole of it is declared defective, and when a part is found correct the rest is declared correct and the whole is regarded as perfect and genuine.

On realizing this it is clear to you that the danger of an accident leading to hypocrisy in the course of forms of worship of the Second Kind is greater and severer than the appearance of such an accident in the

course of the first kind.

As for the Third Kind in which the motive of hypocrisy appears in the primary stage¹⁵ of the worship, it is of two kinds: Either (1) this occurs in the *ṣalāt* and its *niyyat* (intention) and continues with the motive of hypocrisy till he finishes the prayers. There is no disagreement (Fol. 292b) in the fact that he completes the prayer but is not considered to be worship even though he performs *ṣalāt*. Or (2) he repents in the course of the prayer. In this case, there are two opinions: according to one opinion his *ṣalāt* is not as all valid, while no other intention is found in the case. It follows necessarily that his prayer is not at all genuine, at all the actions which he committed after the *ṣalāt* were not consummated and went in vain. The second opinion is that the modes of worship are only judged on the basis of how they end. When the end is attained with sincerity it is considered correct and genuine. The best thing is to say that if this action was caused from the very beginning by mere hypocrisy without the feeling of sincerity, the action would not be confirmed as worship and whatever action followed it would not be correct. As an example, consider the case of a man who does not perform *ṣalāt* nor does he fast when he is alone.¹⁶ But when he finds people he starts praying. Now, this prayer is without *niyyat* (intention). For, the *niyyat* means to intend to do something as a mode of worship to exalt Allah, the Exalted, and this concept is not present here.

If the motive of hypocrisy is found together with the motive of Faith and the latter¹⁷ gets preference, it will have to be considered while "the preferred" in relation to "the preferable" will be non-existent. If both motives happen to be equal and commensurate both of them will fall. And that which is preferred

will obviously fall.

A Problem: When a man enjoys some sort of faith in an action of hypocrisy, which is a calamity of this world and the next world, takes the trouble of expressing his dislike for hypocrisy at heart, and continuously conceals his good deeds and brings to light his misdeeds and this is the best way of treating hypocrisy—but with all this—he finds his heart inclined to hypocrisy, liking it in spite of the fact that he abhors his liking for it. Now, will he be counted in the group of the hypocrites or among those who are truthful?

Al-Ghazzālī (Allah's peace be upon him) says:¹⁸ "Allah does not place a burden on His slave but to the extent to which he possesses strength. We have already seen that the best way to treat hypocrisy is to compare one's belief, condition and action with their contraries. When a slave displays this, he performs all that is in his power, and anything which is outside it, is not in his power. It is, thus, necessary that he should not be blamed for it.

An argument has been advanced against this in what has been narrated that the companions of the Prophet complained to him and said:¹⁹ "Our hearts sometimes entertain thoughts which cannot be expressed. It is better that we should fall down from the heaven and be snatched away by a bird and thrown into a remote place by the wind, than that we should speak to anyone about these thoughts. The Holy Prophet said, 'this is the clear faith.'" (Imam) al-Ghazzālī says, "They did not find but a whim and evil thought and dislike. It cannot be said that "Explicit faith" means "inner evil thought"; there remains, now, nothing but dislike which is equivalent to an "inner evil thought".

Having established this we say : hypocrisy,²⁰

though greatly disliked, removes the smaller harm. The best thing with what is achieved is that all that is desired by the soul is true if the soul dislikes it. But if the soul is pleased with it or inclines to it, then it is surely from the Satan and the (evil) soul.

You must know that this problem gives rise to another problem. That is, when the Satan is unable²¹ to induce a man to display hypocrisy he lets him think that the righteousness of his heart lies in waging war against the Satan. By this method the Satan finds a means to create a doubt concerning the clarity of the heart. Again, to be engaged in fighting with the devil is to be kept away from the pleasures caused by things which are permitted by Allah, the Exalted.

You must know that the people in this place have grades: (1) to be engaged in fighting with the devil and in resisting him; (2) to be content with declaring that the Satan is a liar and not to engage oneself in quarrelling with him; (3) not to engage oneself even in declaring that the Satan is a liar but to continue as usual to dislike hypocrisy without engaging himself in accusing him of falsehood or opposing him; (4) to be determined on this that whenever the devil opposes him regarding a condition out of the conditions of sincerity, he must intend to perform those actions which necessitate sincerity.

^{293a} Hārith al-Mūhāsibī has mentioned a parable²³ to explain all the four grades saying, "they are like four persons who intend to be benefited by attending the lecture of a learned man. A deviating innovator envies them on this and approaches one of them (Fol. 293a) asking him not to attend the lecture. But when he refuses, the innovator engages him in fighting. The man wants to refute his misleading nature and remains quarrelling with him till he misses "the sitting of knowledge". At this, the object of the deviator person

is fulfilled.

When the second man passes by him he prevents him and stops him. So, he (the second man) halts and rejects the prohibition of the deviator. But he does not engage himself in fighting. The deviator is, however, pleased with the duration of his halting there for defying him.

The third man also passes by him but does not pay any heed to him, nor does he engage himself in defying him or fighting with him. He, on the contrary, passes along making the deviator totally disappointed.

The fourth one also passes by without stopping there, rather hastens his steps.

It is likely that they return and pass by the deviator a second time, and all of them be approached by him excepting the last one whom he will not approach fearing that he will hasten his steps.

The Second kind: They have disagreed whether it is necessary to wait²⁴ for the Satan before he infuses a doubt or it is necessary for him to rely on Allah who Himself will protect him.

A group of people hold: The best thing is to give up the idea of waiting in an ambush. This is supported by more than one reason.

(a) Verily to wait in an ambush to defy the devil will necessitate indifference to the remembrance of Allah. It therefore means to fall into the trap of the Satan.

(b) To wait for the Satan is to rely on the soul, whereas to refer the matter to Allah is to rely on Truth. Whoever therefore waits for the Satan, in fact relies on his soul and has therefore fallen in the trap of the Satan.

(c) The Satan is a weak creature²⁵ who has no power over anything as has been expressed by Allah, the Exalted, in the language of the Satan himself: "And I had no power over you save that I called unto you and

you obeyed me".³⁰

As for Allah, the Exalted, He has the right of commanding and prohibiting. And to refer the matter to Allah is to take caution, since whoever relies on Allah his reliance is sufficient for him.

(d) It is not possible for a man to rely on Allah unless he is sure that Allah knows every object of knowledge and is powerful over all the objects of power, has a general Mercy, an encompassing Grace and Judgement (Decree) and that nobody has any power against His Power, nor has anybody any mercy with His Mercy. When a heart is enlightened with these objects of gnosis, the Satan does not find a way to him. These objects of knowledge become a means for achieving peace and safety from quarrelling with the Satan.

As for those who wait for the Satan to combat his infusing doubts, they need to adopt ways and means.

Another group of people holds that it is necessary to be cautious about Satan³¹ and argues by saying that absorption in gnosis and love does not save any one from the stings of the Satan, since prophets were greatest of all in esteemed knowledge and love but they were not free from the influence of Satan. Allah, the Exalted, has said: "Never sent We a messenger or a prophet before thee but when he recited (the message), Satan proposed (opposition) in respect of that which he recited thereof."³²

The Holy Prophet said, "verily the Satan is assisted against my heart",³³ in spite of the fact that his Satan had surrendered (or embraced Islam) and always commanded to do good.

Again, Allah, the Exalted, had explained to Adam and Eve that the Satan was different from them and was their enemy, in His expression: "O Adam! This is an enemy unto thee and unto thy wife, so let him not drive

you both out of the Garden so that thou come to toil."³⁰ Allah, the Exalted, only forbade³¹ a particular tree (for them). But with all these (forms of caution) both of them fell into the trap of Satan.

When this is the condition of prophets and friends of Allah what would be the condition of others? Moses said, "This is of the devil's doing."³² Joseph said, "...after Satan had made strife between me and my brethren".³³ Allah says: "O Children of Adam! Let not Satan seduce you as he caused your first parents to go forth from the Garden...."³⁴

The Qur'ān contains many verses in which man has been cautioned against Satan. How is it possible to pay no heed to these warnings?

Again, Allah, the Exalted, has ordered us to be cautious of the infidels and said, "and let them take their precaution and their arms".³⁵

He has also said, "Make ready for them all thou canst of (armed) force and of horses tethered."³⁶

Now that it is necessary for you to be cautious against the unbelieving enemy while you see him it is far more necessary to be careful of the enemy who sees you, while you do not see him.

They have replied to the first discourse and have said, "to be cautious against the Satan (Fol. 293b) means that one should constantly act upon the assignments of religion which leads to the belief in difficult activities so that nature may not get the upperhand. When the divine law becomes dear to one, consideration for the welfare of the people is entrusted to the Creator. This is the place of reality and engrossment in servitude. Don't you see we surely eat and drink and then rely on the Grace of Allah in achieving health and the curing of diseases? Similarly, we prepare to fight the unbelievers believing fully that success and assistance is only

from Allah. Likewise we are cautious about the Satan³⁷ and believe that Allah alone guides us aright or causes us to go astray. This is the view adopted by al-Hārith al-Mūhāsibī, and this is the view of those who are perfect, who unite the consideration of the laws of the Sharī'ah with that of the methods of mysticism.

When you have understood this problem we say that they have disagreed concerning the condition of the caution in three ways: Some people say,³⁸ when Allah has warned us against the enemy it is necessary that the recall of this caution must be most dominating over our hearts. Some others have held that this would keep the heart away from the remembrance of Allah, the Exalted, and keep it engaged entirely in fighting the Satan and his party which is just what Satan desires. One should, on the contrary, bring together the remembrance of Allah and the remembrance of the warning given against Satan.

Those who are well-versed say:³⁹ "Both the groups have committed mistakes. As for the first group, this is so because whoever isolates himself, concentrates on fighting the Satan and forgets everything else is sure to become indifferent to the remembrance of Allah, which is the real aim of the Satan. Again, the Satan cannot enter into the heart which contains the light of the remembrance of Allah, the Exalted. As soon as the heart becomes devoid of the light, the Satan overtakes it necessarily. Thus, complete isolation for fighting the Satan necessarily helps the Satan in dominating the heart.

The Second Group⁴⁰ has shared the views of the first group: Since when the remembrance of Allah, the exalted, and the remembrance of fighting with the Satan come together in the same heart, it remains deprived

of the remembrance of Allah to the extent to which it is engaged in remembering some one other than Allah. Now, righteousness is that the devotee determines in his heart to be the enemy of the Satan, and leaves this idea like a defeated object to the soul. Then, he undertakes entirely the remembrance of Allah and saves himself from being afflicted at heart by the matter of the Satan. Then again, if in this situation the idea of Satan passes through his mind, he takes caution of him. When he grows firm he engages himself in defying him. And to be engaged with the remembrance of Allah in this way will not prevent him from awakening. On the contrary, it is feared that he may fall asleep while having been afraid of missing an enterprise at the time of sunrise. Hence, it is necessary for him to be cautious. Often he wakes up in course of the night before the dawn appears, since his heart remains cautious although in sleep he is indifferent to this caution. How can his engagement with the remembrance of Allah prevent him from taking caution? This case has rather a different example, viz. there is a well⁴¹ containing impure water. Now, the owner of the well wants to purify the well by removing the impure water so that pure water may flow from it. Thus, whoever is engaged in the remembrance of Satan is like the person who has left impure water in the well, and whoever combines the remembrance of Allah and that of Satan is he who adopts measures to let the pure water flow but it is mixed with impure water.

The person who attains righteousness is he who takes out impure water entirely and gets hold of pure water, his case being like the one who is engaged in the remembrance of Allah. In short, there is no way to drive away the Satan except by remembering Allah, the Exalted, as He says: Lo! those who ward off (evil), when a glamour from the devil troubleth them, they

do but remember (Allah's guidance)".⁴²

"When the Satan is driven away only by keeping oneself engaged in the remembrance of Allah, it is necessary to continue this remembrance till safety and weapon grow strong for driving the Satan away. Whenever diversion from the remembrance of Allah is stronger the weapon is weaker and, on the contrary, when the remembrance of Allah increases the weapon of driving away the Satan grows stronger.

The first group holds that it is confirmed by these discourses that whenever the remembrance of Allah at heart is perfect, distinct and free of doubts, the power of defence is perfect. But the engagement in the remembrance of the Satan pollutes the purity of the remembrance. This necessitates the weakness of the weapon (Fol. 294a). All this necessitates the opposite of the desired object, and is contrary to the purpose.

Rather we say, "he whose knowledge of Allah is perfect his heart is strengthened and fortified. When the fortress is strong the Satan is unable to tamper with it or commit a theft. This is, therefore, the perfect method. And here they reach a dreadful object, i.e., to be engaged in external deeds means to be engaged in something other than Allah, which would necessitate the domination of the Satan over the heart. Whoever is subject to this must necessarily show indifference to Allah, the Exalted. This is a dreadful discourse which has a disliked depth leading to the appearance of dangers.

NOTES

1. The title is apparently borrowed from the *Ihyā'*, III, p. 299.

2. Cf. *al-Ihyā'*, III, p. 299:

فان ورد بعد الفراغ سرور مجرد بالظهور من غير اظهار
فهذا لا يفسد العمل اذ العمل قد تم على نعت الاخلاص سالما
عن الرياء فما يطرأ بعده فيرجو ان لا ينقطع عليه اثره لا
سيما اذا لم يتكلف هو اظهاره والتحدث به ولم يتمن اظهاره
وذكره ولكن اتفق ظهوره باظهار الله ولم يكن منه الا ما
دخل من السرور والارتياح على قلبه ،

3. Ibid.:

"نعم لو تم العمل على الاخلاص من غير عمد رياء و
لكن ظهرت له بعده رغبة في الاظهار فتحدث به واظهره
فهذا مخوف ، وفي الاثار والاخبار ما يدل على انه يحبط (كما
ذكر في المتن).

4. This has been only narrated in the third person and not in the second person as has been recorded in the text. Imam Rāzī seems to have copied it verbatim from the *Ihyā'*, p. 299. Imam Muslim has narrated on the authority of Abu Qatādah:

قال عمر "يا رسول الله كيف بمن يصوم الدهر؟" قال :
"لا صام ولا افطر"

and al-Tabarānī has recorded the *ḥadīth* of Asmā' bint Yazid which contains:

.. فقال رجل اني صائم قال بعض القوم انه لا يفطر .
انه يصوم كل يوم ، قال النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم لا صام
ولا افطر من صام الا بد .

5. This saying of Ibn Mas'ūd is also recorded in the *Ihyā'*, I, p. 299.

6. Cf. *al-Ihyā'*, III, p. 299:

.. بل الانبياء ان يقال انه مثاب على عمله الذي مضى
ومعاقب على مراآته بطاعة الله بعد الفراغ منها —

7. Ibid.:

.. ولكن ورد في اثنائها (اثناء العبادة) وارد الرياء فلا
يخلو إما ان يكون مجرد سرور لا يؤثر في العمل ، واما ان
يكون رياء باعنا على العمل وختم العبادة به حبط اجره .

8. The case that Riyā (show) induces a man to undertake a performance contains, according to Imām Rāzī, three alternatives: (1) to feel happy at the news that people are aware of his performance—a case in which Hārith al-Muḥāsibī states that if the happiness urges him to perform his religious duties, the performance will go in vain; (2) to improve the quality of the performance realizing in its course that he is watched; and (3) the show (riyā) affects the performance itself which is divided into two: either the show is found in the beginning and remains till the end of the performance—a case which is considered as null and void—or the show (riyā) vanishes at the end and the performance is completed with sincerity. There is a difference of opinion concerning the last case. Some scholars declare it absurd as Niyyat (intention) is not renewed. Others accept it as valid considering the end of the performance.

9. Cf. al-Iḥyā', III. p. 300:

ولقد ذهب الحارث المحاسبى رحمه الله تعالى الى الاحباط في امر هو اهون من هذا ، وقال اذا لم يرد الا مجرد السرور باطلاع الناس يعني سرورا هو كحب المنزلة والجاه قال قد اختلف الناس في هذا فصارت فرقة الى انه يحبط لان تقص العزم الاول ، وركن الى حمد المخلوقين ولم يحتم عمله بالاخلاص ، واما يتم العمل بخاتمته .

10. Cf. al-Iḥyā', III. p. 300:

ثم قال (الحارث) ولا اقطع عليه بالحبط وان لم يتزيد في العمل ولا آمن عليه وقد كنت أقف فيه لاختلاف الناس والاغلب على قلبي أنه يحبط اذا ختم عمله بالرياء..

11. This ḥadīth has been recorded by al-Bayhaqī in *Shu'ab al-Imān* narrating from Dhukwān on the authority of Ibn Mās'ūd. Tirmidhī and Ibn Hibbān have narrated as follows:

ذكوان عن ابى هريرة : الرجل يعمل العمل فيسره فاذا اطاع عليه أعجبه قال له أجر السر والعلائية قال الترمذى غريب وقال انه روى عن أبى صالح وهو ذكر انه مرسل .

12. Ibid.:

واما الحديث فتكلم عليه بكلام طويل يرجع حاصله الى ثلاثة اوجه احدها : انه يحتمل انه أراد ظهور عمله بعد الفراغ الثاني : أنه أراد ان يسره للاقتداء به او

لسرور آخر محمود.... بدليل انه جعل له به اجرا ، ولا ذاهب من الامة الى أن للسرور بالمحمدة اجرا وغايته ان يعنى عنه ، والثالث : انه قال أكثر من يروى الحديث يرويه غير متصل الى ابى هريرة بل أكثرهم يوقفه على أبى صالح ، ومنهم من يرفعه —

13. Ibid.:

واما اذا كان وارد الرياء بحيث لا يمنع من قصد الاتمام لاجل الثواب كما لو حضر جماعة في أثناء الصلاة ففرح بحضورهم وعقد الرياء وقصد تحسين الصلاة لاجل نظارهم ، وكان لو لا حضورهم لكان يتمها أيضا .

14. Cf. al-Iḥyā', III. pp. 299-300:

ومثاله ان يكون في تطوع فتجددت له نظارة او حضر ملك من الملوك ، وهو يشتهي أن ينظر اليه أو يذ تر شيئا نسيه من ماله وهو يريد أن يطلبه ، ولو لا الناس لقطع الصلاة فاستتمها خوفا من مذمة الناس فقد حبط أجره وعليه الاعادة —

15. See Supra Note No. 13.

16. Cf. al-Iḥyā', III. p. 301:

ان كان باعته مجرد الرياء في ابتداء العقد دون طلب الثواب و امتثال الامر لم ينعد افتتاحه ولم يصح ما بعده وذلك فيمن اذا خلا بنفسه لم يصل ولما رأى الناس تحرم بالصلاة —

17. Ibid.:

فاما اذا كان بحيث لولا الناس أيضا لكان يصلى الا أنه ظهر له الرغبة في المحمدة أيضا ، فاجتمع الباعثان (باعث الرياء وباعث الدين)... فان كان في صدقة فقد عصى باجابة باعث الرياء و اطاع باجابة باعث الثواب.

18. Cf. al-Iḥyā', III. p. 305:

فاعلم ان الله لم يكلف العباد الا ما تطيق.... فاذا فعل ذلك فهو الناية في اداء ما كلف به .

19. This ḥadīth has been recorded by Imam Muslim on the authority of Ibn Mas'ūd. Al-Nasa'i in his *al-Yawm wa'l-Laylah* and Ibn Hibbān in his *Ṣaḥīh* have also recorded. Al-Nasa'i has related this ḥadīth on the authority of Ḥaḍrat 'Āyishah.

20. Cf. al-Ihyā', III. p. 305 :

والرياء وإن كان عظيماً فهو دون الوسوسة في حق الله تعالى فإذا اندفع ضرر الأعظم بالكراهة فبان يندفع بها ضرر الأصغر أولاً ،

21. Ibid. p. 306:

ألا إن للشيطان ههنا مكيده و هي أنه إذا عجز عن حمله على قبول الرياء خيل إليه أن صلاح قلبه في الاشتغال بمجادلة الشيطان ومطاولته في الرد والجدال حتى يسلبه ثواب الاخلاص و حضور القلب ، لأن الاشتغال بمجادلة الشيطان ومدافعتة انصراف عن سر المناجاة مع الله فيوجب ذلك نقصاناً في منزلته عند الله —

22. Those who want to get rid of *riyā'*, show, by driving away all its feelings pass through four stages, as explained in the text. These stages may be studied with details in the Ihyā', III. p. 306.

23. Ibid.:

و ضرب الحارث المحاسبى رحمه الله لهذه الاربعة مثالاً أحسن فيه فقال : مثالمهم كأربعة قصدوا مجلساً من العلم و الحديث لينالوا به فائدة و فضلاً و هداية و رشداً فحسداهم على ذلك ضال مبتدع و خاف ان يعرفوا الحق فتقدم الى واحد فعنعه و صرفه عن ذلك و دعاه الى مجلس ضلال ، فأبى ، فلما عرف اباه شغله بالمجادلة فاشتغل معه ليرد ضلاله و هو يظن ان ذلك مصلحة له و هو غرض الضال ليفوت عليه بقدر تأخره فلما مرّ الثاني عليه نهاه و استوقفه فوقف فدفع في بحر الضال و لم يشتغل بالقتال ، و استعجل ففرح منه الضال بقدر توقفه للدفع فيه و مر به الثالث فلم يلتفت اليه و لم يشتغل بدفعه ولا بقتاله بل استمر على ما كان فخاب منه رجاءه بالكلية — فمر الرابع فلم يتوقف له و أراد أن يغيظه فزاد في عجلته و ترك التأنى في المشى فيوشك ان عادوا و مروا عليه سرّة اخرى ان يعاود الجميع الا هذا الاخير ، فانه لا يعاوده خيفة من ان يزداد فائدة باستعجاله .

24. Cf. al-Ihyā', III. p. 306:

فهل يجب التردد له (لشيطان) قبل حضوره للحذر منه انتظار الوروده ام يجب التوكل على الله ليكون هو الدافع له .

25. Ibid., p. 307:

و يعلم أن الشيطان ذليل مخلوق ليس له امر ولا يكون إلا ما أراد الله فهو الضار و النافع .

26. Sūrah Ibrāhīm: 22.

27. Cf. al-Ihyā', III. p. 307:

وقالت فرقة من اهل العلم لابد من الذر من الشيطان اذ الانبياء عليهم السلام لم يتخلصوا من وسواس الشيطان و نزغاته قال تعالى و ما ارسلنا من قبلك من رسول و لا نبي الا اذا تمنى القى الشيطان في أمنيه ، فينسخ الله ما يلقي الشيطان ثم يحكم الله آياته — وقال النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم : انه ليغان على قلبي مع ان شيطانه قد اسلم و لا يأمر الا بخير .

28. al-Hajj: 52.

29. Vide Chapt. I. Note No. 15.

30. Tāhā: 117.

31. Cf. al-Ihyā', III. p. 307:

ومع انه لم ينه الا عن شجرة واحدة و اطلق له وراء ذلك ما أراد فاذا لم يأمن نبي من الانبياء و هو في الجنة دار الأمن و السعادة من كيد الشيطان فكيف يجوز لغيره أن يأمن في دار الدنيا و هي منبع المحن و الفتن و معدن الملاذ و الشهوات المنهى عنها .

32. al-Qaṣaṣ: 15.

33. Yūsuf: 100.

34. al-A'rāf: 27.

35. al-Nisā': 102.

36. al-Anfāl: 60.

37. Cf. al-Ihyā', III. p. 307:

معنى التوكل لا يناقض امتثال التوكل مهما اعتقد القلب ان الضار و النافع و المحيى و المميت هو الله تعالى فكذلك يحذر الشيطان و يعتقد ان الهادى و المضل هو الله و هذا ما اختاره الحارث المحاسبى .

38. Cf. al-Ihyā', III. p. 308:

فقال قوم إن ذلك يؤدي الى خلو القلب عن ذكر الله و اشتغال الهم كله بالشيطان و ذلك مراد الشيطان منا بل

نشتغل بالعبادة وبذكر الله تعالى ولا ننسى الشيطان و
عداوته ، والحاجة الى الحذر منه فنجمع بين الأمرين --

39. Ibid.:

وقال العلماء المحققون غلط الفريقان : اما الاول فقد
تجرد لذكر الشيطان ونسى ذكر الله فلا يغني غلطه ، واما
أمرنا بالحذر من الشيطان كيلا يصدنا عن الذكر ... ثم
يؤدي ذلك الى خلو القلب عن نور ذكر الله تعالى فاذا قصد
الشيطان مثل هذا القلب وليس فيه نور ذكر الله تعالى ،

40. Ibid.:

اما الفرقة الثانية فقد شاركت الاولى اذ جمعت في القلب
بين ذكر الله والشيطان وبقدر ما يشتغل القلب بذكر الشيطان
ينقص من ذكر الله وقد امر الله الخلق بذكره ونسيان ما عداه
ابليس وغيره ، فالحق أن يلزم العبد قلبه الحذر من الشيطان
و يقرر على نفسه عداوته فاذا اعتقد ذلك وصدق به وسكن
الحذر فيشتغل بذكر الله .

41. Ibid.:

فمثال القلب مثال بئر اريد تطهيرها من الماء القذر
ليتنجر منها الماء الصافي فالمشتمل بذكر الشيطان قد ترك
فيها الماء القذر ، والذي جمع بين ذكر الشيطان وذكر الله
قد نزع الماء القذر من جانب .

42. al-A'raf: 201.

〈CHAPTER XVIII〉

EXPLANATION OF PERMISSION TO INTEND TO MANIFEST OBEDIENCE¹

You should know that in concealing good deeds there is the benefit of sincerity and safety from hypocrisy, and in expressing it the benefit of following the well-versed savants and inspiring the people with the explicit good. But this contains the mischief of hypocrisy² and for this reason, Allah, the Exalted, has eulogised both the concealment of good actions and their display and God says: "If ye publish your almsgiving, it is well, but if ye hide it and give it to the poor, it will be better for you."³

Now, display of actions⁴ is of two kinds: (1) The expression that concerns the action itself, and (2) the expression that concerns the narration of the action. So far as the first kind is concerned, i.e. to display the action itself, you must know that some actions cannot be concealed, such as Hajj (pilgrimage), Jihād (struggle for the right), and 'Umrah (paying a visit to the holy shrine of Ka'ba), and there are some actions which can be concealed, such as fasting, some forms of prayer and alms.

It is preferable⁵ to make haste in the case of the first and express a desire to perform it in order to encourage others as it is not possible to conceal it.

We, therefore, say, "if to give alms openly⁶ does harm to its recipient, but induces others to give alms,

the best thing is to give it secretly, as it is prohibited to do harm, whereas to inspire others with giving alms is merely desirable. To give up the prohibition is better than to do the desirable. In case the display of the action does not result in doing any harm, there are two opinions concerning this. Some say that secrecy is better than displaying the desirable, as in displaying it there is the danger of hypocrisy which is prohibited. To avoid the possible prohibition is better than to inspire others with what is desirable. Others say, the manifestation that necessarily asserts power is better than secrecy.

They have argued that Allah, the Exalted, has ordered the prophets to display their actions so as to be followed by others. It is not permissible to think about them that they considered the best action unlawful. The other argument is the expression of the Prophet⁷ (peace be upon him): whoever treads on a good path deserves its reward and the reward of those who will act according to it till the day of Resurrection." This is only possible in case the action is displayed.

The best thing is to say that if the likelihood of hypocrisy in the case of manifesting an action is greater, it is better to avoid displaying it, if the likelihood of people's following is greater than hypocrisy it is better to display the action. If the two possibilities are equal I feel that concealment is better than to incline to particularise the additional gain. When he, however, thinks strongly that the possibility of his being followed is preferable, it is the best thing to display it under the following conditions:

1. It is sufficient to achieve it. For, a being followed is considered only in general, and it is not necessary that he should be followed by all. Many a person⁸ is followed by his family and not by his neigh-

hours, often a man is followed by his neighbours and not by the people of the market. Again, mostly a man is followed by the commonalty and not by the chiefs and the learned. But, often it so happens that all people follow him.

2. To display acts of devotion in order to be followed by others is only genuine for one who is in a position of power in relation to him who is in place of the one who is followed. As for him who is not like this, it is not correct. This is for the reason that when one who is not learned⁹ displays some of his devotions, he is very often accused of hypocrisy, and show, and they condemn him instead of following him. He is therefore not allowed to display his actions.

3. He should keep a watch¹⁰ over his heart which often contains love for implicit hypocrisy which induces him to display his actions on the pretext of inducing people to follow him. This is the place where feet slip. For, the weak people resemble the strong people in expressing their action. But their hearts are not strong enough to behave with sincerity. Their rewards are, therefore, forfeited due to hypocrisy.

The Sign of Distinction

(Fol. 294b) When it is said that you conceal your action,¹¹ the purpose of seeking followers is achieved by displaying your action for others. If, however, he does not find any discrepancy it is manifest that the display was just for his interest in seeking followers. When this object is achieved by some other method he grows indifferent to expression. If he finds some discrepancy, we know that what has induced him to display his action is hypocrisy.

The second kind is that one feels attracted and fascinated by one's own action after one completes it.¹²

It is to be considered like displaying the action itself. But the danger in this is severer, as it is very light and easy for the tongue to speak out. At the time of relating the story sometimes something is intended for a particular reason known to the soul. Here the meaning of hypocrisy is falsehood. But this expression of the first finds its place in a different way. For the form of worship has been accomplished as divorced from hypocrisy which has turned up only after the perfection of the act of worship. In the first case the motive of hypocrisy turned up at the time of displaying the action. The prohibition of obtaining these actions themselves, however, characterises them as a form of worship.

NOTES

1. The title and the contents are apparently derived from Ghazzālī's *al-Iḥyā'*, III. p. 92.
2. Cf. *al-Iḥyā'*, III. p. 92:
اعلم ان في الاسرار للاعمال فائدة ، الاخلاص ،
و النجاة من الرياء و في الاظهار فائدة الاقتداء و ترغيب
الناس في الخير ولكن فيه آفة الرياء —... ولذلك اتى الله
تعالى على السرو العلانية فقال : ”و ان تيدوا الصدقات
فنعما هي و ان تحفوها و تؤتوها الفقراء فهو خير لكم —“
3. *al-Baqarah*: 271.
4. Cf. *al-Iḥyā'*, III. p. 92:
والاظهار قسمان : احدهما في نفس العمل و الآخر
بالتحدث بما عمل :
5. Cf. *al-Iḥyā'*, III. p. 309:
فالافضل المبادلة اليه و اظهار الرغبة فيه للتحريض الخ
6. *Ibid.*:
فان كان إظهار الصدقة يؤدي المتصدق عليه و يرغب
الناس في الصدقة فالسرافضل لأن الايذاء حرام .
7. *Ibid.*:
فقال النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم من سن فله
اجرها و اجر من اتبعه .
This ḥadīth has been narrated on the authority of Jarir ibn 'Abd
Allah al-Bijli by Imam Muslim.
8. Cf. *al-Iḥyā'*, III. p. 309:
و مهما حصلت شائبة الرياء لم يتفعه اقتداء غيره و هلك
به فلا خلاف في ان السرافضل منه ولكن على من يظهر
العمل و طائفتان : احدهما أن يظهره حيث يعلم أنه يقتدى
به أو يظن ذلك ظنا ، و رب رجل يقتدى أهله دون جيرانه
و ربما يقتدى به جيرانه دون اهل السوق و ربما يقتدى به
اهل محله و انما العالم المعروف هو الذي يقتدى به الناس كافة ،
9. *Ibid.*:
فغير العالم اذا أظهر بعض الطاعات ربما نسب الى
الرياء و النفاق و ذممه و لم يقتدوا به فليس له الاظهار من

غير فائدة وإنما يصح الاظهار بنية القدوة من هو في محل
القدوة على من هو في محل الاقتداء به ،

10. Ibid.:

والثانية أن يراقب قلبه فإنه ربما يكون فيه حب الرياء
الخبى فيدعوه الى الاظهار بعذر الاقتداء وهذه مزية
أقدام العباد والعلماء فانهم يتشبهون بالاقوياء في الاظهار ولا
تقوى قلوبهم على الاخلاص فتحبط اجورهم بالرياء —

11. Ibid. p. 310:

لوقيل له اخف العمل حتى يقتدى الناس بعباد آخر . . .
فإن مال قلبه الى أن يكون هو المقندر به وهو المظهر للعمل
فباعته الرياء . . .

12. Ibid.:

القسم الثاني: أن يتحدث بما فعله بعد الفراغ وحكمه
حكم اظهار العمل نفسه والخطر في هذا اشد لأن مؤنثه
النطق خفيفة على اللسان وقد تجرى في الحكاية زيادة ،

(CHAPTER XIX)

EXPLANATION OF PERMISSION TO CONCEAL SINS ¹

You must know that it is necessary to conceal a sinful deed, as has been indicated by the expression of Allah, the Exalted: "Lo! those who love that slander should be spread" ² and by the expression of the Prophet (peace be upon him) "whoever commits anything of these filthy sins he should conceal it with the cover of Allah" ³.

It is surely prohibited ⁴ to conceal sins deliberately in order to deceive the people and lead them into believing that he is an ascetic, and devoted to Allah. You should also know that it is not permissible for him to be pleased with the concealment of sins for a number of reasons:

Firstly, when Allah has concealed ⁵ for him his sinful deeds in this world, Allah shall conceal them in the next world as well.

Secondly, the proofs which we have mentioned indicate that Allah, the Exalted, likes to conceal the defects and dislikes disgracing him who has a fault. He also desires that the creature should resemble the Exalted Creator in this habit in consonance with the expression of the Prophet (peace be upon him): "You adopt the ways of Allah" ⁶.

Thirdly, when people are informed of his defects, they curse, condemn and disgrace him. This necessarily causes confusion in his heart and prevents him from

devoting himself to the worship of Allah, therefore he should endeavour to conceal his defects so that he may not be withheld from obeying Allah.

Fourthly, a man avoids informing others of his defect, since it often happens that when one accuses him with a defect his nature⁸ urges him to investigate the conditions of the accusing person, find out some of his defects and accuse him of them. This is because retaliation is inherent in the nature of man. He therefore tries to conceal his own defects in order to avoid the harm.

Fifthly, he conceals⁹ a sinful deed so that no harm is done to him or any other painful deed.

Sixthly, he conceals the sinful action simply due to bashfulness.¹⁰ It is surely a kind of vicious boldness not to give any care to the sin which is a bad manner on the part of one who commits sin. Whoever does not feel ashamed combines in himself both sin and vicious boldness which is an object of condemnation. But here there is a point, i.e. bashfulness is very much like hypocrisy. The difference between the two is that bashfulness is a psychological case which dislikes that anybody else should become aware of his defect. Hypocrisy is a case which demands the dislike of this state. It is combined with a desire to misguide others with the intention that others continue his respect for and devotion to him.

Seventhly, he fears¹¹ that his sin will become manifest if others follow him.

Having realised this, we say: If a sinner tries to conceal his sin for anyone of the reasons mentioned, he is obedient to Allah, the Exalted, in concealing it, and sincere in his devotion by attempting to conceal his sin. But, when he intends¹² to conceal his sinful action in order to let the people think that he is an ascetic or a devotee, he will surely be a hypocrite.

NOTES

1. The full title in the *Ihyā'* is as follows (p. 21):

بيان الرضاة في كتمان الذنوب وكراهة اطلاع الناس عليه وكراهة التمسك به

2. Al-Nūr: 19.

3. Cf. *Ihyā'*, III. p. 310:

انه قد علم الله تعالى يكره ظهور المعاصي و يحب سترها كما قال الله عليه وسلم فليستر بستر الله

The ḥadīth has been recorded by al-Hākim in his al-Mustadrak.

4. Ibid.:

بل الله تعالى يستر ذلك ليرى الناس أنه ورع خائف من الله تعالى مع الله ليس كذلك فهذا هو ستر العرائى —

5. This is derived from the ḥadīth recorded by Imam Muslim on the authority of Abū Hurayrah:

أن من ستر الله عليه في الدنيا ذنباً ستره الله عليه في الآخرة —

6. Ismā'il b. Md. al-'Ajalūni (d. 1162 A.H.): *Kashf al-Khafa' wa Muzil al-Albās 'ammā ushtuhira min al-shādūn 'alā alainat al-Nās*, Maktabah al-Qudsi, al-Qāhirah, 1351 A.H. p. 49:

تخلوا بأفلاك الله

7. Cf. *Ihyā'*, III. p. 311:

الثالث أن يكره ذم الناس له به من حيث أن ذلك يغمه ويشغل قلبه وعمله عن طاعة الله تعالى ،

8. Cf. Ibid. p. 311:

واما كراهة الذم بالمعصية من حيث الطبع فليس بمذموم فله الستر حذرا من ذلك و أبا كراهة الذم على المعصية فلا يحدود فيه الا امر واحد وهو ان يشغله غمده باطلاع الناس على ذنبه عن اطلاع الله فان ذلك غاية النقصان في الدين بل يشي ان يكون رغبة باطلاع الله و ذمه له اكثر ،

9. Ibid. p. 312:

السادس ، ان يستر ذلك كيلا يقصد بشر إذا عرف ذنبه
و هذا وراء ألم الذم —

10. Ibid.:

السابع مجرد الحياء فانه نوع ألم وراء ألم الذم والقصد
بالشرو هو خلق كريم... فالذى يفسق ولا يبالي ان يظهر
فسقه للناس جمع الى الفسق والتسك والوقاحة وفقد الحياء
فهو أشد حالا بمن يستتر ويستحيى الا ان الحياء يمتزج بالرياء
ومشتبه به اشتباها عظيما —

11. Ibid.:

الثامن : أن يخاف من ظهور ذنبه ان يستجري عليه غيره
و يقتدى به

12. Ibid. p. 313:

وليس في اظهار الطاعة عذر الا هذا العذر الواحد ومهما
قصد يستر المعصية ان يخيل الى الناس أنه ورع كان مرائيا
كما اذا قصد ذلك باظهار الطاعة -

(CHAPTER XX)

THE EXPLANATION OF GIVING UP ACTIONS OF OBEDIENCE IN ORDER TO AVOID HYPOCRISY.¹

There are people who give up a certain action so that they may not fall in worldly (sins). This is wrong. On the contrary, we say, "actions of obedience are of two kinds: ² (1) There are some acts of devotion which give no pleasure in themselves. They are the corporeal acts of worship like prayer (Ṣalāt), fasting (Ṣawm) and Ḥajj (pilgrimage).

(Fol. 295a) Some actions are pleasing in themselves. They are those acts of devotion which are connected with the agent such as Khilāfat (to be the chief of the Believers), al-Wilāyit, (to be the chief of a town or place), al-Qaḍā, (to give judgement), al-Shahādah, (to bear witness to). Imāmat al-Ṣalāt, (to lead prayer in congregation), the position of giving admonition and lesson, and to spend money for the people in virtuous causes: 295a

As for the First Kind, we say that it contains the danger of hypocrisy in three ways:

1. It may be that the motive of action is mere hypocrisy without involving faith in any way as a motive. Such actions should be abandoned,³ as they are sinful deeds and no act of obedience.

2. To begin with a religious motive induces the agent to do the action, but it also contains hypocrisy as a motive. This should not be given up, since he has

obtained a religious motive which would complete the action in a befitting manner. But it is necessary for him to struggle with his soul in order to drive away hypocrisy and attain sincerity.⁴

3. The action is performed in accordance with the religious motive. Then, there appears the motive of hypocrisy in the course of action. It will therefore be necessary for him to struggle to drive away the latter, but he shall not give up his action, as the Satan urges him at first to give up the action. When he does not respond to the Satan and begins the action, the Satan leads him to hypocrisy; if he continues without responding to him and drives him away, the Satan tells him that his action is not pure and that he is a hypocrite and that his endeavour is absurd, and hence there is no good in an action devoid of sincerity. At last, he urges him in this way to give up the action. If he abandons the work, the Satan achieves his object.⁵ It is also a deceitful action of the Satan⁶ to embellish for him the prospect of abandoning his action and to convince him that it is good for him to give up the action lest people say that he is a hypocrite and they disobey Allah by this. This is also absurd for a number of reasons:

Firstly, this is to think ill of the believing people. It is not his right to think of them in this way.

Secondly, if this is so he will not suffer any harm and will miss the reward of the action by giving it up for fear of their remarks that he is a hypocrite. This is sheer hypocrisy. Had he no love of their praise and fear of their condemnation why should he care for their remarks that he is a hypocrite?

Thirdly, if he gives up the action in order to be considered as a sincere man who does not crave for name and fame, the Satan puts into his heart that he is one of

the strongest of ascetics, as he has given up name and fame and preferred aloofness. This is also dangerous.

In short, the heart is not entirely free from the stings of the Satan, so that this is to be excused. Now, if one's engaging in forms of worship is conditioned with this sort of complete absence (of Satanic stings) it will be difficult for anybody to be engaged in any kind of worship. This would necessitate absurdity (in action) which is the highest aim of the Satan. On the contrary, it is correct to continue your activity as long as you find a religious motive in favour of the action. Hence, it should not be given up. If, however, there arises in course of action an idea that leads necessarily to hypocrisy you must struggle against your evil soul and find ways and means to remove the idea as much as you can.

Those who hold that it is necessary to give up the action when there arises fear of the calamity of hypocrisy, argue with what has been related that a certain man entered upon al-Nakh'i when the latter was reciting the Qur'ān. Al-Nakh'i closed the Muṣḥaf (the Qur'ān) and stopped recitation saying, "This man should not see me reciting the Qur'ān all the time."

Ibrāhīm al-Taymī has said, "When you are fascinated by speaking, you keep silent, and when you admire silence, you speak."

The reply⁷ is as follows. As for al-Nakh'i, obviously he understood with certainty that the man would remain near him in this state and that he would soon return to the recitation of the Qur'ān presently without the danger of hypocrisy.

As for al-Taymī, if he intended those objects of speech which are permitted, he meant eloquence in speech and stories which cause fascination to those who are absorbed deeply in them while silence is permissible and limited, because it means to turn from one object

of permission to another object of permission just to avoid fascination.

The Second Division contains what concerns the creatures of God (the people?) in which there are great calamities and dangers and the greatest of them is the Khilāfat, succession (of the Chief of the believers), which is the best form of worship when it is accomplished with justice¹⁰ and moderation. The Prophet (peace be on him) said,¹¹ "An act of justice (Fol. 295b) is better than 295b sixty years' worship."

You must realize that though this *ḥadīth* is good tidings in a way, it is warning¹² in another sense, since its content surely indicates that "A single day's rule of an oppressing autocrat is more evil than committing sin for sixty years." The matter is like this because of the fact that the effects of Khilāfat (succession) and Imarat, (Chieftainship) are not confined to the subject, rather they reach others. Its case in "justice" and in "doing evil deeds" remains inevitably the same and equal to the states of all in a general way.

The Prophet (peace be on him), has said, "There is no ruler over ten persons but shall come on the Day of Resurrection while his hands would be tied with his neck. His justice would set him free and his oppression would bring him abhorrence."¹³

There is a problem here, viz. a man may control himself and find that his soul is patient in the face of truth and refrains from evil passions in a period other than that of Wilāyit, i.e., when he has no political power; but he fears that his soul may change when he continues to enjoy political power for a long period.¹⁴ He may feel the sweetness of his position and find it pleasant to enforce orders, and thus he may dislike the prospect of removal from his position and adopt measures to conceal his

dislike for removal from his position. In this case the jurists have different views.

Some jurists hold he must run away from undertaking Chieftainship. Some others hold that this is a matter that concerns the future. But at the present moment he finds himself strong in manifesting truth and keeping away from the absurd.

Al-Ghazzālī says, the right thing¹⁵ is that he must avoid the assumption of political power. For, when a man begins with chieftainship it becomes difficult for him to bear the pain of removal from it. Often the affairs of a state are not completed except with show, by adopting unfair means and undertaking the absurd. He is therefore urged by the fear of being removed from it to begin with what is absurd and to commit evil deeds. When you have understood the discourse on Khilāfat and Imarat you should understand that the case is similar concerning Qaḍā', giving judgement.

As for admonition,¹⁶ giving legal decision, teaching, and all that is included in the extension of position and through which a man's value is greatly enhanced, their calamity is great, because the pleasure of position and reception dominates natures. While in power and position, it is feared that man may not stick to the old path of expressing truth and nullifying the absurd. On the contrary, he has evidently to fall in the habit of compromising with evil. Whoever, then, finds in himself the urge of hypocrisy, love of position, and is afraid of the two, it is necessary for him to give up the action.

If it is said, this would lead to suspension of things,¹⁷ abandonment of sciences and effacing the Shari'ah, we shall say, just as people need a little of knowledge and law (Shari'ah) they need those who stand for the affair of Khilāfat and Imarat.

We say, it is a view which necessitates that man should refrain from these matters and abandon them here. The reason, on the contrary, is this that the natural urge for undertaking *Khilāfat* and *Imārat*, and for manifesting knowledge and law (*Shari'ah*), continues constantly which is enough for achieving them. The prohibition which we already mentioned would, therefore, not necessitate the said prohibited object.

There is another problem here, viz. when a man makes effort in collecting lawful wealth¹⁸ in order to distribute it among the deserving people, is it better for him to do it, or to give it up?

Some of them have said, "It is better for him to give it up, because the pleasure of drawing praise and eulogy dominates the soul which contains dangers which stand in the way of sincerity.

Others say, "it is better to do so, because it is a virtuous deed which contains an obstacle that extends to him. The action is therefore an excellent one. The full discourse on the problem has been mentioned in the Chapter on "The Problem of Ornamentation."

The third problem is on the characteristics (signs)¹⁹ which make it known that the preacher is sincere in his preaching and that he does not intend to make a vain display to the people. They are more than one:

1.—If there appears one who is better, than him in preaching excels him in learning, and that people are more devoted to him, he should feel happy and should not envy the preacher. Of course, there is no harm in cherishing the ambition, that is, desiring for himself to have knowledge like his.

2.—When big people attend his meeting, his speech does not suffer any change, he continues, on the contrary, in his usual style. Now, if change occurs to his speech due to the presence of some big persons it indicates that

he cares for hearts and embellishes his speech for some selfish motives, which would prevent him from being sincere.

3.—If it so happens that he commits mistake in something and some one of those present turns him to the right thing, it is necessary for him to accept it and be happy and pleased with him, and he must not think ill of such people in any case.

THE BOOK IS FINISHED

And, all praise belongs to Allah alone as it befits and deserves Him. Allah's Blessings be upon Muḥammad and his family (Peace be upon them!).

Allah suffices us, and Excellent is He as Helper !

—: o :—

NOTES

1. The full title in the Ihyā' (III p. 313) reads as follows:

بيان ترك الطاعات خوفا من الرياء ودخول الآفات

2. Cf. al-Ihyā', III. p. 313:

اعلم ان من الناس من يترك العمل خوفا من ان يكون
مراثيا به وذلك غلط أن الطاعات تنقسم الى (١) ما
لا لذة في عينه كالصلوة والصوم والحج والغزو والى
(٢) ما هو لذيد وهو اكثر ما لا يقتصر على البدن بل يتعلق
بالخلق كالخلافة والقضاء والولايات والحسبة وامامة
الصلوة والتذكير والتدريس واتفاق المال على الخلق وغير
ذلك مما تعظم الافة فيه لتعلقه بالخلق ولما فيه من اللذة —

3. Ibid.:

القسم الاول : الطاعات اللازمة للبدن التي لا تتعلق
بالغير ولا لذة في عينها كالصوم والصلاة والحج فخطرات
الرياء فيها ثلاث : احداها ما يدخل قبل العمل فيبعث على
الابتداء لرؤية الناس وليس معه باعث الدين فهذا مما ينبغي
ان يترك لانه معصية لا طاعة فيه —

4. Cf. Ihyā', III. p. 313:

الثانية : ان ينبغي لا اجل الله ولكن يعترض الرياء منع
عقد العبادة اولها فلا ينبغي ان يترك العمل لانه وجد باعثا
دينيا فليشرع في العمل وليجاهد نفسه في دفع الرياء وتحسين
الاخلاص ،

5. Ibid.:

الثالثة أن يعقد على الاخلاص ثم يطرا الرياء ودواعيه
فينبغي أن يجاهد في الدفع ولا يترك العمل لكي يرجع الى
عقد الاخلاص ويرد نفسه اليه قهرا حتى يتم العمل لأن
الشیطان يدعوك أولا الى ترك العمل فاذا لم تحب واشتغلت
فيدعوك الى الرياء فاذا لم تحب ودفعت بقي يقول لك هذا
العمل ليس بخالص ، وانت مرء وتعبك ضائع فاي فائدة
لك في عمل لا اخلاص فيه حتى يملك بذلك على ترك العمل ،
فاذا تركته فقد حصلت غرضه —

6. i.e. من مكائد الشيطان. The author has explained a few deceitful designs of the devil. Cf. Ihyā', III. p. 314.

ومن هذا القبيل ان يترك العمل خوفا على الناس ان يقواوا
انه مرء فيعصون الله به ، فهذا من مكائد الشيطان لانه اولا
أساء الظن بالمسلمين ، وما كان من حقه ان يظن بهم ذلك ،
ثم ان كان فلا يضره قولهم ويفوته ، ثواب العبادة وترك
العمل خوفا من قولهم انه مرء هو عين الرياء فلولا حبه
لمحمدتهم وخوفه من ذمهم فماله ولقولهم قالوا انه مرء
او قالوا انه مخلص ،

7. Ibid.:

ثم كيف يطمع في ان يتخلص من الشيطان بأن يترك
العمل ، و الشيطان لا يخليه بل يقول له الان يقول الناس
انك تركت العمل ليقال انه مخلص لا يشتهى الشهرة فيضطررك
بذلك الى أن تهرب ، فان هربت ودخلت سربا تحت الأرض
ألقي في قلبك حلاوة معرفة الناس لتزهدك و هربك منهم
و تعظيمهم لك بقلوبهم على ذلك فكيف يتخلص منه بل لا
نجاة منه ،

8. Cf. Ihyā', III. p. 314:

فمن شرع في العمل لله فلا يد ان يبقى معه اصل قصد
الثواب ، فان قلت فقد نقل عن أقوام ترك العمل مخافة الشهرة ،
روى ان ابراهيم النخعي دخل عليه انسان و هو يقرأ فأطبق
المصحف وترك القراءة ، وقال لا يرى هذا أنا نقرأ كل ساعة ،
وقال ابراهيم التيمي اذا اعجبك الكلام فاسكت و اذا
اعجبك السكوت فتكلم ،

9. Ibid.:

و أما طبق ابراهيم النخعي المصحف فيمكن أن يكون
لعلمه بأنه سيحتاج الى ترك القراءة عند دخوله واستئنافه بعد
خروجه للاشتغال بمكالمته فرأى أن لا يراه في القراءة أبعد عن
الرياء ، و هو عازم على الترك للاشتغال به حتى يعود اليه
بعد ذلك ،

و أما قول التيمي اذا أعجبك الكلام فاسكت يجوز أن يكون قد أراد به مباحات الكلام كالفصاحة في الحكايات وغيرها فان ذلك يورث العجب ، و كذلك العجب ، بالسكوت المباح محذور فهو عدول عن مباح الى مباح حذرا من العجب —

10. Cf. Ihyā', III. p. 315:

القسم الثاني : ما يتعلق بالخلق وتعظم فيه الافات و الاخطار و اعظمها الخلافة مم القضاء ثم التذكير والتدريس و الفتوى ثم اتفاق المال — أما الخلافة و الامارة فهي من افضل العبادات اذا كان ذلك مع العدل و الاخلاص

11. This hadith is not fully quoted. The full text as recorded by al-Ṭabarānī and al-Bayhaqī on the authority of Ibn 'Abbās is as follows:

”ليوم من امام عادل خير من عبادة الرجل وحده ستين عاما“

12. Ibid. :

فاذا صارت الولاية محبوبية كان الوالى ساعيا في حفظ نفسه و يوشك أن يتبع هواه فيمتنع من كل ما يقدر في جاهه و ولايته و ان كان حقا و يقدم على ما يزيد في مكانته و ان كان باطلا و عند ذلك يهلك و يكون يوم من سلطان جائر شرا من فسق ستين سنة بمفهوم الحديث الذي ذكرناه ،

13. Imām Aḥmad has narrated from 'Ubādah ibn al-Sāmit, also Aḥmad, al-Bazzār, Abū Ya'la and al-Ṭabarānī from Abū Hurayrah.

14. Cf. al-Ihyā', p. 346 :

... و من جرب نفسه فراها صابرة على الحق ، كافة عن الشهوات في غير الولايات و لكن خاف عليها ان تتغير اذا ذقت لذة الولاية و أن تستحلي الجاه و تستلذ نفاذ الامر فتكره العزل فيداهن خيفة من العزل — فهذا قد اختلف العلماء في انه هل يلزمه الهرب من تقلد الولاية ، فقال

قائلون لا يجب لأن هذا خوف أمر في المستقبل و هو في الحال لم يعهد نفسه الا قوية في ملازمة الحق و ترك لذات النفس ،

15. Ibid.:

والصحيح أن عليه الاحتراز لأن النفس خداعة مدعية للحق واعدة بالخير جزما لكن يخاف عليها ان تتغير عند الولاية ، فكيف اذا أظهرت التردد و الامتناع عن قبول الولاية أهون من العزل بعد الشروع ، فالعزل مؤلم ... فاذا شرع لا تسمح نفسه بالعزل [و تميل نفسه الى المداينة و اهمال الحق و تهوى به في قعر جهنم ،

16. Ibid.:

و اما الوعظ و الفتوى و التدريس و رواية الحديث و جمع الاسانيد العالية و كل ما يتسع بسببه الجاه و يعظم به القدر فافته أيضا عظيمة ، و الواعظ يبد في وعظ ... لذة لا توازيها لذة ، فاذا غلب ذلك على قلبه مال بطبعه ، و كان ينبغي ان يكون فرحه به من حيث انه عرف طريق السعادة و طريق سلوك سبيل الدين ... فمن لا باعث له الاطلب الجاه و المنزلة و الاكل بالدين و التفاخر و التكائر فينبغي ان يتركه و يخالف الهوى فيه .

17. Ibid.:

فان قلت مهما حكم بذلك على أهل العلم تعطلت العلوم و اندرست و عم الجاهل كافة الخلق و القضاء و الخلافة مما يحتاج الناس اليه في دينهم كالوعظ و التدريس و الفتوى و في كل واحد منهما فتنة و لذة فلا فرق بينهما ، فاما قول القائل نهيك عن ذلك يؤدي الى اندراس العلم فهو غلط ،

18. Cf. Ihyā', III. p. 319:

و ههنا رتبة رابعة : و هي جمع المال و أخذه للفرقة على المستحقين ، فان في الاتفاق و اظهار السخاء استجلابا

للثناء وفي ادخال السرور على قلوب الناس لذة للنفس والافان
فيها ايضاً كثيرة —

وقد اختلف العلماء فقال قوم اذا طلب الدنيا من الحلال
وسلم منها وتصدق بها فهو افضل من ان يشتغل بالعبادات
والنوافل —

.... فاما المال الحاصل من الحلال فتفرقته افضل من
امساكه بكل حال ،

19. Ibid.:

فان قلت فباي علامة تعرف العالم والواعظ انه صادق
مخلص في وعظه غير مرید رياء الناس، فاعلم أن لذلك علامات :
احداها أنه لو ظهر من هو احسن منه وعظا أو أغزر منه
علما والناس له أشد قبولا فرح به ولم يحسده ، نعم لا بأس
بالغبطة وهو أن يتمنى لنفسه مثل عمله —

والاخرى أن الاكابر اذا حضروا مجلسه لم يتغير كلامه
بل بقي كما كان عليه فينظر الى الخلق بعين واحدة ،
والاخرى ان لا يحب اتباع الناس له في الطريق والمشى
خلقه في الاسواق .

—o—

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 'Abd al-Ḥaqq Anṣārī, *The Ethical Philosophy of Miskawīh*.
Aligarh, 1964.
'Abd al-Muta'āl al-Ṣa'īdī, *Al-Mujaddidūn fī'l-Islām, al-Numūzajīyah*, Egypt.
'Abus Salām Nadwī, *Imām Rāzī*, India, 1950.
Abu'l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Aḥmad b. 'Alī, *K. al-Mukhtārāt fī'l-Ṭibb*, First ed. Hyderabad-Deccan, 1362 H.
Abū Shāmah al-Maqdisī, *Tarājīm Rijāl al-Qarnain al-Sadis wa'l-Sabi'* ed. Zahid al-Kawthari, Cairo, 1937.
Abū Dawūd, Sulaymān b. al-Ash'ath al-Sijistānī, *Sunan abū Dāwūd*.
Al-'Ajlūnī Ismā'il b. Muḥammad, *Kashf al-Khafā, wa Muzīl-al-Albās 'ammashtahara min al-aḥādīth 'alā alsinat al-Nās*.
'Alā' al-Dīn 'Alī b. al-Muẓaffar al-Kindī al-Widā'i, *Tadhkirah al-Kindīyah*.
'Alī al-Sāmi al-Nashshār, ed. *I'tiqādāt al-Muslimīn wa'l-Mushrikīn li'l-Fakhr al-Rāzī, al-Nahdah al-Miṣriyyah* 1356/1938.
Aristotle, *De Caelo, Physics, Rhetorica, De Anima, The Nicomachean Ethics*, The Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1956, *Maḡna Moralia, Generation of Animals*, Loeb ed. 1953.
Al-Bayhaqī, Aḥmad b. al-Ḥusayn b. 'Alī, *Shu'ab al-Imān*.
Al-Ghazzālī, Imām Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad b. Muḥammad, *Ihyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn*, Cairo, *Mizān al-'Amal*, Maṭba'ah al-'arabiyyah, Egypt.
Al-Fārābī, Abū Naṣr Muḥammad b. Tarkhān, *Al-Siyāsāt al-Madaniyyah*, Hyderabad.
Al-Dhahabī, *Mizān al-'I'tidā*, Vol. II, Hyderabad.

- Brockelmann, C., *Geschichte des Arabischen Litteratur*, I, II and Supplement.
- Browne, E. G., *A Literary History of Persia*, Cambridge, 1956.
- Gibb, H. A. R., *Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 1953.
- Guillaume, A. Shahrastānis' *K. Nihāyat al-Iqdām*, Oxford, ed. and Trans.
- Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'ah, Abū'l-'Abbās Aḥmad b. al-Qāsim b. Abi Uṣaybi'ah, '*Uyūn al-Anbā' fī Ṭabaqāt al-Aṭibbā'*'.
- Ibn al-Aṭhīr, Mubārak b. Muḥammad b. al-Aṭhīr, *Tārīkh al-Kāmil*.
- Ibn al-Subki, Tāj al-Dīn 'Abd-al-Wahhāb, Abū Ḥamid Aḥmad b. 'Ali b. 'abd al-Kāfi, *Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfi'iyyah*.
- Ibn Ḥajar, Aḥmad b. 'Ali b. M. b. Ḥajar al-'Asqalāni, *Lisān al-Mizān*.
- Ibn Hibbān, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Busti, *Ṣaḥīḥ*.
- Ibn al-'Ibri, Abū'l-Faraj, Gharighurius ibn Ahron, *Tārīkh Mukhtaṣar al-Duwal*, Beirut, 1958.
- Ibn al-'Imād, Abū'l-Fataḥ 'Abd al-Ḥayy ibn Ahmad ibn al-'Imād (d. 1039), *Shadharāt al-Dhahab*.
- Ibn Khallikān, Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm, *Wafayāt al-A'yān*.
- Ibn Mājah, Abū 'Abd-Allah Muḥammad b. Yazīd b. Mājah al-Qazwīni, *Sunan, Aṣaḥḥ al-Maṭābi'*. Lucknow, 1315 H.
- Ibn Miskawīh, Abū Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā, *al-Fauz al-Aṣghar, Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq*, Kurdistan al-'Ilmiyyah Press, Egypt, 1329 H.
- Ibn al-Qifṭī, Abū'l-Ḥasan 'Ali b. Yūsuf, (*Muntakhab*) *Tārīkh al-Hukamā'*.
- Ibn Sīna, al-Shaikh al-Ra'īs Abū 'Ali al-Ḥusain b. 'abd-Allah, *Al-Qānūn* (al-Kulliyāt), Nāmī Press, Lucknow, India.
- Ibn Taimiyyah, Abū'l-'Abbās Aḥmad b. 'abd al-Ḥalīm. *Bayān Muwafaqāt Ṣarīḥ al-Ma'qūl li Ṣaḥīḥ at-Manqūl* on

- the margin of *K. Minhāj al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah*, Vol. II, Al-Amīriyyah, Press, Bulāq, Egypt, p. 106.
- Imām Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, Egypt.
- Imām Bukhārī, Abū 'Abd Allah Muḥammad b. Ismā'īl *Al-Jāmi' al-Ṣaḥīḥ*.
- Imām Fakhr Rāzi, Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. 'Umar al-Rāzi (d. 606 H):
Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb known as *Tafsīr Kabīr*.
Al-Arba'in fī Uṣūl al-Dīn, Hyderabad-Deccan, India.
Al-Khamsūn fī Uṣūl al-Dīn, included in *Majmū'ah al-Rasā'il* published by Muḥī al-Dīn Ṣabīī, Egypt, 1328 H.
Asās al-Taqdīs/Tasīs al-Taqdīs, Egypt, 1935/1354.
Lawāmi' al-Bayyināt.
Risālah al-Kamāliyyah, ed. S. M. Bāqir Sabzwārī, Tehran, 1335 H.
- Imām al-Ḥaramain, Abū-Mā'ālī 'Abd-al Mālīk, *Al-Shāmil fī Uṣūl Dīn*.
- Imām Mālīk, Abū 'Abd Allah, Mālīk b. Anas b. Mālīk, *al-Mawattā'*.
- Imām Muslim Abū A'l-Ḥusayn, Muslim b. Al-Ḥajjāj al-Nisāburi, *Al-Jāmi' al-Ṣaḥīḥ*.
- Imām al-Tirmidhī, Abū 'Isā Muḥammad b. 'Isa, *K. Sunan al-Tirmidhi al-Jāmi'*, al-Maṭba' al-Majīdi. Cawnpur.
- Ismā'īl b. M. Al-'Ajlūni (d. 1162 H),—*Kashf al-Khaṭā wa muzīl al-Albās 'ammāshahar min al-Aḥādīth 'alā alsinat al-Nās*, Maktabah al-Qudsi, al-Qahirah. 1351 H.
- Khaṭīb al-Dimashqī M. B. 'Abd 'Allah, *Mishkāṭ al-Maṣābiḥ*, Nizami Press, Delhi.
- Khwāndmir, *Ḥabīb al-Siyar*, Haidari, Iran.
- Kurd 'Ali, *Rasā'il al-Bulaghā*, 1374/1954. Cairo.
- Maimonides, *Guide to the Perplexed*.
- Mullā Ṣadrūddīn, *Asfār Arba'ah*.

- Al-Nasa'i Abū 'Abd al-Raḥmān Aḥmad, b. Shu'ayb, *Sunan al-Yawm wa'l-Laylah*.
 Naṣīruddīn Ṭūsī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, al-Ḥaidari, Tihiran, *Sharḥ 'Uyūn al-Ḥikmah*.
 Paul Kraus, *The "Controversies" of Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī, Islamic Culture*, April 1938.
 Plato, *Timeus*.
 Plotinus, *Enneades*.
 Qazwīnī, *Cosmography*, (Zākārīā b. Muḥammad b. Muḥammad Abū Yahya).
 Rāghib Iṣfahānī, Imām: Abū'l-Qasim al-Ḥusain b. Muḥammad b. al-Mufaḍḍal al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, *K. Taḥṣīl al-Naḥṣ'atain wa Taḥṣīl al-Sa'ādatain*, Beirut 1319 H. Al-Dharrī'ah ilā Makārim al-Sharī'ah, Al-Waṭan Press.
 Ṣālaḥ al-Dīn al-Ṣafī, *al-Wāfi bi'l-Wafayāt*.
 Sarton, G. *Introduction to the History of Science*.
 Sayyid Muḥammad Baqīr, *Al-Risālah al-Kamālīyyah li'r-Rāzī*, Tihiran, 1335.
 Shahrastānī, Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Karīm b. Aḥmad, *K. Nihayat al-Iqdām*, ed. A. Guillaume, Oxford, 1934.
 Al-Shahrāzūrī, Muḥammad, Shamsuddīn b. Al-Shaikh Al-'Alim-al-Ishrāqī died after 687 A.H. *K. al-Rumūz wa'l-Amṭhāl al-Lāhūtiyyah fi'l-Anwār al-Ḥamūdah al-Malakūtiyyah fi Ma'rifat al-Nafs wa'r-Rūḥ*, MS. Vatican, Italy.
 Al-Ṭabarānī, Sulaymān b. Aḥmad.
 Ṭāsh Kaprizādah, *Miftāḥ al-Sa'ādah*, Hyderabad.
 'Umaruddīn, *Some Fundamental Aspects of Imām Ghazzālī's Thought*, Agra.
 Vanden Bergh, S., Averroes' *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*, Notes, University Press, Oxford, 1954.
 Wüstenfeld, *Qazwīnī's Cosmography*.
 Al-Yāfi'dī, 'Abdallāh b. As'ad b. 'Alī b. Uḥmān, *Mir'āt al-Jinān wa 'ibrat al-Yaqzān*.

- Yāhya ibn 'Adī, Jacobite (364/974) *Kitāb Tahdhib al-Akhlāq*, included in *Kurd 'Alī's Rasā'il al-Bulaghā*, Cairo, 1374/1954, 4th ed.
 Yāqūt al-Rūmī, *K. Irshād al-Arib, Hindiyah*. Egypt, 1925.
 Zakariyyā Qazwīnī, ibn Md. Ibn Maḥmūd, *'Athār al-Bilād wa Akhbār al-Bilād*, Beirut, 1960/1380.

INDEX

- 'Abd al-Majid b. Qudwah, 10
 Abhorred *per se*, 202
 Abraham, 233
 Abū Bakr (R.), 20, 21
 Abū Bakr, Qaḍī, 17
 Abū'l-'Alā al-Ma'arri, 17
 Abū'l-Barakāt, 28, 29
 Abū'l-Faḍl, 13
 Abū'l-Hasan al-Ash'ari, 2, 17, 20
 Abū'l-Hasan 'Alī al-Subki, 5
 Abū Qatāḍah, 297
 Abū Sa'īd, 216
 Abū Shā'ina, 6
 Action, 67, 79, 90, 111, 114, 188, 230, 248, 249, 252, 257, 268, 284-9; show off, 270, 272; condition of, 294; concealing of, 303-5; giving up of actions of obedience to avoid hypocrisy, 313; 314
 Adam, 292
 Ahādīth, 197, Hadīth, 216, 278, 283, 285, 286
 Baghdad, 29
 Bahā' al-Dīn Walad, 32
 Bay'at, 246
 Balme—abhorring of, 237 f.
 Blessing, 252, 255
 Bliss, 35, 50, 51, 102, 169, 170, 171, 172, 174, 183, 188
 Bukhāra, 2, 9
 Bukhl, 211
 Calamity, 247, 253, 255, 264
 Circular, 75
 Combat, 36
 Concealment of defect, 310, of sinful action, 310
 Condemnation, of wealth, 195-6; 217, 218, 248, 256, 257, 258, behaving with respect to, 216 f, fear of, 252
 Continuous (تسلسل), 75, 81, 97
 Criticism, 255, 256, 257, 258
 Damascus, 27
 Defect—in essence, 242, in quality, 242.
 Desire, 45, 46, 47, 77, 78, 80, 81, 91, 133, 187, 188
 Devil, 213, 291
 al-Dhahabī, 6
 Dhukwān, 298
 Dīn, 267
 Disliking satire, 252, care of, 252f, treatment of, 255f
 Diyā' al-Dīn, 10, 11
 Diyā' al-Dīn 'Umar, 1
 East and West, 243, 244
 Entity, 36
 Essence, 63, 77, 78, 88, 99, 181, 187, 226, 242
 Eternity, 36, 48, 61, 64, 68
 Eve, 292
 Evil, 45, 188, 218, 277, 244
 Excellence—degrees of, 195f; 242, 244, 246, 249, 250, 252, 253, 254, 257, 270
 Existence, 51, 63, 65, 77, 79
 Existents, 43, 44, 65
 'Explicit faith', 289
 Faḍā'il, 197
 Faḍl Allah, 197.
 al-Fārābī, 4, 11, 17, 27
 Fatwa, 233

- Fiqh, 288
 Firuza Koh, 14
 Galen, 29, 119, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 134, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141
 Generosity, 204, 206, 213, 214, nature of, 217, 218, 253, 257
 Generous, 205, 219
 Ghaznīn, 9, 14, 27
 Ghazzālī, 1, 4, 17, 26, 27, 28
 Ghiyāth al-Dīn, (Sultān), 10
 Gnostic, 227, absorption in, 292
 Grace, 246, 262, 263
 Greed, 202
 Habit, 44, 51, 187, 188
 Hadā'iq al-Anwār fi Haqā'iq al-Asrār, 23
 Haḍrat 'Ayyishah, 299
 Hajj, 247, 303, 313
 Hajjī Khalīfah, 25, 26
 Happiness, 252, 253, 257, 261, 263, 264
 Hārīth al-Muhāsibī, 290, 294, 298
 Herāt, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 14
 Husain Kharmīl, 14
 Hypocrisy, 35, 243, 267; of worldly affairs, 267; of Dīn, 272; pillars of, 268, 269, 270; ranks of, 271; law of, 267-272; of concealed, 279; signs, 279, 280, 281; concealed and manifest of, 284; nullification of deed, 284, 285; motive of, 287, 288; treatment of, 289, 304; 305, 306, 313, 315
 Hypocrite, 122
 'Ibādat, 271
 Ibn Abi 'Uṣaybi'ah, 23
 Ibn Bājjah, 27
 Ibn Furak, 17
 Ibn Hajar, 12, 21
 bn Hibbān, 298, 299
 Ibn Khallikān, 2, 3
 Ibn Mājah, 216
 Ibn Mas'ūd, 285, 297, 298, 299
 Ibn al-Qifī, 2
 Ibn Rushd, 27
 Ibn al-Ṣalāh, 19
 Ibn Sīnā, 4, 5, 11, 17, 25, 27, 28, 164
 Ibn al-Subki, 3, 13
 Ibn Taimiyah Taqī al-Dīn Shaikh, 5, 12, 16, 17
 Ibn Tufail, 27
 Iḥya' 'Ulūm al-Dīn, 26, 28, 197, 200, 201, 211, 212, 216, 224, 231, 232, 236, 241, 247, 251, 259, 260, 265, 266, 274-77, 282-283, 297-302, 307, 308, 311-12, 320
 al-Ikhtibārāt al-'Alā'iyyah, 13
 al-Iksir fi 'Ilm al-Tafsīr, 12
 al-Ikhtiyārāt al-'Alā'iyyah, 23
 Image, 243
 Imagination, 46, 90
 Imām Aḥmad, 271
 Imāmat, 313, 316
 Imām Ghazzālī, 197, 211, 216, 224, 228, 229, 241, 248, 251, 262, 271, 282, 289, 307, 317
 Imām Muslim, 283, 297, 299, 307, 311
 Imām Rāzī, 277, 282, 297, 298
 Imām Trimidhī, 216
 Imārat, 316, 317, 318
 Impression, 229, 230, 242, 246, 254, 286
 'Inner evil thought', 289
 Intellect, 43, 44, 45, 48, 49, 67, 70, 112, 114, 122, 133, 152, 156, 167, 175, 181, 187, 188
 Ismā'il ibn M.J. al-'Ajalūnī, 311
 Isnād, 216
 'Istihzā', 277

- 'Istikhfāf', 277
 I'tiqād Firaq al-Muslimin wa'l-Mushrikīn, 23
 I'zz al-Dīn, 10
 Jāh, 220, 224
 Jābir ibn 'Abd Allah al-Bijlī, 307
 Jesus-Christ, 190
 Jihād, 303
 Joseph, 235, 293
 Kamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Mikā'il, 23
 al-Kamāl al-Simnānī, 2
 Karrām, 22
 Kashf al-Khaṭā' wa Muzil al-Albās 'ammā ashtahara min al-Aḥādīth 'alā alsinat al-Nās, 311
 Kay Khusro, 250
 Khair, 197
 Khilāfat, 313, 316, 317, 318
 Khurāsān, 2, 14, 23 (Sāmiyān), 27
 Khawarizm, 2, 3, 22, 23 (Bāmiyān), 27
 Kitāb al Najāt, 25
 Knowledge, 227, 228, 229, 234, 272, 280, 284; of Allah, 296
 Love, 48, 52, 78, 181
 Loved perse, 202
 Lubāb al-Ishārāt, 1
 Lust, 206, 207
 Maḥmūd ibn Labid, 278
 Majd al-Dīn Muḥarrāf b. Mu'ayyad, 22
 Makhdūma, 218
 Malāmatīyah, 248
 Manliness, 199, 217, 219
 Manner bad, 256
 Marāghah, 2
 Matter, 65, 167
 Māwarā' al-Nahr (Transoxiana), 2
The Meaning of the Glorious Koran, 29
 Miser, 201, 205, 206, 207, 213, 214, 219, 220
 Miserliness, 202, 204; treatment of, 213, 214, 215; nature of, 217, 218, 219
 Misery, 199, 208, 255
 Morals, 26, 37, 83
 Movement, 91, 111, 128, 129, 131, 132, 136, 139, 140, 141, 148, 149
 Mu'āwiyah, 20
 Mu'ayyid al-Mulk, 7
 Muḥammad al-'Alā'i, 25
 Muḥammad b. Ḥasan, 13
 Muḥammad ibn Takush (Khwārazm shāh), 2, 12, 22
 Muḥammad ibn Zakariyyā al-Rāzī, 4, 164
 Muḥammad Marmaduke Pickthall, 29.
K. al-Muḥassal, 1
 Mujāhadah, 264
 Mullā Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, 4, 28
 Murād, 246
 Murid, 246
K. al-Nafs wa'l-Rūh, 6, 24, 25, 26
 al-Najm al-Tawfi, 21
 Narrowness, 217, 218
 Naṣir a-Dīn al-Tūsī, 4, 28
 Nature, 43, 137
 Need, 198, 203, 208, 209, 213, 234; needy, 213, 234; spiritual, 213, 234; corporal, 234f
 Negation, 97, 113
 Niggardliness, 210, 214, 215; niggardly, 217
 Nishāpur, 4
 Niyyat, 287, 298
 Nūr al-Dīn al-Ṣābūnī, 9
 Obedience dis-obedience, 262; permission to intend to manifest of, 303ff

- Pain, 48, 49, 50, 76, 82, 107, 178, 179, 180, 182, 183, 185, 186, 189, 245, 246, 247, 255
 Palpable, 133
 Panegyric, 237, 238, 252
 Passion, 26, 68, 102, 187
 Peace, 244
 Perception, 120, 131, 136, 139, 140, 141
 Perfection, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 169, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 179, 186, 190; 198, 202, 221, 222; real and whimsical, 226, 227, 228, 230, 234, 237, 238, 239, 241, 242, 261
 Phantasy, 149
 Pleasure, 35, 48, 49, 50, 76, 77, 80, 81, 82, 83, 107, 108, 109, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 187, 188, 189, 207, 208, 237-39, 244, 245, 247, 248, 261, 271, 285-87, 290, 313, 318
 Plato, 164
 Position, 218; worldly love of, 220, 221, 223, 229, 230, 233, 234; research for, 235, 236, 242; treatment of, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 254, 269, 270, 271, 272; achievement of, 244; pleasure of, 245; possessor of, 245f; 317
 Power, 228, 229, 238, 239, 240, 242, 270, 289
 Praise, 204, 213, 221; reason for loving praise, 237-240; expectation of praise, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257; difference in behaving with respect to, 261-63; impression of, 263; position of praiser, 263-64; dislike of, 264; 286, 318
 Pride, 214, 215, 253, 254
 Prophet, 204, 205, 213, 257, 270, 273, 281, 286, 289, 292, 309, 316
 Pure manifestations, 81
 Qaḍa, 313, 317
 Qiyām, 270
 Al-Qutb al-Taughānī, 19
 Qur'an, 287
 al-Qurtubī, 21
 Radī al-Dīn Nishāpūrī, 9
 Rāfi' ibn Khadīj, 278
 al-Rāghīb al-Isfahānī, 28, 29
 Rāzī, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
 Rayy-jibāl, 1, 2, 3, 13, 14, 27
 Reason, 27, 35, 87, 119
 Record, 48
 Remembrance of Allah, 294, 295, 296; of Satan, 294-98
 Revelation, 27, 35, 69, 87, 119
 igteousness, 295
Al-Risālah al-Kamāliyyah fi 'l-Haqā'iq al-'Ilāhiyyah, 23
Risālah Munazarāt, 9
 Riyā, 267, 298, 300
 Rizq, 197
 Rukn al-Dīn, 7
 Rukū', 270
 Sa'ādah, 197
 Ṣadaqāt, 199
 Ṣaḥīḥ, 299
 Sajjādah, 269
 Ṣalāh al-Dīn, 8
 Ṣalāt, 287, 288, 313
 Samarkand, 9
 Satan, 262, 290, 291, 292, 293; caution about, 294, 295, 296, 314, 315
 Satire, 237; Cure of disliking satire, 252, 258; treatment of, 255f
 Savant, 214
 Ṣawm, 287-313
 Self admiration, 253

- Shaddād ibn Aaws, 278
 Shāfi'ī, 2
 Shahādat, 313
 Shaikh al Ishrāq, 9
al-Shāmil fi 'Uṣūl al-Dīn, 2
 Sharaf al-Dīn ibn 'Unain, 3, 4, 15
 Sharaf al-Dīn Mas'ūdī, 9
 Shar', 219
 Sharī'ah, 281, 294, 317
 Shu'ab al-Imān, 298
 Shaykh Najm al-Dīn al-Kubrā,
 15, 16
 Shihāb al-Dīn Ghori, 3, 5, 7, 14,
 22, 23
 Sign of distinction, 305
 Sins, concealment of, 309; permis-
 sion of, 309
Al-Sirr al-Maktūm fi-'al-Sihr wa
Mukhāṭabāt al-Nujūm, 12
 Slave, 218, 246, 273, 280, 281, 284,
 289.
 Soul, 25, 35, 65, 81, 83, 87, 90,
 92, 96, 97, 100, 101, 102, 103,
 107, 108, 109, 115, 119, 120, 121,
 125-129, 152, 154, 155, 156, 157
 158, 164, 165, 166, 167, 169, 180
 187, 195-97, 210, 214, 218; pas-
 sive action of, 219, 228, 229, 230,
 237, 242, 243, 245, 247, 250, 257,
 258, 290, 291, 315, 316, 318
 Spirit, 25, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 78,
 79, 80, 82, 109, 110, 120, 127,
 132, 133, 152, 180, 205, 206,
 220, 222
 Sufi, 229
 Sujūd, 270
 Sultan Maḥmūd, 14
 Sum'ah, 267
 Sunnah, 269
Ṭabaqāt, 3, 13
Talwīḥāt, 9
Taḍkīrah al-Kindīyah, 7
 Tafsir, 228
al-Tafsir al-Kabir (Maṣāṭih al-Ghalīb),
 1, 26, 197
 Taṣawwuf, 269
Tāṣīs al-Taḥdīs or Asās al-Taḥdīs,
 23
 Time, 36
 Tirmidhi, 298
 'Umar (R), 20, 21
 'Umrah, 303
 'Uḥmān (R), 20
 Virtue, 217, 249
 Wealth-Love of, 195, 196, Praise of,
 197, 198, 199, method of using of
 for spiritual bliss, 298f; 202, 203,
 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 210, 213,
 214, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, Love
 for, 222, 223, Causes: reasons,
 222f. 229, 230, 233, 234, 235,
 242, 254, 267, 269, 318
 Whims, 254, 289
 Wilāyit, 313
 Wisdom, 43, 48, 51, 52, 119
 Zakāt, 199, 217
 Zuhd, 271